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The first case was called the other day before His Honour, Judge 
Twinfeet, who was attired in a robe of poplin green. He 'opened' that 
abstraction, the 'proceedings', by expressing the hope that there would 
not be too much jargon. 'Justice is a simple little lady', he added, 'not to 
be overmuch besmeared with base Latinities. ' 
In the first case the plaintiffs sought a plenary injunction for trespass, 
a declaration of fief in agro and other relief The defense was a traverse 
of the field as well as the pleadings and alternatively it was contended 
that the plaintiffs were estopped by graund playsaunce. 
Mr Juteclaw for the defendants, said that at the outset he wished to 
enter four caveats in feodo. His statutory declarations were registered 
that morning and would be available for the plaintiffs on payment of the 
usual stamp duty. He asked for a dismiss. 
His Honour said that he observed that there was no Guard in court 
to prove certain maps and measurements. That was a serious matter; it 
showed disrespect to the court. 
Mr Juteclaw said there were no maps in the case; if the plaintiffs 
intended to produce maps, he was entitled to 18 days' clear notice and 
viaticum for engrossment. 
Mr Faix, for the plaintiffs, said he knew of no maps; he had received 
no instructions as to maps. 
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His Honour said he would let the matter pass, but for the future it 
must be understood that there must be a Guard in court to prove maps; 
one never knew when a map would be produced, he added.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it was clearly present in much of twentieth-century 
jurisprudence, and indeed was momentarily quite fashionable towards 
the fin de siecle, it never found its name, and it never quite came out 
on its own.2 Satirical legal studies will be defined initially as the 
humorous pillorying of the pretensions of law and lawyers.3 It is more 
than parody, burlesque, or simple humor, in that satire implies ridicule 
of folly and vices that have a social significance and ill effect.4 In the 
words of one early common law reformer, the end of "satyr . . . is 
reformation,"5 and in this sense it has always been an important 
component in movements for abolition or change in the methods and 
practices of law. In the last century, satire played a varying yet visible 
1. MYLES NA GOPALEEN (FLANN O'BRIEN), THE BEST OF MYLES 137-38 (1968) 
[hereinafter O'BRIEN, BEST OF MYLES]. 
2. Satirical legal studies has almost entirely shunned the adjectival and has been 
expressed only in the practice. However, there are the occasional asides or footnotes. The 
one practitioner who was also a commentator on the genre is Karl Llewellyn, who calls 
attention to "one fascinating facet of modem Jurisprudence: the reintroduction into that 
field of satirical and ironical writing." Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer 
Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1940) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Reading], reprinted 
in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 162 (1962). That, however, is about all he says, 
beyond referring to his own inspirations in Jonathan Swift, or the figure of Professor 
Tuefelsdrockh and his Heuschrecke, or philosophy of clothes, elaborated upon to exquisite 
effect in THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS (Univ. of Cal. Press 2000) (1865). 
Llewellyn imitated Carlyle in the pseudonymous D.J. Swift Tuefelsdrockh, Jurisprudence, 
The Crown of Civilization. Being also the Principles of Writing Jurisprudence Made Clear to 
Neophytes, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Neophytes] .  The author of 
the latter was, of course, Llewellyn. 
3. The various genres of satire, and their legal equivalents will be discussed throughout. 
Initially, I will simply note three of the more important studies. C.A. VAN ROOY, STUDIES IN 
CLASSICAL SATIRE AND RELATED LITERARY THEORY (1965), provides an expansive 
introduction to etymological and philological issues related to the meaning and genres of the 
satirical. MICHAEL COFFEY, ROMAN SATIRE (2d ed., Bristol Classical Press 1989) (1976) 
provides an excellent account of the Roman satirists and their schools. JOHN DRYDEN, A 
DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL AND PROGRESS OF SATIRE (1693), reprinted in 2 
ESSAYS OF JOHN DRYDEN 5 (W.P. Ker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1926), provides a fine 
overview of the conflicting traditions of poetic satire. 
4. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY: A MODERN SELECTION 357 (E.L. McAdam, Jr. & George 
Milne eds., 3d prtg. 1963) defines satire as work in which folly or vices are exposed to 
ridicule. For legal discussion of the distinction between satire and parody, see Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. , 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994), where Justice Souter notes that "parody 
often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts." 
5. DANIEL DEFOE, A TRUE COLLECTION OF THE WRmNGS OF THE AUTHOR OF THE 
TRUE BORN ENGLISHMAN, at fol. AS (London, Croft 1703). He adds a ditty to the same 
effect somewhat later: "For Penitence would all his verse disarm, I The Satyr's answer'd if 
the man reform." 
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role in scholarly movements critical of law ranging from legal realism 
to law and economics, from legal anthropology to critical legal studies. 
The accessibility and humor of satirical legal studies afforded it 
unusual scope. Satire transcended the established political and 
doctrinal boundaries that defined legal studies. It moved between the 
professional, the popular and the arcane, the public and the eruditely 
esoteric. In varying forms, satirical studies of law allowed for the 
recuperation and revision of a marginal yet potent genre of classical 
jurisprudence, associated most obviously with Cicero's noted 
propensity for deflationary jokes.6 But most of these innovations were 
implicit rather than selfconscious; the movement to use satire as part 
of the scholarly armature of legal debate never mastered the 
technique's conscious deployment, thus dampening its effectiveness. 
With the time and distance made available by the turn of the twenty­
first century, it is now possible to connect the dots and sketch the face 
of an understudied but important genre of legal studies. Though it 
dates back to the classics, to the poetry, glosses, art and emblems of 
the earliest Western lawyers, I will look at it here mainly in its 
twentieth-century manifestation. Satirical legal studies is perhaps most 
closely connected to leftist critiques of law, but it is far from restricted 
to them. Anatole France, for example, is much cited by radical legal 
theorists for his satirical observation that "[t)he majestic equality of 
the laws . . .  forbid[ s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg 
in the streets, and to steal their bread."7 That ironic theme has many 
variants within radical legal theory but it is by no means confined to 
those complaining about the inequities of law. At the same time, and 
just to show that there are no easy political boundaries to satirical legal 
studies, Judge Richard Posner, the progenitor and scion of law and 
economics, devoted a book to satirizing the pretensions of lawyers and 
others. 8 In Public Intellectuals he excoriates the aggrandizing claims of 
public-intellectual lawyers, showing, for example, that the opinions of 
Professor Akhil Amar, a leading constitutional law scholar, on the 
2000 U.S. election debacle were of no greater relevance to reality than 
6. 2 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 439, 441 (T.E. Page et al. eds., H.E. Butler 
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1933) (1921). 
7. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILLY 91 (Frederic Chapman ed., Winifred Stephens 
trans., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1925) (1894). For elaboration of this position, see THE POLITICS 
OF LAW: A PROGRESSivE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); Sammy Adelman & Ken 
Foster, Critical Legal Theory: The Power of Law, in THE CRITICAL LAWYERS' HANDBOOK 
39 (Ian Grigg-Spall & Paddy Ireland eds., 1992); Alan Hunt, Marxism, Law, Legal Theory 
and Jurisprudence, in DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 102 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1991). 
8. RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001) 
(hereinafter POSNER, INTELLECTUALS}. 
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literary critic Elaine Scarry's theory that airplane crashes are caused 
by bad vibrations.9 
While the critical legal studies movement and subsequent work in 
gender and race theory are the most visible moments in late twentieth­
century satirical legal studies, the excitement and importance of the 
long-term movement lies precisely in its ability to transcend the 
boundaries of any particular sect or intersection. For every article with 
a title taken from a recent movie,10 or rock-oriented complaint 
jurisprudence that borrows a name such as Tina Turner and links it to 
law,11 there is a prosaic equivalent of the erudite ilk of Kenneth 
Lasson's Scholarship Amok.12 A piece such as Michael Fischl's widely 
read essay, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies,13 which 
satirically defends the critique of law, has its many counterparts in 
apparently sober 14 and not-so-sober 15 deliberations on the footnote or 
seemingly serious accounts of the relation of law to phrenology.16 
There is the reductio ad absurdum, the blank page or the almost-blank 
page, that usually comes with a satirical footnote. 17 There is the main 
9. Id. at 39, 92; see also Elaine Scarry, Swissair llI, TWA 800, and Electronmagnetic 
Interference, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2000, at 92. MARJORIE GARBER, ACADEMIC 
INSTINCTS 30-31 (2001), also discusses the Elaine Scarry case in terms of academic 
tendencies towards boundary crossing or traveling outside their competence. 
10. There are many. E.g. , David Gray Carlson, Duel/ism in Modern American 
Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1999) (taking its theme from the Ridley Scott movie 
The Duellists); Peter Goodrich, Sleeping With The Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical 
Legal Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389 (1993) [hereinafter Goodrich, Sleeping] 
(borrowing the title of the eponymous movie) . 
11. E.g., Gary Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N.M. L. REV. 479 
(1986). 
12. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); see also Penelope Pether, Discipline and Punish: Despatches from 
the Citation Manual Wars and Other (Literally) Unspeakable Stories, 10 GRIFFITH L. REV. 
101 (2001); Dan Subotnik & Glen Lazar, Deconstructing the Rejection Letter: A Look at 
Elitism in Article Selection, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 601 (1999). 
13. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & 
Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992). 
14. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989). More broadly, on the 
history and uses of footnotes, see ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE FOOTNOTE: A CURIOUS 
HISTORY (1997). 
15. There is a huge humorous miscellany on the footnote and the law review, dating 
back at least to the acknowledgments in K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME 
LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH]. For 
more recent instances, see, for example, Aside, Don't Cry Over Filled Milk: The Neglected 
Footnote Three to Carolene Products, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (1988), and its sequel, Aside, 
Challenging Law Review Dominance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1601 (2001). See also NEIL 
DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE (2001) (arguing that there is an 
inverse relation between number of citations and degree of influence); Robert A. James, Are 
Footnotes in Opinions Given Full Precedential Effect?, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 267 (1999). 
16. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997). 
17. Erik M. Jensen, The Shortest Article in Law Review History, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156 
(2000); Grant H. Morris, The Shortest Article in Law Review History: A Brief Response to 
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text which literally falls into a footnote,18 and there are texts that 
appear in pictures, and pictures that appear in law reviews.19 Satirical 
legal studies takes no one form, and its gems are often buried in the 
interstices of articles on the most somber of substantive doctrines. 
Granted the diffusion of satirical legal studies, and accepting as we 
must that it can only ever be a partial construction elaborated 
diversely from the fragments and incidents of earlier texts, this Article 
is necessarily exploratory rather than definitive. If the tone of most 
twentieth-century criticism of law could be captured in the notion of 
complaint jurisprudence, and tends towards both earnestness and 
verbosity, the satirical legal texts that will be studied here are 
distinctive by virtue not only of a certain ease of access but also by dint 
of the eloquence of humor.20 It has given us the serried wit of the legal 
realists, Fred Rodell's farewell to law reviews,21 the jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court that says "NI!" or "Neeeow . . .  wum ... ping,"22 
Arthur Leff's imaginary anthropology of the hermaphroditic Jondo,23 
Scott Shapiro concisely incisive on the fear of theory, or the distinction 
between the obvious and the odious,24 and Dennis Arrow's dictionary 
of legal "pomobabble."25 It has poked fun at us with the 
pseudomelancholic lament of an animal law enthusiast complaining 
that the Buffalo Law Review contains no studies of buffalo law.26 In a 
Professor Jensen, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 310 (2000); Thomas H. Odom, A Response to 
Professors Jensen and Morris, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2000); Erik M. Jensen, Comments in 
Reply, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 312 (2000). On the other side of the pond, there is Angus H. 
MacDonald, 23 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 221 (2001), offering an entirely blank page, free even of 
any footnote but unable to resist attribution in the form of a name and institutional 
affiliation. 
18. Keith Aoki & Garrett Epps, Dead lines, Break downs & Troubling The Legal Subject 
Or "Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Meta, " 73 OR. L. REV. 551 (1994). 
19. As, for instance, David Carlson, Cartoon, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 776 (1976); Keith Aoki, 
P.l.E.R.R.E. and the Agents of R.E.A.S.0.N., 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 743 (2003). 
20. Giinter Frankenberg, Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 360 (1989) (observing the rise of humorous critiques of law). 
21. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936) [hereinafter 
Rodell, Goodbye]; Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 
(1962). 
22. Kim Lane Schepelle, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election and the 
Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361,  1437 (2000). 
23. Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978). Lester J. Mazor, uses a similar 
technique of criticism and to comparably telling effect. See Lester Mazor, Some Recent 
Discoveries Concerning the Modern State, BLACK ROSE, Summer 1979, at 15. 
24. Scott Shapiro, Fear of Theory, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 389 (1997). 
25. Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional 
"Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) [hereinafter Arrow, 
Pomobabble]. Reprised, often all too literally, in Dennis W. Arrow, Spaceball (or, Not 
Everything That's Left is Postmodern), 54 VAND. L. REV. 2381 (2001). 
26. Eric M. Jensen, A Call for a New Buffalo Law Scholarship, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 433 
(1990). 
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more literary vein, critical jurisprudence has devised the 
"whiskoletterosmotron" method for reading texts - loosely drink 
some whisky and see how the textual meanings break down.27 It has 
noted stupid lawyer tricks,28 mocked the idiosyncrasies of legal dress,29 
excoriated the legal form,3 0 and put Freud on the couch as a failed law 
professor.3 1  It has produced the Lizard,32 the Reptile,33 and Casual 
Legal Studies,34 as well as critical legal studies. It has given us Ronald 
Dworkin the movie,3 5 the lost maxims of Equity,3 6 the University of 
Rutland School of Law,37 the fallacies of Xanadu,3 8 and baseball and 
legal theory.3 9 It has devised the figures of the bad man,40 the 
27. COSTAS DOUZJNAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN 
THE TEXTS OF LAW 267 (1991). 
28. Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1618 (1996). 
29. Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes, and Legal Change, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 1129 (1995). 
30. Charles M. Y ablon, Forms, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
258 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
31. Charles Yablon, Freud as Law Professor: An Alternative History, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1439 (1995). 
32. There were three issues of the Lizard, published from January 1984 to July 1984; and 
then the Lizard Reborn was published as an annual from 1986 to 1988. Thanks to Duncan 
Kennedy and Jack Schlegel for providing copies. 
33. The Reptile was published at irregular intervals from February 1987 through 
February 1988. Many thanks to Amy Shapiro for copies. 
34. LUKE COLE ET AL., CASUAL LEGAL STUDIES: ART DURING LAW SCHOOL (1989 & 
Supp. 1990) (collecting bitingly dismissive and self-critical cartoon strips). 
35. Allan C. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637 (1987) 
(book review) (hereinafter Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin). 
36. Eugene Volokh, Lost Maxims of Equity, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619 (2002). The lost 
maxims, ironically enough, were actually coauthored by Professor Dolinko. See Eugene 
Vololkh, Eugene Volokh Replies, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309 (2003); see also Kenneth S. 
Gallant, Letter to the Editors, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 308 (2003) (responding to the original 
article). 
37. University of Rutland School of Law, named after a county in England that was 
erased from the map during an administrative revision of counties in the 1970's, appears 
prominently in chapter four of WILLIAM TwINING, BLACKSTONE'S TOWER: THE ENGLISH 
LAW SCHOOL 64-90 (1994) (hereinafter TwINING, BLACKSTONE'S); and again in William 
Twining, Thinking About Law Schools: Rutland Reviewed, 25 J.L. & SOC'Y 1 (1998) 
(hereinafter Twining, Rutland Reviewed). 
38. Twining, Rutland Reviewed, supra note 37, at 8-13. 
39. Most famously, Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
1979, at A23, reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT 
COVER 249 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992). The history is well covered in Charles Yablon, 
On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227 (1994) 
(hereinafter Yablon, Baseball). 
40. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) [hereinafter 
Holmes, Path of the Law). 
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normativo,41 the jurismaniac,42 the professor embalmed in footnote 
233,43 the rigor mortis professor of law,44 the antilawyer,45 inter­
pretative "bouillabaisse,"46 and the trasher and the trashed.47 It has 
41. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 168 (1990) 
[hereinafter Schlag, Normative]. 
42. PAUL CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998). 
43. Pierre Schlag, My Dinner at Langdell's, 52 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
44. This unseemly, or more properly, splenetic piece came out in the Harvard Law 
Revue, an occasional and usually humorous spoof issue of the Law Review which is normally 
produced for circulation at the annual law review dinner. I looked at a copy of this issue 
when it came out, on the eve of the Critical Legal Conference at Harvard in 1990, but have 
never been able to obtain a copy. It was something of a scandal and was withdrawn from 
circulation by the insistence of the Faculty - at least that was my impression - almost 
immediately after production. This footnote, I guess, is outside of the Bluebook and can only 
be verified by the Harvard Law Review itself. I will make a note to write them on the issue, 
but I don't have high hopes of any response. In fact, final proofs, last pages, I still don't have 
a reply from them. Isn't that a pretty pass, a moral decline, a failure to respect professional 
correspondence. A sign of the times, sic transit jurisprudentia, and all that. Or perhaps I 
forgot to write them. But I will say that my research librarian hasn't been able to come up 
with anything. And I do correspond, on and off, more off than on in fact, with a colleague at 
Harvard Law School, who has answered all my questions save that one. Wouldn't even tell 
me over lunch. Very upsetting. And so I have only memory to rely on, the naked eye to 
report from, no object to proffer as proof. No use at all according to the MLR style gurus, 
and CCC 4 (i) (2) (3), or some other acrostic of a multi-lettered sub sub sub rosa rule with 
which they keep bombarding me says doubtless that this won't do. I could unpack that a bit, 
here in a footnote, will have to in fact as even I am not so oblivious as to imagine that any 
lengthier or more visible discussion would make it into the text because, after all, there could 
not be any verified, touched, personally handled, and guaranteed footnotes to the original, 
the missing text from the Harvard Law Revue itself. What is a historian of satirical legal 
studies to do? Must one accept Harvard Law School's right to dictate the terms of its own 
history and to hide certain unsavory items or events from public purvi.ew? That seems very 
French and not American at all. In any event we have to challenge this claim that the past be 
erased. Here, oral history, my own memory, will have to serve. The Revue published a biting 
parody of Mary Joe Frug's piece on postmodern legal feminism which had appeared, 
obviously after a heated Editorial Board debate, in Harvard Law Review. Mary Joe Frug, A 
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992). Frug's law review 
article came out not that long after her very untimely and unexplained death - she was 
stabbed by an unknown assailant in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Revue piece took 
satirical advantage of the morbid circumstances surrounding the publication of the Frug 
article. The spoof's title was along the lines of "What Has a Girl Got to Do to Get Published 
in Harvard Law Review?", so I recall. It was not a very sensitive title or, in my view, from 
what I saw, a particularly witty piece. That said, it is symptomatically of great interest, a very 
forceful and direct expression of conservative outrage, and a very visible representation of 
hostility towards feminism and postmodemism, a hostility that would more often - in 
publishing terms - be exercised discreetly, in a more politic manner, and to more subtle and 
liquid effect. The only footnote I have seen to Harvard Law Revue, incidentally, and thus a 
secondary source of proof of its existence, and the dead of course can neither be disproved 
nor divested of their footnotes, comes along with a reference to Yale Law Jumble, and is in 
Llewellyn, On Reading, supra note 2, at 612 n.33. This refers to "the little circulated Harvard 
Law Revue, and Yale Law Jumble," which "spasmodically appear." Id. Which reference to 
spasms would seem in this context to get it proleptically and uncannily right. But that is 
another footnote and I need to stop here. 
45. DAVID SAUNDERS, ANTI-LAWYERS: RELIGION AND THE CRITICS OF LAW AND 
STATE (1997). 
46. Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (with Suggestions 
on how to Make a Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850 (1985) (discussing Stanley Fish). 
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offered the stories of Hercules,48 Geneva Crenshaw,49 and the youthful 
Rodrigo.5 0 At the same time it has offered up the Diary of a Law 
Professor,51 the biographical narratives of legal feminism,5 2 the oral 
histories and alternative rhetoric of critical race theory,5 3 A Lawyer's 
'Alice',54 a view of sales from the back of a horse,5 5 the philosophy of 
legal naming,5 6 the pseudonym Gil Grantmore,5 7 a study of legislation 
applied to canine contraception,5 8 and much, much more. 
That is already quite a list, and a fairly large number of footnotes. 
It will give the citecheckers something to get started on, and it 
provides a useful conspectus of the scope and ecumenical character of 
the satirical legal tradition. It proves that I am very open-minded, and 
it allows for some preliminary observations on methodological 
protocol. First off, because this article will analyze a more or less 
inexplicit dimension of the legal tradition, satirical legal studies will be 
47. See Alan David Freeman & John Henry Schlegel, Sex, Power, and Silliness: An 
Essay on Ackerman 's Reconstructing American Law, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 847 (1985) (the 
exemplar of trashing). As an instance of the trashers trashed, see Paul D. Carrington, Of 
Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). Paul Carrington argues that Roberto 
Unger's manifesto for critical legal studies was unreadable and that as apostates the critical 
legal scholars should resign from law school. An earlier version of the same debate took 
place concerning the nihilism of the realists. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1995) [hereinafter DUXBURY, PATTERNS] ; Charles Fried, 
Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 331 (1988). For satirical 
self-trashing, see Trashers Trashed!: Audience Rebels Against CLS Panel, LIZARD, Jan. 7, 
1984, at 1-2, and REPTILE, Mar. 18, 1987, showing an advertisement reading, "You can send 
Roberto to grammar school," and requesting donations toward helping Roberto learn the 
rudiments of stylistic accessibility. 
48. Hercules appears first, and without any apparent satirical intention, in RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 115 (1978), and reappears with a vengeance in 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE] . 
49. Geneva Crenshaw appears first in Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term -
Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1985). 
50. Rodrigo appears first in Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 
(1992) (review essay). 
51. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (hereinafter 
WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY] . 
52. My favorite example, for no good reason, is Anne Bottomley, Theory Is a Process 
Not an End: A Feminist Approach to the Practice of Theory, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
LAW THEORY 25 (Janice Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 2000). See also CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997). 
53. For an interesting reflection on this theme, see Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, 
Myth and Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self, 40 How. L.J. 1 (1996). 
54. Glanville L. Williams, A Lawyer's 'Alice', 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 171 (1946). 
55. K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939). 
56. Peter Goodrich, The Omen in Nomen: An Exemplary Dictionary of Legal Names, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1309 (2003) [hereinafter Goodrich, Omen in Nomen]. 
57. Gil Grantmore, Lex and the City, 91 GEO. L.J. 913 (2003). 
58. Note, Man, His Dog and Birth Control: A Study in Comparative Rights, 70 YALE L.J. 
1205 (1961 ). 
406 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:397 
defined as limited to the work of lawyers. There are obviously very 
important diatribes, parodies, parables, japes, quips, jocastic 
interventions, facetious digressions, ludic excursions, splenetic 
episodes, and polemical squibs authored by legally informed non­
lawyers but, among other things, it would be quite unfair to the 
citecheckers to be using materials from the main library or other such 
arcane and distant sources. More than that, the requirements of 
coherence and the constraints of finitude suggest that while the great 
satirical works of literature often address law, their impact needs to be 
assessed in the form of their manifestation in the work of lawyers. 
Jonathan Swift's finely criminal suggestion that supernumerary babies 
be processed and sold as leather, food, and glue,59 for example, 
arguably gains legal expression in Landes and Posner's piece on the 
economics of the baby shortage.6() So, at least, one can claim. And 
Rabelais's dice-throwing judge in Gargantua and Pantagruel appears 
many times in legal forms.6 1 For example, a thoroughly Rabelasian 
tone is adopted by the satirical theater of the Basoche, the literary 
progeny of alienated fifteenth-century French law clerks.6 2 Much later, 
Professor Duxbury's Random Justice develops a similar satirical 
theme: Why not decide cases by lot, by a throw of the dice?6 3 On the 
other hand, the immortal reports of Myles na Gopaleen from The 
Cruiskeen Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction can be highly recommended 
but are simply without legal peers. 64 That is how it is, and the point, I 
guess, is that we cannot cover everything. 
59. JONATHAN SWIFT, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Ireland from 
Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country, in SATIRES AND PERSONAL WRITINGS 19 
(William Alfred Eddy ed., 1932). 
60. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner , The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). For commentary, see Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, 
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, .52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979), and 
Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1449 (1986). For Posner's apologia of his position, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND 
REASON 410 (1992), and Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing 
Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989). 
61. FRAN<;:OIS RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL: THE FIVE BOOKS (Jacques 
LeClercq trans., Limited Editions Club 1936) (mid-1500s). 
62. On the theatre of the Basoche, see JODY ENDERS, RHETORIC AND THE ORIGINS OF 
MEDIEVAL DRAMA (1992); HOWARD GRAHAM HARVEY, THE THEATRE OF THE 
BASOCHE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE LAW SOCIETIES TO FRENCH MEDIAEVAL COMEDY 
(1941); S. LYSYK, MAKING A FARCE OUT OF JUSTICE: THEATRICALITY & LAW LITERATURE 
& CRIME IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE (forthcoming 2005). 
63. NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE (1999). 
64. O'BRIEN, BEST OF MYLES, supra note 1. Further reports are contained in FLANN 
O'BRIEN, FuRTHER CUTTINGS FROM THE CRUISKEEN LAWN (1988). On the legal 
significance of Fiann O'Brien, see Joseph Brooker, £stopped by Grand Playsaunce: Fiann 
O'Brien 's Post-Colonial Lore, 31 J.L. & SOC'Y 15, at 34-37 (2004). 
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Second, and in a similar vein to the first protocol, the merely 
humorous and the miscellaneous will be excluded. The humorous 
certainly improves legal writing and arguably provides many benefits 
for law.6 5 The miscellaneous equally has virtues of freedom of 
expression and eccentricity of form, but neither genre satisfies the 
requirements, the lex operis, of satirical legal studies. I will argue that 
it is the primary virtue of satire to afflict the comfortable while 
comforting the afflicted. To be effective, hang it, to be of interest, 
satire must bite. If it is to be more than mere parody or, as Professor 
Handler, past president of the Law and Society Association, had 
occasion to remark, more than merely farting,6 6 then the incidental 
humor beloved of benignly senescent legal practitioners cannot make 
the cut. Satirical legal studies has frequently had occasion to draw 
upon the merely humorous, the ridiculous imitation or parody proper, 
the burlesque and the farcical, but its purpose, as will be illustrated in 
what follows, has to exceed simple wordplay, the merely curious, and 
the diversely miscellaneous.6 7 Thus, to subdivide, tabulate, and list in 
the manner of the legalist, the following categories will be excluded. 
First, the incidentally humorous. Take an example at random; I 
happened upon it this morning. It nicely confirms the value of random 
encounters in the library, and it also puts one in a space where that 
mythical creature, the library equivalent of the bird of Psaphon, that 
unique Jons et origo of law review style, the citechecker may be 
spotted. In a recent review, by one Dr. Ireland, of a book titled 
Regulating Lives, the following remark appears in the pre-penultimate 
sentences: "For the record it should be stated that the book is printed 
with ink on paper. I mention this because I had assumed that for the 
price asked it might be a work of hand calligraphy on the pelt of a 
member of an endangered species."6 8 This splendid metaphor both 
attacks the profit margins of contemporary publishers and indirectly 
impugns the low level of law school salaries in the Principality of 
Wales in which jurisdiction - perhaps ironically, given his name -
Dr. Ireland is a professor of law. It is a satirical enough aside but its 
lack of relation to the review makes it too marginal or incidental to 
form part of any deliberative account of the satirical as an 
epistemology of law or a rhetoric of legal argument. 
65. This point is well-argued in J.T. Knight, Comment, Humor and the Law, 1993 WIS. L. 
REV. 897 (1993). 
66. Joel F. Handler, Postmodemism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LA w & 
SOC'Y REV. 697, 727 (1992). 
67. I will assume that parody is simply writing in which "the words of an author . . .  are 
taken, and by a slight change adapted to some new purpose," JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, 
supra note 4, at 283, whereas satire uses ridicule, humor, and wit to impugn "wickedness or 
folly," and so is distinctive by virtue of its social and political purposes or effects, id. at 357. 
68. Richard W. Ireland, Book Review, 30 J.L. & SOC'Y 466, 470-71 (2003) (reviewing 
REGULATING LIVES (John McLaren et al. eds. , 2002)). 
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While Dr. Ireland, a historian and critic of legal thought, uses this 
incidental humor to caustic ends, the second subcategory of the 
miscellaneous is excluded for complacency. It is not 1:Jnusual for a 
court of law to please itself with fine phrasing, pretty parsing, or clever 
puns. In Duncan v. Black, the court delighted itself with the humorous 
simile that the plaintiff's sale of cotton allotments was the equivalent 
of selling the green cheese rights to the moon.6 9 In Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. , Chief Justice 
Traynor, to my mind rather riskily, compared his more literally 
minded brothers to Swedish peasants feeding their sick cattle pages of 
the Psalter wrapped in dough, in the hope of curing them.7 0 In a 
similarly expansive but less purposive allegorical mode, the judges in 
Textiles Unlimited, Inc. v. A. .BMH & Co. greatly entertained 
themselves by spinning a seamless yarn of woolen metaphors.7 1 In 
Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A.,  the appropriately invested Acting 
Presiding Justice Johnson posed the plaintiffs' dilemma as follows: 
'"Many millions of dollars' in anticipated profits had melted away like 
so much banana ripple ice cream on a hot summer day."72 These are all 
somewhat beside the satirical point; they amuse without informing or 
instructing to any social end or political consequence.7 3 In the same 
vein, Justice Megarry's highly entertaining Miscellany-at-Law: A 
Diversion for Lawyers and Others must rest in the miscellaneous 
69. 324 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) ("It falls into the same category as a claim 
of purchase of the green cheese monopoly on the moon."). 
70. 442 P.2d 641, 643 n.2 (Cal. 1968). The court wrote: 
The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in primitive groups; the ancient 
Egyptian myth of Khem, the apotheosis of the word, and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the 
Giver of Words and Script, the Master of Incantations; the avoidance of the name of God in 
Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and protective names in mediaeval Turkish and 
Finno-Ugrian languages; the misplaced verbal scruples of the 'Precieuses'; the Swedish 
peasant custom of curing sick cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page 
tom from the psalter and wrapped in dough. 
Id. (quoting STEPHEN ULLMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTICS 43 (1963)). For more on 
the metaphor, see infra notes 351-355 and accompanying text. 
71. 240 F.3d 781, 783-86 (9th Cir. 2001). I won't cite at any length, but note that the 
defendants were "spinning a yarn," arbitration was "looming," facts were "warp(ed)," the 
affair was "tangled," the arbitration clause had not been "woven" into the contract, 
"threads" inevitably enough ran through the case, and so on. Id. at 783-84, 786. You get the 
drift. 
72. 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
73. The most complete collection is found in CORPUS JURIS HUMOROUS: A 
COMPILATION OF HUMOROUS, EXTRAORDINARY, OUTRAGEOUS, UNUSUAL, COLORFUL, 
CLEVER AND WITTY REPORTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND RELATED MATERIALS DATING 
FROM 1256 AD. TO THE PRESENT (John 8. McClay & Wendy L. Matthews eds., 1991). 
AMICUS HUMORIAE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LEGAL HUMOR (Robert M. Jarvis et al. eds., 
2003) is also a useful source and frequently hilarious. Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the 
Laboratory: or, Can They Run Through Those Little Mazes?, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2001), is 
less humorous but provides an account of the sociological significance of lawyer jokes. 
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sphere of contexts, quips, and curiosities rather than in the more 
organized domain of satirical sallies in criticism of law and lawyers.7 4 
Third and finally, I will argue that the satirical refers to a genre, a 
mode of making statements, and not to the intention of the author. 
Thus, the seriously intended can at times be both amusing and 
satirically effective. By the same token, the satirically intended dart 
can at times be quite mundane and prosaic, let us say a simple pun or 
parody, a sneer or mock and nothing more. A mere joke is not satire, 
although of course the jocular is a part of the satirical. It probably, 
therefore, behooves me briefly to point out, this being the 
introduction, that the word satire derives from the late Latin satura, as 
in lam: satura, "full dish" or, more to our purposes, lex per saturam, 
meaning an "omnibus law" or a piece of legislation that was stuffed 
with unrelated rules.7 5 In etymological terms, the word satire suggests 
two things. It points to a lack of distinction, something too full, 
something gross, stuffed, or indistinct. Secondly, it suggests a mingling 
of things and so a failure to respect the social hierarchy or order of 
places. The satirical crosses the line, it goes beyond the pale, and it 
challenges the norm. At its best, satirical legal scholarship enlivens 
argument with the political scintilla of humor; in doing so, it offers the 
persuasive force of a theater of reason that is willing to cross 
boundaries, subvert disciplines, mix genres, and break laws. 
In terms of literary form, I will note that there is a satirical lex 
operis, or "law of genre." Just for the sake of completeness, Roman 
satire was generally censorious and boundary maintaining. It crossed 
the extant boundary so as to draw it back to a prior place. It crossed 
the boundary backwards, as it were. The satirists derided poor morals, 
religious lapses, foreign borrowings, linguistic error, bad taste, and the 
vices and follies of their day. The Roman genre ran from Ennius to 
Juvenal, 7 6  though its most famous exponent was the poet Horace. 
Roman satire - let's follow Dryden and term it "Horatian" - was 
marked variously by personal attacks, anger, acerbic criticism, 
moralism, sermonizing, and the decrying of decadence and decay. 
Horatian satire would usually attack the folly or vice of 
contemporaries in the hope of restoring a purer order or reestablishing 
74. R.E. MEGARRY, MISCELLANY-AT-LAW: A DIVERSION FORLAWYERS AND OTHERS 
(1955), is a collection of aphorisms, maxims, anecdotes and curiosities. The notion of 
diversion captures one common sense of what Shaftesbury calls the "miscellaneous taste." 
See ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, CHARACTERISTICKS OF 
MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES (Philip Ayres ed., Clarendon Press 1999) (1714). 
75. VAN ROOY, supra note 3, at 14-16. 
76. For the full gamut of sources, see the monumental GIAN BIAGIO CONTE, LATIN 
LITERATURE: A HISTORY (1994). See also VAN ROOY, supra note 3, at 30-44. 
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the prior customs, their moral boundaries, and their expressions in 
law.7 7  
The Horatian genre was poetic, polemical, and serious. It gains its 
juristic counterpart in legal apologetics or defensive works that seek to 
maintain traditional forms and established values. The Horatian 
literary mode will be compared to the Greek form of satire, dubbed 
Menippean satire after the lost work of the Cynic Menippus of 
Gadara.7 8 The latter is a more radical and political genre that has its 
roots in the bacchanalian tradition of the satyr. It is associated more 
with the body, with myth and festival rites that sought to overturn or 
move beyond the extant hierarchy or modes of law. The Menippean 
tradition is closer to invective and has its effects through irreverent 
hilaritas, or "satirical laughter." The Menippean genre differs from the 
Horatian in that it seeks to overturn so as to promote a new order or 
mode of life. It is political and generally written with a view, in one 
felicitous formulation, of making the weaker case the stronger.7 9 The 
Menippean satire was more dangerous than the Roman and would 
usually make a point to invert the order of proprieties and precedents, 
inveighing against the hierarchy of respect and recognition in the 
process. It ridicules and deflates, but it does so by promoting a new 
order rather than shoring up the old. In this regard the Menippean is 
both a broader and a more radical genre than the Horatian, and in its 
further reaches we can find not simply works of critique, but equally 
utopian and dystopian works of fiction that savagely contrast the 
present with the future.8 0 
Whatever the intention of the authors - be it to amuse, instruct, 
hurt, or destroy - I will judge their works as belonging to one or 
another genre of satire not by intent so much as product and 
perception. Humor and satire are occasioned as much by context and 
juxtaposition as they are by intent. If timing is the essence of comedy, 
then venue, reputation, and the contemporary patterns of dialogue are 
the key markers of satire. It is in this sense that the utopian work is 
often more satirical than intended, and the dystopian work is 
frequently less savage than it seems. For these reasons we can include 
within the ambit of satire the unintentional social parody, the 
incidentally ridiculous, the grandiose and the absurd, irrespective of 
77. For a recent translation of Horace's works, see THE SATIRES OF HORACE (William 
Matthews trans., 2002). 
78. On whom, see THE CYNICS: THE CYNIC MOVEMENT IN ANTIQUITY AND ITS 
LEGACY 75-76 (R. Bracht Branham & Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze eds., 1996). 
79. PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE 30 (1975). 
80. See, e.g., Frederic Jameson, The Politics of Utopia, 25 NEW LEFT REV. 35 (2004). For 
discussions of this theme, see ROBERT ELLIOTT, THE POWER OF SATIRE: MAGIC, RITUAL, 
ART (1960), and THE WORLD OF JONATHAN SWIFT (Brian Vickers ed., 1968). 
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whether the tone or intent of the author was gauged to satirical ends. 
What is important here is that however disparate the intention, the 
effect of satirical humor, to borrow from Diogenes, is that of changing 
the currency and so altering the current political forms.8 1 
It remains to remark that empirical study as well as theoretical 
design have irrefragably pointed out a curious feature of the mirror of 
satire. Contrary to expectation and, indeed, as an exception to the rule 
of natural logic, the mirror of satire has been shown to reflect every 
face except that of the viewer.82  We don't see our own visage in the 
glassy reflection of the satirical and that, of course, is a very good 
thing. You, dear reader - citechecker, editor, colleague, friend, critic, 
enemy, Cnutist,83 whomever - should feel affirmed. You are exempt 
from the strictures and punctures that follow, and coincidentally, allow 
you the comfort and pleasure of reading on, undaunted by the 
prospect of any potential mishap, free of all unpleasant feelings, and 
secure in the knowledge that whatever else may be learned, it will not 
directly affect you. Law professor, sociologist, feminist, literary critic, 
race theorist, analytic legal philosopher, judge, libel specialist, 
psychiatrist, zoologist, or whomever, please accept as the premise of 
what follows that, for structural reasons, even if you are named, the 
ensuing argument is in principle directed at anyone or everyone but 
you. That may seem paradoxical but that is just how it is, a final 
flourish to what the Augustan age was wont to call the benevolence of 
wit. 
Finally, no introduction is complete without a map to guard against 
the dangers of unedited reading. The epigraph from Flann O'Brien 
indicates as much, and whether or not he is right in general, it is in my 
experience imperative in a law review, and as circumstance will have it, 
particularly in the Michigan Law Review, to announce the parts, 
sections, headings and subheadings, tables and lists, coda and keys, 
graphs and schemata that will allow the reader to know in advance and 
with comfort what to expect. This can also serve to spare the 
photocopier, reduce the costs in paper and toner, and immunize 
against the desire to download and exhaust precious disk space. 
Surely, very few will read the entirety of articles as long and as densely 
footnoted as the normal law review contribution, or for that matter, as 
81. As reported in 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 23 
(R.D. Hicks trans., 1925). 
82. JONATHAN SWIFT, Battle of the Books, in A MODEST PROPOSAL AND OTHER 
SATIRICAL WORKS 2 (1986). The same principle is close to the core of MIGUEL DE 
CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE (Edith Grossman trans., HarperCollins Publishers 
2003) (1589). 
83. On the philosophy of Cnutism, derived from the rite invented by King Cnut, see 
Peter Goodrich, A Fragment on Cnutism with Brief Divagations on the Philosophy of the 
Near Miss, 31 J.L. & SoC'Y 131 (2004) [hereinafter Goodrich, Cnutism].  
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exhaustive and erudite as the present offering; nonetheless, the prior 
announcement of the contents, the divisions, subdivisions, and sub­
sub-divisions acts as an invaluable guide to what it is no longer 
necessary to read. In that dauntlessly honest spirit of exculpation and 
prior provision or pre-reading, I will list and schematize the 
subsequent deliberations in detail and by-and-large accurately, though 
one is never really entirely sure what it is that gets published after the 
final law review edits. 
Caution to the wind, in boldly assertive form, to hell with it, and 
assuming that I have no last-minute changes of mind, I here predict the 
following: In the Introduction, I will trace the earliest history and the 
broad forms or classical genres of satire. I will offer a lot of footnoted 
references and then a splendidly lucid overview of the article that will 
follow for the benefit of those who do not wish to follow. That is the 
Introduction, and just to be recursive about it, we - reader and author 
- are still in it. In Part I, I build upon the general introduction, the 
lexicon of terms, the array of references and erudite asides that 
seduced the reader this far. Here I expand on the distinction between 
the Horatian and the Menippean forms of satire and then suggest that 
a similarly bold division can be used to map satirical legal studies. In 
support of that argument, I use the example of the earliest surviving 
satirical legal poem within the Western tradition. My analysis of this 
exemplary satirical legal artifact delineates four principal modes of 
legal satire that will organize the ensuing discussion of more 
contemporary examples of the genre. 
In Part II, I will address the currently popular and yet somewhat 
novel mode of ad hominem or nominate legal satire. I will argue that 
the last century was witness to a change in the prevalence and the 
significance of satirical legal studies and that we are only currently 
coming to appreciate the implications of those changes. The ad 
hominem satirical sally engages authors in a much more direct manner 
than is usual in academic discourse. It calls to account, it names and 
exposes, it removes the mask of abstracted prose from the face of 
tellurian legal studies. That leads very neatly into Part III where I will 
examine the theatrical forms of legal satire and particularly the 
increased use of dialogue, fiction, and drama in the critique of legal 
studies. Satire has generally been a force for formal innovation and the 
style of contemporary satirical legal studies bears this out. Whether 
maintaining boundaries or overturning the norm, satirical legal studies 
plays upon the law of genre as it governs the genre of law. 
Part IV looks to the combination of the ad hominem and the 
thespian or dramatic in the genre of trashing. Trashing derives 
historically from religious polemics, from Reformation and counter­
Reformation texts with inventive and invective titles such as 
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(ironically) "irenicum,"84 "blast,"8 5 "confutation,"8 6 "deballacyon,"87 
"harborowe,"8 8 "apologie," or "defence."8 9 Such works were virulently 
dismissive of the heretic or derisive of the corruption of the orthodox 
and of his or her work. The stakes were real, the penalty often death, 
and the trashing or trashing of the trashers comparably vehement. If 
the wrong word or image, a false argument or unorthodox translation 
led fairly directly from the text to the faggots, from argument to 
incineration, then such vehemence was necessary and appropriate. But 
enough history. We live in virtual times. What is novel is for such 
polemics to transfer into secular law, and the obvious task of the 
satirical legal scholar is to trace the effects of satire when it makes that 
transition. My initial hypothesis, formulated over coffee with my 
colleague Chuck Yablon, is that from the realists to the 
counteroffensive against postmodernists, satirical legal trashing 
transformed doctrinal scholarship. The moments of satire were short­
lived and little acknowledged but they offered the final expression or 
zenith of critique. They were the visible moment of criticism becoming 
the norm. The humorous and vocal dismissal of established forms on 
all points of the legal-political spectrum is the mark of the satirical 
legal moment. The trashers trashed formalism and deconstruction, 
along with traditionalists and radicals. The reconstruction of that 
history allows us to make the argument that satirical legal studies has 
been surprisingly effective in changing the modes of legal study or, as 
Emperor Julian said of the Cynics, they managed to change the 
political coinage.90 Much more so, in fact, than straight-faced legal 
studies, complaint jurisprudence, or, to coin a phrase describing the 
ponderousness of most dogmatic scholarship, serio-legal criticism. 
84. EDWARD STILLINGFLEETE, IRENICUM. A WEAPON-SALVE FOR THE CHURCHES 
WOUNDS, OR THE DIVINE RIGHT OF PARTICULAR FORMS OF CHURCH-GOVERNMENT 
(1662), which is simply the short title of the work. 
85. JOHN KNOX, THE FIRST BLAST OF THE TRUMPET AGAINST THE MONSTROUS 
REGIMENT OF WOMEN (1558), reprinted in THE PoLmCAL WRmNGS OF JOHN KNOX 37 
(Marvin A Breslow ed., 1985). 
86. SIR THOMAS MORE, THE CONFUTATION OF TYNDALE'S ANSWERE, in 8 THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS MORE (Louis Schuster et al. eds., 1973) (1533) as, for 
example, at 6, denouncing the "pestylent bokes" of heresies. 
87. SIR THOMAS MORE, THE DEBELLACYON OF SALEM AND BIZANCE (1533), 
reprinted in 10 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE 1 (John Guy et al. eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 1963). 
88. BISHOP JOHN AYLMER, AN HARBOROWE FOR FAITHFUL AND TREWE SUBJECTES 
(n.p. 1559) (title shortened). 
89. JOHN JEWEL, AN APOLOGIE OR AUNSWER IN DEFENCE OF THE CHURCH OF 
ENGLAND (photo. Reprint, Scolar Press 1969) (1564). There were countless defenses and 
defenses of defenses, as, for example, JOHN JEWEL, DEFENCE OF THE APOLOGIE (1567). 
90. DONALD R. DUDLEY, A HISTORY OF CYNICISM FROM DIOGENES TO THE 6TH 
CENTURY A.O., at ix (1937). 
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Part V elaborates the theme of satirical advocacy by taking up one 
surprising but persistent figure of critique both ancient and modem. It 
is that of the bad man - Moriarty, as it were, to Sherlock, I mean 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the judge. In fact, it is precisely in Holmes' 
path-breaking work that "the bad man "91  first appears in an explicitly 
modem guise.9 2  The various possibilities and permutations upon the 
bad in contemporary legal studies are explored and dissected. The bad 
man or, in more contemporary work, the bad woman, or for that 
matter the bad hermaphrodite, is a marker of the incursion of 
difference, of body, voice, and diversity of experience into the 
cloistered domain of law. It is a dangerous and fertile theme, so in Part 
VI, I outline the philosophical significance of the bad man, of the body 
and satirical laughter, by reference to traditions of anomaly and 
upbeat cynicism. From the earliest satirical poems, through the gay 
science of the fifteenth century, through Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud 
- the unholy trinity - to postmodern and retro-legal studies, law and 
economics, and complaint jurisprudence, there is a theme of humor, 
playfulness, and provocation. It is a theme of being bad so as to do 
good, which one very successful German philosopher usefully dubs 
kynicism.9 3 It is a term that develops the theoretical and jurisprudential 
import of Menippean satire in the domain of law. 
And finally, quite breathless, and necessarily so for fear that 
anything shorter might end up as a Comment, or - horribile dictu, 
"more frightening still" - as an Essay or Note, the Conclusion 
retraces the path of the argument and intimates that conclusions are 
either futile or funny because all good things, even a satire, have to 
come to an end, whatever their author intends. Even the most 
sprightly law review article, the longest and best footnoted of instances 
of the genre, the most cited and quoted, will eventually, pretty soon in 
fact, end up in the Cemetery of Forgotten Books. The unread among 
the unreadable. 
91. See Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40, at 459. 
92. On the earlier tradition of exclusion of the bad man or woman, see Peter Goodrich, 
Antirrhesis: Polemical Structures of Common Law Thought, in THE RHETORIC OF LA w 57 
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994). 
93. As Peter Sloterdijk stated: "Ancient kynicism, at least in its Greek origins, is in 
principle cheeky . . . .  In kynismos a kind of argumentation was discovered that, to the present 
day, respectable thinking does not know how to deal with." PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRmQUE 
OF CYNICAL REASON 101 (1987). That sentiment finds its twentieth-century heirs not just in 
the work of Sloterdijk, but also in the avant garde radical tradition that runs from the 
Dadaists to the situationists. See GUY DEBORD, PANEGYRIC (1997) (providing illuminating 
insights into lifestyles and wit amongst the politically serious situationists); see also SADIE 
PLANT, THE MOST RADICAL GESTURE (1992). 
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I. FRAGMENT A ANTIQUITATIS (THE ENDURING TRADITION)9 4 
My principal concern is with twentieth century satirical legal 
studies. I will be true to my word and focus primarily on the last 
century. It does, however, bear saying, even if history is not popular 
amongst the theorists of momentary legal systems, free-floating 
analytic wholes, or The Pure Theory of Law,95 that there is a long 
tradition of satirical critique of law. It is also true that it has always 
been a precarious genre and not much loved by those in power. 
Horace, to take an ambiguous instance, when he consulted a lawyer 
friend as to the propriety of his satires was roundly told by the 
doubtlessly wise jurisconsultus to drop his satirical maunderings 
altogether. With exemplary conciseness, unusual for a lawyer, he 
simply says "(t]ake a break."9 6 
John Dryden is similarly somewhat scornful of the vast host of 
unsuccessful or lesser satirists, the "dull makers of lampoons,'' the 
lamentable composers of doggerel, the malicious, the ill-informed, the 
splenetic, and the ill-humored.9 7  All of which simply imposes a caution 
that the historian has to choose her examples wisely, and in doing so, 
recognize that there is poor satire just as often as there are ill­
formulated laws to be satirized. 
The satirical legal tradition is no more free of the precarious and 
uneven quality of satire than the genre as a disparate whole. By way of 
introduction, I will take only a few random examples from our 
discipline's antique (and in the main European) reminiscences. This 
will provide, I hope, a sense of the scope and historical flow of satirical 
legal studies, its elective affinities, patterns and forms. It will also allow 
me to get the citecheckers started on some really obscure and 
annoying texts that have no modem editions. That will sort the literary 
lambs from the legal mutton, and how else are we to select who will 
edit the Law Review next year? I will be happy, incidentally, and as a 
94. The title is from THOMAS BLOUNT, FRAGMENTA ANTIQUITATIS (1679), a rare 
example of early-modem legal humor defining itself as an exercise in rem levem or on the 
lighter side of things. For a wonderfully apt depiction of the importance of Latin and Greek 
titles and epigrams, see JOSEPH ADDISON, SIR ROGER DE COVERLEY PAPERS 201 n.76 
(Mary Litchfield ed., Ginn & Co. 1899) (1711). Addison writes: 
Id. 
The natural love to Latin which is so prevalent in our common people, makes me think that 
my speculations fare never the worse among them for that little scrap which appears at the 
head of them; and what the more encourages me in the use of quotations in an unknown 
tongue is, that I hear the ladies, whose approbation I value more than that of the whole 
learned world, declare themselves in a more particular manner pleased with my Greek 
mottoes. 
95. HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967). 
96. HORACE, supra note 77, at 53. 
97. DRYDEN, supra note 3, at 22. 
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perk of publishing this article, to offer my own opinions to the 
outgoing Board, based in particular upon the outcome of the cite 
checking of the present section of this piece. I will offer absolutely no 
help. I won't even translate the Latin maxims. Enough said. I will leave 
it at that. 
A. The Civilian Tradition 
Remember prehistory? That is a trick question, but it opens the 
way for me to acknowledge that the classical legal tradition was not 
without its moments of highly discreet satirical adventure. Recollect 
that Caligula nailed the text of his laws on columns so high that the 
populace could not read them.9 8 Clearly he believed that the 
pretensions of law greatly exceeded its practical relevance. He was, 
after all, himself the law, lex loquens, or viva vox iuris as the Romans 
were wont to put it.99 The Greek Emperor Solon is reputed to have 
done more or less the same thing with his laws. There was precedent, 
in other words, from an earlier tyrant who also pilloried the law in a 
quite literal sense. The Roman tyrant borrowed from the Greek. 
Perhaps the root of their desire to place the text of the laws in spaces 
where they could not be read was simply a reminder that writing leads 
to forgetfulness, and that the law, as Lycurgus of Sparta enthused, 
should be written invisibly on the heart and made manifest in acts. It is 
not likely that the tyrants had such benevolently epistemological 
purposes but they could have, maybe in part, and who are we to say?100 
That raises another and related point as to the scriptural form of law, 
the mode of the code, or at least of Western codifications. 
Prior to papyrus and long before paper, commandments and laws 
were inscribed on stone, upon wooden tablets, and sometimes on skins 
which common lawyers called "wethers."101 The form militated in favor 
of brevity and also mitigated against change. The law was as it was 
98. For judicial mention of this practice, see Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 237 
(1953). 
99. On the common law notion of law as a mute magistrate (lex est mutus magistrates) 
and thus requiring the breath of life, or lex loquens, of the sovereign or judge, see Peter 
Goodrich, Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism and Common Law, 1 Soc. & LEGAL 
STUD. 7, 16-19 (1992) [hereinafter Goodrich, Illiterate]. 
100. The story of the necessity of keeping laws unwritten was a common theme in 
classical discussions of written law and was repeated in the Renaissance by the Elizabethan 
antiquary SIR HENRY SPELMAN, OF THE ORIGINAL OF THE FOUR LA w TERMS OF THE 
YEAR (1614), reprinted in ENGLISH WORKS (London, D. Browne 1723). I discuss that text in 
PETER GOODRICH, Eating Law, in LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE 87 (1996) [hereinafter 
GOODRICH, COURTS OF LOVE]. 
101. See Peter Goodrich, Literacy and the Languages of Early Common Law, 14 J.L. & 
Soc'Y 422, 429 (1987) [hereinafter Goodrich, Literacy]; see also M.T. CLANCHY, FROM 
MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066-1307, at 120-25 (1993) (discussing the 
technologies of writing). 
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inscribed, and there, in sum, was the end of it. The Twelve Tables, the 
earliest codification of Roman law, explicitly decreed that the Tables 
were the law, the ipsissima verba, or singular and irreplaceable words 
of the law.102 Such law could not be meddled with or expanded by any 
judge, interpreter, or advocate. It was supreme and unchangeable even 
in the letter.10 3 While that might be fine and good in abstract terms, it 
was hardly a practical position. Time, circumstances, and mores 
change, and unless the law-applying body can develop and elaborate 
on the rules, the law will soon fall into desuetude (as the Roman 
lawyers liked to name irrelevance occasioned by the passage of time). 
And so the Roman lawyers developed the protosatirical tool of the 
"legal fiction," fictio iuris, a method by which they would, essentially, 
preserve the law by changing the facts of the case to meet the letter of 
the rule.104 Thus, a child might be treated as an adult or a woman as a 
man, if, in the view of the judge, that would lead to a proper outcome. 
The tyrant stripped bare, one might say, by his judiciary. And that, no 
doubt, is just what a committed tyrant really fears. 
The Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian had a touch of a 
comparable tyrannical intent. When he compiled the Corpus Juris 
Civilis in the first half of the sixth century C.E., he took the view that 
his lovingly compiled code of earlier Roman law was both authored by 
God and quite comprehensive. He promulgated that not a word of it 
could be changed. He even ordered the destruction of all prior sources 
of law and forbade any interpretative innovations.10 5 So he too was 
implicitly satirizing the law, or at least that is the argument that I am 
making. He was so overblowing the content and importance of what 
was, as it happens, a rather inaccurate synthesis of earlier law that he 
has to be viewed as a satirist avant la Lettre. No one, however, pays 
much attention to the classics anymore, and so I will leave the 
prehistory of satirical legal studies at that.106 It is a little brief, I know, 
and there is a danger that it seems a touch essayistic, and not really of 
the depth necessary to form the stuff of a treatise or article, but I am 
102. Generally, see PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999) at 3-7. 
The topic is also discussed in PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LA w at 29-30 (1986) 
(hereinafter GOODRICH, READING]. 
103. The common law doctrine of misprision precluded enforcement of a writ even for 
error in a letter. Examples are given in PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM 
LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 137-39 (1990) (hereinafter GOODRICH, 
LANGUAGES]. 
104. For discussion of legal fictions, ancient and modern, see Peter Birks, Fictions 
Ancient and Modern, in THE LEGAL MIND 83 (Neil Maccorrnick & Peter Birks eds., 1986). 
105. 1 THE DIGEST OF THE JUSTINIAN, at !xii (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985) 
(threatening the most severe penalties - poenis gravissimis - for any judge who cites any 
law other than the Digest or Institutes or other legislation promulgated by Justinian himself). 
106. See Peter Goodrich, Distrust Quotations in Latin, 29 CRITICAL INQillRY 193 (2003) 
(providing a more in-depth look at the exhaustion of the classical language). 
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going to take the risk. If the reader objects, I can always plead my 
European roots and a suitable and sufficient ignorance of the local 
norms of student-edited law reviews. Brevity is often a virtue, a mode 
of incisiveness that spares the prolongation of errors and expedites the 
accession to truth. That aside, we really know of the classical tradition 
through its reception during the Renaissance, and that is true too of 
the satirical legal scholarship that was transmitted by the legists. 
The Western legal tradition as we know it in New York, on Twelfth 
Street in fact, circa anno Domini, now C.E., 2004, begins with the 
reception of Justinian's great compilation the Corpus Juris Civilis 
along with its juristic sibling, the Corpus Juris Canonici, or "Code of 
Canon law." So let me run through it, and of course, in much greater 
detail because few of us lawyers are really comparatists, 107 its parallels 
in common law. First, however, the context: The founding moment of 
the Renaissance, juristically speaking, was the rediscovery of a huge 
compilation - a sacred text comprising the fifty books of the Digest, 
the pedagogic manual of the Institutes, the Novels which were 
Justinian's own promulgations. This was the Corpus Juris that was 
rediscovered in 1189 after five centuries of obscurity. It was a 
rediscovery of an antique resonance harbored in the Latin tongue. It 
was a compilation of the fragmentary remains of a long-dead law that 
had applied, if at all, to the inhabitants of a now-extinct world. That 
gives you a sense of the game being played or the ruse at work. It 
intimates the fiction that underlies the legal tradition, this sacral 
scriptural relic that was for a long time housed in a tower in Pisa.108 
Not the leaning tower, sad to say, but it could have been and maybe it 
should have been. Towers lean back everywhere, or at least all over 
Venice - I have never been to Pisa - and no doubt particularly if 
they house the scriptural skeleton of a Holy Code which proclaims at 
its very outset that its author is God himself - Dea Auctore, the 
juggernaut or "supreme being."109 It is already a little funny, somewhat 
droll, a touch absurd from a secular humanist point of view and there 
were, as we will see, some who had the courage to make that point 
satirically and well. 
For those who like old texts, it is not a bad read, though I would 
add that if God was really its author, as the preface proclaims, then 
God and grammar are not as closely aligned as Nietzsche for one 
107. On this rather too-topical point, namely the legal resistance to comparison and so 
to comparative law, see Igor Strarnignoni, Francesco's Devilish Venus: Notations on Legal 
Space (forthcoming 2005) (on file with the author). 
108. This description is taken from FRANCOIS HOTMAN, ANTITRIBONIAN 121 (photo. 
Reprint, Publications De L'Universite De Saint-Etienne 1980) (1567), and is discussed in 
GOODRICH, LANGUAGES, supra note 103, at 270. 
109. 1 THE DIGEST OF THE JUSTINIAN, supra note 105, at Iv. See generally PIERRE 
LEGENDRE, LE DESIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU (1988). 
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seemed to believe.11° That, or there have been serious failures in 
transmission - endless interpolations, philological slips, cold fingers, 
poor copying, and the like.111 Such, however, is a separate issue. The 
immediate point is rather that the legal tradition itself stems from a 
vast fiction, a bizarre fraud, a borrowing from what Rotman termed "a 
patchwork of fragments and splinters."112 All that antique Latin locked 
away and doing justice unchangingly and with pristine and unsullied 
style - in fictione iuris semper est aequitas, as the maxim goes, and 
loosely translating as "legal fictions are there to do justice."1 13 In any 
event, the Roman tradition comes as a package, so Professor Alan 
Watson says, and I am inclined to believe him - I once had sherry 
with him in Edinburgh and he seemed both energetic and full of 
knowledge, among other things. He calls it "the block effect "114 of civil 
law, and although I think he means it as a noun, I would read it as a 
verb: there is a lot of blocking and a lot blocked by the inaptly named 
Digest. Put it like this, whatever else may be its enduring virtues or 
juristic qualities, the Digest is palpably undigested and overall it is self­
evidently indigestible. One could spend a lifetime studying it. The 
humanist Baldus did exactly that and became according to Rotman 
one of the most remarkable of law teachers and yet, after 47 years of 
being the mediaeval equivalent of a law professor, one of the most 
famous there was, he admitted that he was still an apprentice in his 
knowledge of the Digest.115 
B. The Sermon on the Laws 
Obviously enough, the first work of satirical legal studies is a 
critique of Justinian's Corpus. In a beautiful juxtaposition of names, 
Placentinus, a twelfth-century lawyer and one of the most important of 
glossators, derided the dead Justinian and the old corpse of the 
Corpus. Placentinus, of course, is cognate with placenta and with 
giving birth.116 That which is associated with birth is unlikely to 
resonate much with old age, let alone with a corpse; that indeed is the 
110. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE Tw!LIGHT OF THE IDOLS (1889), reprinted in 16 THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 22 (Oscar Levy ed. & Anthony M. Ludovich 
trans., 1964) (1909) (hereinafter NIETZSCHE, Tw!LIGHT] ("I fear we shall never be rid of 
God, so long as we still believe in grammar."). 
111. SEBASTIANO TIMPANARO, THE FREUDIAN SLIP (Kate Soper trans., NLB 1976) 
(1974) (discussing the philological sources and significances of slips). 
1 12. HOTMAN, supra note 108, at 134. 
1 13. Cited, for example, in Wilkes v. The Earl of Halifax, 95 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B. 1769). 
1 14. WATSON, supra note 102, at 14-22. 
1 15. HOTMAN, supra note 108, at 109; PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'AMOUR Du CENSEUR 63 
(reprint 1995) (1974) (hereinafter LEGENDRE, L'AMOUR] . 
1 16. On names and naming, see Goodrich, Omen in Nomen, supra note 56, at 1311-16. 
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theme of Placentinus's Sermo de Legibus or satirical sermon on the 
laws. The Sermo takes the form of a poem and seems to have been 
delivered as an introductory lecture to beginning law students as an 
entertainment and as a spur to critical thought.117 His poem was 
curiously similar in status to the poems that still occasionally appear in 
the casebook - lauding the bovine fate of Rose the Second of 
Aberlone,118 for example, or explaining the absurdity of a recent 
decision.11 9 
Placentinus was a jurist, a poet, and a satirist. He taught law for a 
while in Bologna but, according to Roffredus of Benevento, he 
"ridiculed a certain doctrine held by another Bolognese doctor, 
Henricus de Bayla, and this man, who was at the same time a powerful 
knight, made a nocturnal assault on Placentinus, who fled in terror."120 
According to one contemporary account, he fled but he took many of 
his students with him and returned to his native Piacenza in fine 
satyrical 121 fashion "dancing with triumph and joy."122 And it was in his 
later years in Piacenza that Placentinus wrote the Sermo, or critique of 
pseudolegistas - namely, phony lawyers. 
Looking back, now quite old, five years or so before his death, 
Placentinus uses the form of the poem to instruct his students in the 
venerable art of satirical critique. Let's look at this classic text in some 
detail. The poem is a satura, in what I have termed its Menippean 
form, but here applied to law. In attacking law, the author acts in 
defiance of custom and of the usual forms. His concern is to invert the 
traditional order and values. He wishes, implicitly at least, to suggest 
the possibility of future and less strangulated forms. That is the 
starting point, and it is compounded by an introduction that places the 
narrative of the poem in the context of a classical figure, that of 
topothesia, or "imaginary place."123 Where law is to be subjected to the 
117. The Sermo is printed in Hermann Kantorowicz, The Poetical Sermon of a Medi�val 
Jurist: Placentinus and his 'Sermo de Legibus', 2 J. WARBURG INST. 22, 36 (1943) [hereinafter 
Sermo]. 
118. EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 490-92 (6th ed. 2003). 
1 19. Robert E. Rains, To Rhyme or Not to Rhyme: An Appraisal, 16 LAW & 
LITERATURE 1 (2004); Robert Rains, When You Wish to Be an R, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 333, 
333-34 (2001) [hereinafter Rains, R]. 
120. Sermo, supra note 1 17, at 25. 
121. The term "satyrical" is derived from "Satyri" - the word for the mythological 
Greek Satyrs. "Satyrical" may be a false etymology, VAN ROOY, supra note 3, at 1, 20, but it 
is an interesting one and resonates with the more Dionysian versions of satirical practice that 
will be discussed in the conclusion. 
122. Sermo, supra note 1 17, at 25. 
123. On topothesia, the figure of imaginary place, see HENRY PEACHAM, THE GARDEN 
OF ELOQUENCE [1593] (facsimile reproduction 1954) at 141-42 ("a fained description of a 
place"). On topographia, the figure of description of an actual place, see also GEORGE 
PuTTENHAM, THE ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE (photo. reprint, Kent State Univ. Press 1970) 
December 2004] Satirical Legal Studies 421 
criticisms of desire, to the court of conscience or of love, then the 
proper mode of announcing this critique is a bucolic setting, a garden, 
an arbor, or a wood.124 In the manner of such poems and in the genre 
of the courts of love, the Sermo begins by describing the author taking 
a walk in the woods and arriving unexpectedly in an undiscovered and 
idyllic, indeed voluptuous, spot.125 There he sees an ager vetus, or 
"ancient field," surrounded by vineyards, meadows, woods, and with a 
river running through it. 
Critical genre established, satire begins. Where better than in the 
woods and among the satyrs, invoking the Greeks and a tradition that 
favored not simply exposing folly but also arraigning vices?126 Satura in 
sylvae. And the protagonists are then introduced. A young and 
dancing girl, scantily clad, alive, lithe, and fleshy. A figure of love, a 
prosopopoeia of desire called Domina Ignorantia.121 In contrast to her, 
comes a figure much less lovely: that of law. Legalis Scientia is 
depicted as an elderly, disfigured, and ugly woman.128 She is deformed, 
bent, desiccated, and she lives in the old field. To paraphrase 
Nietzsche, one must distrust any law that cannot dance, and 
Placentinus proceeds in exactly that manner, by favoring the dancer 
over the tuneless and sedimented.129 In the debate that follows, the 
youthful Ignorantia ridicules the figure of legal studies in 
uncompromising tones. Remote from the world, studied in secret, 
neither competent in philosophy nor even articulate in its own 
languages, legal studies, as we would call them, are depicted as 
immoral, incomprehensible, dishonest, confused, terrible in aspect, 
and deformed in outcome.1 3 0  To this, the protagonist Domina 
lgnorantia adds that legal science is a stultifying pursuit. It offers no 
better than a living death. It is a form of suicide, a fatal sin.13 1 Law 
itself, just to round the critique out, is a murderer of passion and of 
youth, a progenitor of misery rather than of knowledge. The corpse of 
the Corpus Juris makes a zombie of the lawyer. Well, Placentinus 
(Edwin Arber ed., A. Constable & Co. 1906) (1589). 
124. See ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE (P.G. Walsh ed. & trans., Gerald Duckworth 
& Co. 1982) (n.d.); see also GOODRICH, COURTS OF LOVE, supra note 100, at 29-71 
(discussing Capellanus); Peter Goodrich, Gay Science and Law, in RHETORIC AND LAW IN 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 95 (Victoria Kahn & Loma Hutson eds., 2001)  [hereinafter 
Goodrich, Gay Science] (discussing Capellanus and topothesia). 
125. Sermo, supra note 117, at 38 ll. 70-75. 
126. DRYDEN, supra note 3, at 19. 
127. Sermo, supra note 117, at 38 l. 81. 
128. Id. (II. 77-78). 
129. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 45 (1910). 
130. Sermo, supra note 117, at 38 11. 93-98. 
131. Id. at 38 11. 99-107. 
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doesn't use those exact words, but that is the gist of the satire. Law 
flees the living and despises the world. See a lawyer, see a miserly and 
melancholic misanthrope. 
The modern editor, Hermann Kantorowicz, himself a lawyer, does 
not approve of the poem. No surprise there. He calls it mediocre and 
alien.13 2 In the sense that satire is a rather underused and little 
recognized genre of legal studies, I guess he is in some measure 
correct. More correct than interesting, in fact. It is hard to conceive it 
as mediocre or middling in any significant sense. It is either good or 
bad, and I would opt for bad, meaning, as we will see later,13 3 radical, 
or to paraphrase the song, "it is the bomb that brought us together." 
Whether or not it is a "good " or "bad " poem in any conventional sense 
seems to me quite beside the point. Satire makes an argument; it 
deflates the pompous, ridicules the self-loving, and encourages the 
over-serious to get real. I loved the poem and how often am I tempted 
to read a Latin verse? Not often, though it does have a strangely 
calming effect. Soporific even. In any event, we can both have our 
opinions; the more important function of recollecting Placentinus and 
the birth of satirical legal studies is to isolate the original elements of 
the genre. I will do this synoptically by reference to how the 
constituent elements of the genre are developed in later Renaissance 
and modern satirical legal tracts. There are four key ingredients, and I 
will briefly discuss each before moving to their more contemporary 
expressions: personification, novelty, ridicule, and criticism. 
C. Satirical Themes 
1 .  Personification 
Satirical legal studies is a popularizing genre, an attempt to link law 
to life, and legal language to what is said, to the spoken word, and 
latterly to the vernacular.1 3 4  To achieve such populist ends, the satire 
must attach itself to a figure or a person. Satire cannot be generic or 
dry. Thus it needs a narrative and specifically it requires 
dramatization, actors, and action. Unusually for a legal text, the Sermo 
introduces the author, the ambulant observer of the action, and it 
depicts the minutiae of scene and players. Thus we witness a young girl 
132. Id. at 32. 
133. See infra Part V. 
134. This, of course, was not and is not always the case. Fortescue praised the pristine 
and unadulterated character of law French and law Latin. The later tradition would often 
repeat that position and defend the archaic and ungrammatical character of legal language, 
Coke's vocabula artis of a profession that was proudly full of words unknown to the 
grammarians. For Maitland this made it the language of science, comparable to that of 
geometers and algebraists. For full references, see Goodrich, Literacy, supra note 101, at 434-
35. 
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and an old woman, two personifications, two faces going head to head. 
The satirical needs to satirize someone, and while the medieval texts 
would use rhetorical figures, the condensations represented by 
Ignorantia and Scientia, the later tradition moved more usually to 
ridicule of specific people, to ad hominem and, as I like to call them, 
ad nominen arguments. We can follow a certain trajectory in this 
regard. Where the Sermo uses personification through classical figures, 
later satirists used named deities, as, for example, Stephanus 
Forcatulus used Cupid in his constitutional treatise, Cupido 
Iurisperitus, or the "Jurisprudence of Love."13 5 Later tradition, the 
trajectory of advance being always from abstract to the evermore 
concrete, preferred named antagonists. Thus the polemicist lawyer, the 
appropriately named Rotman, wrote his critical treatise on legal 
education as an attack on the compiler of the Digest and titled his 
book Antitribonian.136 Which makes the point pretty clearly, I think. 
No room for doubt when the critique comes bearing your name, 
together with the suffix "against," as its title. 
The politics of satire have always revolved around the dangers and 
rewards of daring to ridicule and arraign . the vices of the living. For 
satire to be effective it has to hurt, it must of necessity cut, and that cut 
will be deepest where its subject is named. The various modes of 
kindly satire, of polite Augustan circumlocutions, may have transitory 
temporal effects but generally it is personalized attack, the nominate 
invective that both takes the risks and causes scandal, ruin, reform, or 
all three. Placentinus, remember, was a critic who had suffered adverse 
physical consequences as a result of his temerity, and if he chose to 
personify rather than to name, there were reasons for that which can 
be well understood. Where the maxim of the legists was "expose the 
folly but don't arraign the vice," the contemporary tradition has 
moved rather to naming and arraigning. At the end of history, time is 
short. It always was, in fact, but now is no exception; it simply takes a 
different form of urgency or political need. 
2. Novelty 
Satirical criticism is variously motivated by dissatisfaction and 
desire for something new: either restoration of the old order or its 
overturning. Placentinus, as his name suggests, gave birth to a novel 
legal form. He adopted the poetic usage of an imaginary topos in 
which to play out both his scorn for the extant and his lust for 
something new. There is necessarily an element of something new, 
135. STEPHANO FORCATULO BLITERENSI, CUPIDO IUSPERITUS (1553). 
136. For Hotman's swingeing critique of Tribonian and his "precious reliquary," see 
HOTMAN, supra note 108, at 85-93, 99. 
424 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:397 
what Ernst Bloch called plus ultra, a novelty or novum, that directs 
and motivates the Menippean form of satirical work.13 7 The desire to 
ridicule, in short, derives from a sense that things have gone too far as 
they are, that they are too much - in contemporary parlance they are 
gross - and a thought experiment or utopian scheme is needed to 
correct the blandishments of the present. The utopian, the beyond or 
elsewhere, is always a dimension of satirical critique. It imagines how 
persons and things could be otherwise and that exercise in thought 
bears with it the risk and the reward of experiment and chance, fortuna 
in the future. 
The appeal to novelty, the insistence that there could be a better 
space of law, other times and topics, is the rhetorical device - the 
topothesia - that the Sermo uses and that we find taken up 
extensively in later works. Thus the courts of love and the gay science 
use a variety of imaginary places, courts of flowers, courts of moods, 13 8  
as well as the High Court of Love in Paris as their literary, and 
sometimes also, temporal sites of existence.139 From Boccaccio's II 
Filocolo140 to Mahieu le Poirier's Court of Love,141 imagination rules in 
legal satire and its location is variously the garden, the saturnalia, the 
carnival, the various dies nee fasti, or "nonlaw days," in which the 
author can encounter the utopian projection, the alternative space 
through the looking glass or on the other side of the mirror. To take a 
common law example, though authored by an antiquary, there is John 
Selden's tract, Jani Anglorum Facies Altera, or "the other face," of 
English law.142 This work traces the feminine history of common law to 
a time immemorial and then to a time imagined when female 
goddesses roamed Britannia, and the laws of the second Venus ruled. 
137. On the spirit of utopia and the persistence of the desire for the new, for renewal 
and reform, see ERNST BLOCH, THE PRINCIPLE OF HOPE (Neville Plaice et al. trans., Basil 
Blackwell 1986) (1959). 
138. MARTIAL D'AUVERGNE, LES ARRETS D'AMOUR (Jean Rychner ed., A. & ]. 
Picard 1951) (1460), provides the fullest set of examples. For others, see GUILLAUME DE 
MACHAUT, LE JUGEMENT Du ROY DE BEHAIGNE AND REMEDE DE FORTUNE (James I. 
Wimsatt & William W. Kibler eds., Univ. of Ga. Press 1988) or the recently published late 
twelfth-century Occitan manuscript LA CORT D'AMOR (Matthew Bardell ed., Legenda 
2002). 
139. LA COUR AMOUREUSE DITE DE CHARLES VI (Carla Bozzolo & Helene Loyau 
eds., Le Leopard d'Or 1982) (circa 1400), discussed in GOODRICH, COURTS OF LOVE, supra 
note 100, at 1-2. 
140. Grav ANNI BOCCACCIO, IL Fl LOCO LO (Donald Cheney & Thomas G. Bergin trans., 
Garland Publishing, Inc. 1985) (n.d). 
141. MAHIEU LE POIRIER, LE COURT D'AMOURS (Terence Scully ed., Wilfrid Laurier 
Univ. Press 1976). 
142. JOHN SELDEN, Jani Anglorum Facies Altera, in JOHN SELDEN, TRACTS (London 
1683), discussed in PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX 152-59 (1995) [hereinafter GOODRICH, 
OEDIPUS). 
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There indeed was a thought, a long-term history of what law could 
have been and might become. 
3. Ridicule 
The spice of satire and the virtue of its critique lie in ridicule - the 
use of humor to deflate, pillory, abase, demote, deride, impugn, and 
overturn. The function of Menippean satire is to make the weaker 
argument the stronger, to distrust seriousness, to think the impossible 
on the grounds that it is precisely the conditions of possibility that 
need to be changed. Put it like this, deep thought tends to be 
immobile, stuck in the depths and burrowing down. Light thought, by 
comparison, trips easily on.14 3 It works to invert common sense and 
shock or at least entertain the reader into a new way of seeing old 
events, patterns, or things. The Sermo is full of ridicule, of course, but 
my favorite example of legal levity is from a sixteenth-century edition 
of the Arrets, or "judgments," from the courts of love reported by 
Martial d' Auvergne. This edition has its own legal and highly legalistic 
commentary by a jurist and eruditae, as they used to say back then, 
bearing the nom de plume of Benoit de Court. His commentary is 
published under the title Commentaires Juridique et Joyeux and 
consists of the most excellent and humorous legal glosses on the case 
law that d'Auvergne had reported.14 4 He says, for instance, to use an 
example of which I am most fond, that juristically, which is to say 
according to the case law on love, kisses can be taken freely but it is 
furtus, or "theft " - his commentary is in the Latin and of the Latin -
the moment that the kiss becomes too passionate. The line is drawn at 
the biting of the lip. Once osculation turns to consumption then 
flirtation has degenerated into theft.14 5 That is a fine, appropriate, and 
good-humored judgment of a case that in current circumstances would 
likely be dealt with wholly inappropriately and quite otherwise.1 46 
There is force in ridicule, and provided that it is not used to excess, to 
mock gratuitously, or to revel in the pain of another, then it is often a 
direct and accessible avenue to truth.14 7 
143. A point well made in OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM & 
SELECTED CRITICAL PROSE (Linda Dowling ed., Penguin Books 2001) (1891). 
144. Benoit de Court, Commentaires Juridique et Joyeux, accompanying MARTIAL 
D'AUVERGNE, LES ARRe.Ts D'AMOURS (Fran�ois Changuion 1731). 
145. Id. at 259. 
146. The most striking example of a kiss leading to an absurd legal proceeding is in 
Becke/man v. Gallop, discussed at length in JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT (1997), and commented upon in terms of the relevant amatory theology and 
law of kissing in Peter Goodrich, The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the Governance 
of Kissing, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 185-98 (1998). 
147. M.A. SCREECH, LAUGHTER AT THE FOOT OF THE CROSS (1997), usefully discusses 
the various uses of laughter, of mockery and derision, in the Christian tradition. SIMON 
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Ridicule, from ridere, involves laughing at some thing or someone. 
Ridicule is the style, the spur or punctum that lances the blemish or 
that cuts to the quick. It is necessarily harsh, and it inflames both in the 
sense of excitation and of demolition. The ridiculum acri was in 
essence purposeless harshness or malicious demeaning; while it might 
succeed in diminishing or ruining a specific subject, it had no greater 
moral or political purpose and hence its bad name. Cave canem, or 
"beware the dogs," was historically a warning against vicious spirits 
and unkind minds whose mere wordplay was inconsequential but 
emotionally harmful to those indicted. At its best, however, ridicule 
calls the subject or the practice to account. It requires responsibility 
and is appropriate to its topic. Consider the following anecdote from 
Laertius: "When some one was discoursing on celestial phenomena, 
'How many days,' asked Diogenes, 'were you in coming from the 
sky?'"14 8 Ridiculous, or at least ridiculous back then, you get the point, 
to make claims as preposterous as those of the astrologer or 
metaphysician who talks of the heavens without ever leaving the 
ground. To be Nietzschean about it, to encounter God you have to, at 
the very least, learn how to dance. 
4. Criticism 
The final category raises the frequently charged question of the 
purpose of ridicule or of humorous criticism most directly. Could not 
the same arguments be performed in somber and accepted forms? The 
answer is no, for the simple reason that satire introduces a novelty that 
is external to law. Let's go right back. Aristophanes satirizes the 
lawmakers by having women take over the assembly and withhold sex 
until they get the legislative changes they want.14 9 Placentinus follows 
in that tradition and introduces poetry into the prose of law, as well as 
bringing youth, femininity, the body, and dance into the supine and 
serried array of desiccated legal texts. In the later tradition, the use of 
humor to juxtapose the inside of law to an outside that threatened or 
sought entry into it is very common. There is the probably apocryphal 
yet repeated story of Accursius, one of the first and greatest of the 
glossators, author of the Glossa Ordinaria, whose daughter is reputed 
to have taught law. She was beautiful and so, in the cause of not 
distracting the students from their studies, she lectured while wearing a 
CRITCHLEY, ON HUMOUR 109-11 (2002), also helpfully analyzes the risus acri as opposed to 
the risus purus or (here) appropriately political laughter. 
148. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 81, at 41. 
149. ARISTOPHANES, ASSEMBLYWOMEN, in ARISTOPHANES IV: FROG, 
ASSEMBLYWOMEN, WEALTH 237-411 (Jeffrey Henderson ed. & trans., 2002). 
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veil or, in some versions of the story, from behind a screen.15 0 Satire 
here marks an alien presence within the law, and intimates thereby the 
need for change. The norm must be suspended if the foreign figure, 
the alien or "aegyptian," and here the feminine, is to be recognized 
and incorporated. 
We can also note a common theme to the satirical as it applies to 
law. Placentinus shares with Aristophanes, Benoit de Court, Selden, 
and the anecdote about the daughter of Accursius a concern with the 
exclusion of difference, and specifically of the feminine from the law. 
It seems in substantive terms to be an exemplary exclusion, a founding 
myth of modern as opposed to mythic laws. That could in part be 
because justice is traditionally depicted in a feminine form, as lustitia, 
or Jgnorantia, but it has a wider resonance. The notion of satirical 
criticism making the weaker case stronger can be aligned with the 
argument that it also brings the exterior and the excluded into law. 
Satire rectifies, redistributes, and reorients. That is its merit and its 
novelty. It introduces what lawyers have ignored, repressed, obscured, 
or demolished in the construction of their science. It resurrects the 
failures and imagines the future. If the exclusion of women or the 
plight of the daughter was the exemplar it strongly suggests that there 
is a creativity or force to the exterior of law, an eros or sex that is as 
attractive as it is threatening. In this context, satire espouses some 
version of the Socratic dictum, "lawyer know yourself, " meaning know 
where you are and who you are in relation to where you are, to an 
outside both proximate and distant, near and far. 
At an epistemological level, satire proffers access to what Foucault 
called the "positive unconscious " of the science of medicine in his case, 
and here, that of law.1 51 Legal science from Placentinus on constructed 
its disciplinary domain, its borders and methods, its jurisdiction and 
writs through a process of selection and exclusion. What did not fit the 
cause of legal science was necessarily jettisoned or otherwise 
demolished, thrown out, or hidden away. The positive unconscious of 
law is a reference to everything that failed to find a place in the novel 
science, the exegesis of a remarkably ambitious but ultimately very 
limited text. What I hope to recoup is thus potentially everything that 
was sacrificed or excluded in establishing the pure science or dictate of 
150. JOHN LESLIE, A DEFENCE OF THE HONOUR OF THE RIGHT HIGHE, MIGHTYE AND 
NOBLE PRINCESSE MARIE QUEENE OF SCOTLANDE, at fol. 139a (London 1569), available at 
http:l/eebo.chadwyck.com, discussed in GOODRICH, OEDIPUS, supra note 142, at 116. 
151. As Foucault explains: 
[T)he unconscious of science . . .  is always the negative side of science - that which resists it, 
deflects it, or disturbs it. What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive unconscious 
of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific 
discourse . . . .  
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, at xi (Vintage Books 1973) (1970). 
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law.15 2 In brief, what are the others of law? Who does law exclude or 
kill on sight, a trajectory from the barbarian to the foreign to the homo 
sacer, the Jew or Muselmann 15 3 of the twentieth-century camps. The 
failures or losses that referred to an internal exile in the Renaissance 
era, come back in the contemporary era as defining themes in legal 
feminism and in those parallel or subsequent movements in legal 
thought that address race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, or species 
as comparable structures of exclusion or denial of voice. Confronting 
lawyers with the experience, narratives, oral histories, and contrary 
norms of excluded groups is precisely the function of Menippean satire 
within the contemporary domain of law. 
Returning to the founding era of modern legal forms, a 
philosopher turned lawyer, Abraham Fraunce, introduces poetry and 
logic into the study of law, this at least is what he claims, so as to 
improve the common law method of the late Renaissance. Along the 
way, and without compunction, he ridicules the "grand little 
mootmen " and other ignoramuses - in that case non-Ramists as well 
as dunces - of the Inns of Court, and to good eff ect.15 4 The lawyer 
William Fulbecke, writing around the same time as Fraunce, derides 
what would now be termed the obsessive compulsion of the common 
law lawyers: "so full of Law-points, that when they sweat, it is nothing 
but Law; . . .  when they sneeze it is perfect law; when they dream it is 
profound law. The book of Littleton's Tenures is their breakfast, their 
boier, their supper and their rare banquet."15 5 That about sums up 
OCCLD (pronounced occlude) or obsessive-compulsive common law 
disorder. Read it as you will, it is a satirical moment in a polemical 
work, and its form is not entirely accidental. It is the body of lawyers 
that is derided, their juristic obesity that is caricatured. Again, in other 
words, an outside has been drawn in, a boundary crossed, and a 
persuasive point made in a juristically unusual form. 
Finally, satire brings with it a certain charge, potential animus, and 
occasionally an erotic attraction. It is a very specific mode of sparring 
or polemics. It tends, as I have suggested, to accompany radically 
novel arguments, changes in position or formalities. In such a spirit it is 
personal, precisely because it seeks to oust an old order, a tired 
incompetence, or entrenched establishment, real or imagined. The 
152. Id. , discussed in GOODRICH, LANGUAGES, supra note 103, at 15-20. 
153. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ. THE WITNESS AND THE 
ARCHIVE 41 (1999); see also Thanos Zartaloudis, The Idea of Humanity or a Letter to the 
Benefactors of Mankind (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
154. ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LA WIERS LOG IKE 89-90 (1588), available at http://eebo. 
chadwyck.com. For discussion, see GOODRICH, LANGUAGES, supra note 103, at 20-32. 
155. WILLIAM FuLBECKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE P ARALLELE OR CONFERENCE OF 
THE CIVIL LAW, THE CANON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF 
ENGLAND, at fol. B2 (1602) (spelling modernized), available at http://eebo.chadwyck.com. 
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twentieth century is no exception. Satire most obviously accompanied 
the realist movement, it reemerged with critical legal studies, and in 
less explicit forms with feminism, law and economics, critical race, and 
LatCrit legal studies. Novelties all. Even if variable in genre and 
content, all were forms of entry into a complacent legalism, and they 
share that element of exteriority, of being the excluded seeking to 
come in, to return, to overturn, or to reform. It is to these moments 
and movements, to the long twentieth century and its admirably 
diverse legal efflorations, that I now turn. In doing so, I will use the 
fourfold root, the categorization that emerges from the Sermon on the 
Laws written all that time ago at the origin of the tradition. 
II. SATURA RESARTUS (THE REVIVAL OF SATIRE) 
The classical satirical tradition favored the innominate mode of 
personification. For Placentinus, it was a prosopopoiea that faced off 
and debated another personification: Domina Ignorantia against 
Legalis Scientia. After his early experience of physical attack, 
Placentinus the satirist was perhaps concerned to shield himself from 
those who might take offense. There was less chance of being attacked 
by a prosopopoeia than by an irate person, though in my experience it 
is still a risk. It is hard to predict who is out there. A similar principle 
of self-protection doubtless underpinned the Basoche theatrical farces 
of the fifteenth-century Parisian law clerks. These were heavily 
allegorical satires in which rhetorical figures such as the Old Digest 
and the New Digest would debate and detract from each other and 
from the law.15 6 Many other classical figures from Justitia herself to 
Phronesis and law clerks identified by number - Primus, Secundus, 
and so on - made their appearance and played their allegorical 
roles.15 7 The later tradition of satirical revels at the Inns of Court in 
London, which theater will gain brief mention again later, also 
adopted a wholly figurative critique of common law. 1 58 
A. Allegory and Theater 
The allegorical satire, in the tradition of the Roman saturnalia, was 
generally predicated upon a festive or farcical reversal of the order of 
things. The clerks of the Basoche would complain about pragmatic 
obstacles to success: lack of money, difficulty of entry into the 
profession, domineering behavior of established lawyers and judges; it 
156. FARCE NOUVELLE, reprinted in RECUEIL DE FARCES FRAN<;AISES INEDITES DU 
XV SIECLE 333 (Gustave Cohen ed., 1949). 
157. FARCE NOUVELLE , supra note 156, at 333 11. 1-10. 
158. PAUL RAFFIELD, IMAGES AND CULTURES OF LAW IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 
89-123 (2004 ) .  
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was not to the name or person but to the position that the satire was 
directed. That remained true for the bulk of the subsequent tradition. 
Hotman, whom I mentioned earlier, attacked Tribonian by name, but 
Tribonian was by then long dead.1 59 Similarly, Gilbert Abbott a 
Beckett's splendid satirical treatise, The Comic Blackstone, originally 
published in 1846, obviously lampooned a titanic but safely dead figure 
of common law. The author was a barrister of Gray's Inn, and the 
treatise commences with the immortal sentiment: "Every gentleman 
ought to know a little of law, says Coke, and perhaps, say we, the less 
the better."16 0  
Later again, and to evidence the continuity of this displacement of 
criticism into the allegorical, there is Professor Rodell's curious 
occasional essay, published on the eve of World War II, and given the 
Biblical and somewhat apocalyptic title Woe Unto You, Lawyers/.161 
The book includes, to give you a flavor, a wonderful allegory of the 
Lady who cannot decide, by legal reason, whether or not to get out of 
bed in the morning.16 2 Here is how the argument progresses. In the 
tradition of reversals, the Lady is the Law, and her Law has two 
primary principles: "The first [is] that anything that seems presently 
desirable is right. The second [is] that anything which seems presently 
desirable is likely, in the long run, to be wrong."16 3 The first decision of 
the day is whether to get up or lie in bed a little longer. Applying 
abstract principles and counter-principles, rules and subrules, she 
eventually follows precedent - she got up yesterday - and arises. 
Then she needs a judicial determination on whether to brush her teeth, 
have a hot or cold shower, which dress to wear, and so on, until late in 
the afternoon, spoiled for choice, like Buridan's ass, she stays at home 
rather than going out. That is all you can hope for, Rodell opines, from 
transcendental legal abstraction, that worryingly brooding 
omnipresence in the sky or more accurately the cloud hovering over 
the bed.16 4 
The tradition of satirizing the named dead, the innominate, or the 
personified living is what Lord Birkett, in his introduction to an 
159. HOTMAN, supra note 108, at 85. Hotman came up with a term for Tribonianisms, 
the classical legal equivalent of "snafu." He termed textual errors emblemata Triboniani, or 
"emblems of Tribonian," and thereby gave him a second life in philological notoriety. See 
the immensely erudite Valerie Hayaert, La Critique Humaniste du Corpus luris Civilis et !es 
Emblemata Triboniani (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
160. GILBERT ABBOTT A'BECKETT, THE COMIC BLACKSTONE 1 (London, Bradbury, 
Agrew & Co. 1887) (1846). 
161. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939). Rodell's title refers to Luke 
11 :  52. 
162 Id. at 135-54. 
163. Id. at 138. 
164. Id. at 139-42. 
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anonymous collection of cautionary legal tales, calls the "kindly" 
tradition.16 5 Such was a very English genre of humorous critique that 
was in the Augustan era dubbed polite satire and associated most 
closely with Addison and Steele, the twin pillars of the Spectator.166 It 
disturbs the dead and instructs the living but keeps all known or extant 
faces out of the mirror of satire. 167 Even where the dead are not simply 
satirized but actively and even maliciously denigrated, their absence 
from the interchange renders the use of their name generic and close 
to a personification. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was long dead 
when the Minneapolis lawyer Ben Palmer published "Hobbes, Holmes 
and Hitler," and it was left to the energy of Professor Fred Rodell to 
respond and correct said Ben who so bent the truth.16 8  When my 
colleague Richard Weisberg, to my dismay, wrote that postmodernism, 
and specifically deconstruction, were versions of Vichy - which is to 
say, fascist - hermeneutics, he specifically gave no names.169 Since 
then he has come clean, but it took a little pressureP0  Polemic has to 
become quite passionate and not a little heated before the personal 
names start to fly and reputations are placed on the line.17 1 
The tradition of satirizing figures such as the lawyer is age-old; 
whether kindly or not, it plays safe by choosing the mask over the face, 
ad personam over ad hominem, the dead over the living. The 
165. Lord Birkett, P.C., Foreword to FORENSIC FABLES BY 0, at v (complete ed. 1961). 
166. The bulk of the issues of the SPECTATOR and all of Addison's essays are reprinted 
in Volumes 5-12 of THE BRITISH ESSAYISTS (Alexander Chalmers ed., 1855-56). For 
discussion and some synoptic examples, see FRANK MUIR, THE OXFORD BOOK OF 
HUMOUROUS PROSE 30-38 (1990). 
167. See Joseph Addison, False and True Humour, SPECTATOR No. 35 (Apr. 10, 1711), 
reprinted in SELECTIONS FROM THE TATLER AND THE SPECTATOR OF STEELE AND 
ADDISON 334 (Angus Ross ed., 1982). 
168. Fred Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 YALE L.J. 620, 621 (1951) 
(discussing Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 AB.A. J. 569 (1945)). 
169. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE 127-75 (1992). But cf Peter Goodrich, Essay, Europe in America: 
Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033, 
2041 (2001). For a more general version of the view contrary to Weisberg's, namely the 
assertion that it is precisely grand narratives, totalizing truth claims, clangorous assertions of 
certitude, that led to the terrors and carnage of the twentieth century, see JEAN-FRANCOIS 
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Univ. of Minn. 
1984) (1979). The twenty-first century hasn't made that great a start on this front either. 
170. Richard Weisberg, Nietzsche 's Hermeneutics: Good and Bad Interpreters of Texts in 
NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (Peter Goodrich and Mariana Valverde eds., forthcoming 
Routledge 2005). 
171. Shaftesbury illustrates as much with an anecdote: 
A Clown once took a fancy to hear the Latin Disputes of Doctors at a University. He was 
ask'd what pleasure he could take in viewing such Combatants, when he could never know so 
much as which of the Partys had the better. "For that matter," reply'd the Clown, "l a'n't 
such a Fool neither, but I can see who's the first that puts t'other into a Passion." 
SHAFTESBURY, supra note 74, at 107-08. 
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wheedler, the wrangler, the bloated abstraction, the dead hand, the 
non placet - the one who "prefers not to"17 2 - the cross-dressing 
judge, and so too the more modern satirical legal figure of the liar, all 
impugn without attaching to any particular being or actual act.1 7 3  It 
takes a twentieth-century transition, an interruption of the tradition, a 
radical break from figure to face, from epitaph to name, for the ad 
hominem argument to emerge as a satirical form. I start with this form 
because it is the most disruptive, the most threatening to the 
established norm, the most diverse and indicative, as well as the most 
recent. It has the merit of being more political than kindly. I also have 
a personal interest in it, having devoted some considerable energy to 
ad hominem and indeed ad nominem criticisms of legal colleagues, 
some of whom, it must be admitted, are not now that well-disposed 
towards me. And what can I do about that? "Quam turpiter enim 
agunt homines, tam turpiter hec reprehendit" as it was put by William 
of Conches in his immortal Glosses on Juvenal and I cannot be 
improving on that. 1 7 4  
B. A d  Hominem Arguments 
The ad hominem argument, just to give a brief history, was 
traditionally viewed as a logical fallacy. In Aristotle's diction, it was an 
elench or sophistical argument. 17 5  A personal attack does not 
substantiate an objective argument. Nor does it disprove it. Outside of 
an alternate universe, mathematical formulae are likely to stand 
irrespective of the character of the mathematician proposing, for 
example, the table of multiplication. 176 Few legal arguments, however, 
172. The non placets are to be found in the wonderful F.M. CORNFORD, 
MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA (1908). Those that "prefer not to" derive from 
Bartleby, the protagonist of the eponymous novel by Herman Melville, Barte/by, The 
Scrivener, in MELVILLE'S SHORT NOVELS 3, 10 (Dan McCall ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2002) 
(1853). 
173. My favorite examples are JOHN DAY, LAW TRICKES (London, More 1608); 
RICHARD HEAD, PROTEUS REDIVIVUS OR THE ART OF WHEEDLING OR INSINUATION 
(1675), available at http://eebo.chadwyck.com; THOMAS POWELL, THE ATTOURNEYS 
ACADEMY (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Ltd. 1974) (1623). For more on that tradition, see 
c.w. BROOKS, PETTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1986), though it 
should be noted that the authors have generally not been lawyers but rather, like 
Shakespeare, people adversely affected by litigation. 
174. GUILLAUME DE CONCHES, GLOSAE IN JUVENALEM (Bradford Wilson ed., 1980) 
[circa 1 135] at 90, and translates: "as foully as men act, so foully this reproves." 
175. On sophistical elenches, see Aristotle, The Sophistical Elenchi, in 2 THE ORGANON 
OR LOGICAL TREATISES OF ARISTOTLE 540-610 (Octavius Freire Owen ed.,1853). 
176. Steve Martin, Hissy Fit, in PURE DRIVEL 80, 80 (1998). 
Let us assume there is a place in the universe that is so remote, so driven by inconceivable 
forces, where space and time are so warped and turned back upon themselves, that two plus 
two no longer equals four. If a mathematician were suddenly transported and dropped into 
this unthinkable place, it is very likely that he would throw a hissy fit. 
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are as definitive or immobile as the times table. "For everything else 
there's Mastercard," as the advertisement goes; 17 7 more properly, all 
political and legal arguments are merely probable and as such are 
highly dependent upon assumptions and susceptible to aspersions of 
character.17 8 Thus Leff in his law dictionary concludes his definition of 
the argumentum ad hominem by remarking, "[i]f, of course, the 'ad 
hominem' attack is an allegation of stupidity and ignorance, then it is 
at least relevant to the matter at hand."17 9 Although traditionally closer 
to rhetorical ethos than to forensic proof, the ad hominem argument 
does assign a probative responsibility, it calls to account, and so 
interrupts the essentially reclusive if not outrightly evasive mode of 
academic argument. The ad hominem is persuasive, often highly 
entertaining, engaging, and telling. More than that, the ad hominem 
argument is central to the satirical genre and so it is precisely with this 
modern rupture in the legal form that an account of more 
contemporary satirical legal studies should begin. 
The satirical ad hominem argument comes in two related forms. It 
either defends or overthrows. In classical terms, it belongs to the 
Horatian or the Menippean mode, and sometimes to both. 18 0  
Depending upon the institutional hierarchy that divides satirical 
author and satirized subject, the form either puts down - abases and 
maybe deflates - or it overturns and interrupts the extant hierarchy. 
The defensive mode is not distinct from what I will term the genre of 
"revolt," but there is a difference of position and project that is 
sometimes significant to the tone and the actualization of the satirical 
persuasion. Granted the plurality of competing hierarchies, it is also 
the case that superiority in one domain, say intellectual precedence, 
may accompany a lesser status within another hierarchy, say that of 
judicial appointment compared to academic standing. Thus Judge 
Posner, to take an example that will occupy a few of the following 
pages, may be judicially superior but also be of lower scholarly ranking 
than his satirized subjects. 18 1  Satirical superiority in one context may 
Id. 
177. MasterCard International Inc., Registered Trademarks, available at http://global. 
mastercard.com/hr/general/copyright.html (last visited Oct. 11,  2004). 
178. ARISTOTLE, THE "ART" OF RHETORIC, 163-343 (John Henry Freese trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1994) (1925); POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 49. 
179. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 
2056 (1985) [hereinafter Leff, Dictionary]. 
180. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (contrasting the two forms of satire). 
181. Posner's tables of scholarly citations try, of course, to prove that the latter is not the 
case and that he is cited more often than Dworkin, Nussbaum, or any other of his scholarly 
peers. See POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 194-220 tbls. 5.1-.10. I have commented 
upon this at greater length in Peter Goodrich, The Perspective Law of the Ego: Public 
Intellectuals and the Economy of Diffuse Returns, 66 MOD. L. REV. 294 (2003) (reviewing 
POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8). It has to be observed, of course, that Posner was 
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indeed compensate for a sense of inferiority in another domain. An 
analytic legal philosopher may feel that his cult is the acme of wisdom 
and virtue, and dismiss with heavy satire scholars of differing 
persuasions or philosophical inclination.18 2 At the same time, the need 
to augment the school to which one belongs by diminishing those who 
are outside it must cast some doubt on the security, the ranking and 
the position, of the satirist. The compulsion to rank is arguably a rank 
obsession. 
The Horatian satirical abasement tends to express the superiority, 
real or imagined, of the writer over the subject of the put down. The 
prime contemporary exponent of the deflationary ad hominem satire is 
undoubtedly Judge Richard Posner. Dick to friend and enemy alike, 
Posner has spearheaded satirical polemics and caustic dismissals of 
opponents. His treatise on the topic is humorously and 
symptomatically subtitled A Study in Decline with the reader being left 
to wonder if the decline is in his capacity to study or in the subject 
studied, internal or external to the work. In either event, he is very 
witty. The argument of the book, however, tends to suggest that it is 
not Posner, but rather the public intellectuals, who are losing their 
grasp, if they ever had one, on real trends in the real world. If that 
interpretation is correct, then Posner's derisive account of the follies of 
law professors offering real-time commentaries on unfolding events is 
classic Horatian invective and boundary maintenance. It is censorious, 
moralizing, and seemingly serious, scientific in intent if not in any 
obvious methodological sense. 
The deflationary mode is predominantly concerned with 
aggrandizing a preferred position, and on occasion, a preferred person 
or self. Posner deflates his opponents primarily by drawing up a list of 
the top 100 public intellectuals judged by scholarly citations.1 8 3  That is 
responsible for the rankings and thus may have some insecurity as to their validity. He 
evinces as much in his book. POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 169. 
182. The most egregious example, at least in print, is a law professor at Cambridge 
University in England, Matthew H. Kramer, who in a series of book reviews has made some 
remarkable and unsubstantiated dismissals of divergent scholarly traditions. These are 
excoriated, detailed and discussed in Peter Goodrich & Linda Mills, The Law of White 
Spaces: Race, Culture, and Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 15, 22-26 (2001). Brian 
Leiter provides some further brief examples. See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of 
Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996); Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of 
Jurisprudence, 72 TEX. L. REV. 187, 187 n.4 (1993) [hereinafter Leiter, Objectivity]; Brian 
Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, RUTGERS L.J. 
(forthcoming 2005). To display again my extraordinary even-handedness, my legendary 
equity, contrast the above with Peter Rush, Semiotics in the Trial of Jurisprudence, 53 MOD. 
L. REV. 121 (1990) (reviewing BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE (1988)), 
or W.T. Murphy, The Style of the Critic, 4 LAW & CRITIQUE 125 (1993) (reviewing 
MATIHEW H. KRAMER, LEGAL THEORY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND DECONSTRUCTION 
(1990)), or Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARVARD L. REV. 1655 (reviewing JULES 
COLEMAN, THIS PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001)) (hereinafter Dworkin, Thirty Years On). 
183. POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 212-14 tbl. 5.4. 
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his proof. His name appears as number ten on the list. He is in the top 
ten public intellectuals ever, or actually between 1995 and 2000. Even 
so, that is pretty good. He is the highest-ranked legal intellectual. He 
beats all of his contemporaries and peers, including Cass Sunstein (12), 
Ronald Dworkin (way lower, ranked at a risible 29), Richard Epstein 
(41), William Eskridge (46), Akhil Amar (50), Martha Nussbaum (59), 
Stanley Fish (67), all the way down to Duncan Kennedy, the token 
critical legal scholar on the list (ranked at 88 but nonetheless above Sir 
Isaiah Berlin (90), E.P. Thomson (93), and Alfred Kinsey, of Kinsey 
Report fame, at 100).184 
The argument attached to the list is often humorous, almost always 
barbed, and in essence uses the putative science of citation and media 
mention to show that public intellectual lawyers, among others, trade 
in credence goods of little or no value. Akhil Amar couldn't have been 
more wrong on Bush v. Gore.185 Bruce Ackerman and Ronald 
Dworkin, ideological opponents of Posner's, are derided for the 
inaccuracy and irrelevance of an open letter entitled The Election 
Crisis that they signed and published in the New York Times.186 They 
are law professors, but they got the law seriously wrong. Dworkin's 
essay on the Clinton impeachment and his review of Posner's An 
Affair of State are lampooned for liberal-left partisanship, for 
relentless "spin," for inaccuracy, and for exaggeration.18 7  Alan 
Dershowitz, a professor of Criminal Law, also took issue with the 
impeachment, and so too incurred the elective wrath of Posner the ex­
post pundit of juridical correctness. Posner goes to great trouble to 
show how Dershowitz, who has, after all, been annoyingly successful in 
terms of media presence, has failed to understand a most rudimentary 
aspect of criminal procedure.18 8 A flaw in the man is a flaw in his 
argument. 
Judge Posner is pretty clear on the significance of irony and satire 
in public intellectual work. He sees his own intellectual role quite 
directly as that of unseating the "false prophets," 18 9 and as 
reinvigorating and promulgating a satirical critique of shabby 
scholarship and lame predictions. In the service of these admirable 
aims, Posner explicitly argues the legitimacy of ad hominem polemic: 
"When the debater's arguments must be taken, to a degree anyway, on 
faith, it is as rational to consider his general trustworthiness as it is to 
consider the general trustworthiness of any seller of credence 
184. Id. 
185. POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 39. 
186. Id. at 113-19. 
187. Id. at 372-74. 
188. Id. at 125-26. 
189. POSNER, INTELLECTUALS, supra note 8, at 130. 
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goods." 190 Law, and particularly the conundrums of constitutional law 
that so animate Dick Posner, belong within the domain of what 
Aristotle terms probable argument,19 1  and hence they rely upon 
character, persuasion, and the myriad other attributes of uncertain 
human interventions.1 9 2  That is a beginning. It allows for a realistic 
recognition of the posturing and posing that accompanies the politics 
of law, but that is not all. 
The deflationary genre of ad hominem satirical legal studies has to 
be understood in the context of its ethical and political goals. In 
structural terms, the deflationary satirical critique has a dual function. 
It elevates the group, cult, school, or self that is utilizing the genre, and 
in aggrandizing the position spoken from, it shores up the hierarchy 
that recognizes the primacy of that sect. Part of that initial function 
gains additional expression in a secondary or incidental feature of 
reasserting the lexical order of an established hierarchy. The satirist 
seeks to maintain a boundary between the sect that satirizes and the 
subjects satirized. In Posner's case, satire is a tool for evidencing the 
priority of law and economics over other schools and subdisciplines 
within the legal academy. It is a story that is well-enough known and 
certainly does not need me to repeat it. 
It is possible that Posner could be interpreted as overthrowing a 
hierarchy or upending an order of precedence. He certainly devotes 
his satirical energies to deflating the grander kind of legal public 
intellectual. Dworkin, Dershowitz, Nussbaum, Ackerman, Amar, and 
their ilk are no small figures. They are publicly recognized and a fairly 
constant presence in the demisphere of elite press and media outlets. 
Deflating them is not a coward's game, but as a judge, with the real­
world weight of bench and bar behind him, and as a leader of the most 
successful of legal intellectual movements of the last half of the 20th 
century, Posner is more plausibly viewed as reasserting and 
maintaining the primacy of his school over its competitors. A 
significant part of his message, after all, is that his competitors are in 
the end merely academics, merely theorists, whereas his work spans 
several worlds, including one supposes, and unusually, the real world, 
at least from time to time. He makes the point most strongly in a 
recent essay that attacks the law and literature movement whose 
history parallels that of law and economics.19 3  It is almost an axiom of 
satire that we are most critical of what is closest to us. It is the most 
190. Id. at 49-50. 
191. ARISTOTLE, supra note 178, at 27 11. 14-15. 
192. Id. at 169, discussed in GOODRICH, READING, supra note 102, at 179-81. 
193. Richard A. Posner, What Has Literary Theory to Offer Law?, 53 STAN. L. REv. 195 
(2000) [hereinafter Posner, Literary Theory] (reviewing GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT 
WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000) ) .  
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threatening or intrusive, and so, having dealt with his intellectual peer 
group, those closest to his heels, Posner turns next to an impudent 
subdisciplinary threat that should have been long quieted by his earlier 
works. In his scathing review of a recent treatise by Binder and 
Weisberg titled Literary Criticisms of Law,19 4  Posner seeks, as 
vigorously and clearly as in any of his writings, to impose the lexical 
priority of law and economics to law and literature.19 5 
Here is a taste of his finely attuned satirical deflation of Binder and 
Weisberg. The authors are two professors of law who endeavor, in 500 
pages of "tightly packed print dense with learning,"19 6  to answer the 
question: "What has literary theory to offer law?" Posner, however, 
pre-empts them and answers the question in the first sentences of a 
review that might well have ended after the first six lines and with the 
answer that he proffers: "Nothing." But because the satire is always in 
the detail, he goes on to indicate that "this book represents decadent " 
legal scholarship.19 7  It is a book that does not discuss law at all but 
rather indulges in "theory-mongering " and invites the question "so 
what?"19 8 The answer to that question is that theory-mongering is 
going to make legal studies a laughing stock, just like it reduced 
English departments to the butt of satirical humor. Semiotics - semi­
idiotics in newspaper parlance - might take hold in the bastions of 
law. That is not all. Professor Dworkin once used an analogy between 
law and literature so surely it can be included in the fold of the 
"ostentatiously marginal" and profoundly irrelevant.199 Dworkin, like 
Binder and Weisberg, or indeed Dershowitz, has nothing to offer the 
serious study of law. He too is demeaned, scorned, cast aside, or 
winnowed away as chaff to the seed of law and economics. 
The least that could be said is that law and literature is put in its 
place. The order of subdisciplines is maintained, and Posner the satirist 
has performed a dual feat of considerable dexterity. He has located 
himself in a position of considerable importance and prominence, as a 
judge and as a judicial arbiter of the degrees of seriousness - of merit 
- that is to be accorded to the genres of legal studies. He has located 
himself not only within the academy but also in the public-intellectual 
sphere of cultural events. He has placed his interest and discipline at 
194. It should be pointed out that in the work reviewed, Binder and Weisberg do refer 
to Posner's contribution to law and literature as "a polemic," BINDER & WEISBERG, supra 
note 193, at 20, and then later briefly, but only very briefly, discuss his work and opine that it 
drains literature of interest. Id. at 287. 
195. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1998). 
196. Posner, Literary Theory, supra note 193, at 195. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 197-98. 
199. See id. at 207. 
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the pinnacle of the order of legal disciplines. In dismissing others, he 
has signaled the assurance and asserted the priority of himself. That is 
key to the deflationary mode. It puts the race in Horace, as it were, 
and the ratio in the Horatian. 
One can also note that this genre is extreme. It gives little or no 
credit to the other position. It objects, excludes, and ridicules. That is 
the style. The deflationary satirical genre is not a modality of 
moderation. It has to be read with humor, lightly, and it is logically 
necessary that the ad hominem quality of the criticisms be matched by 
analysis of the person proposing the satire. 
If Posner's wish is in the end to protect his way of life and bolster 
the position that best maintains it, other instances of the genre can be 
shown to perform comparable functions. Professor Nussbaum, in a 
1999 piece in The New Republic, provides a brilliant example of the 
deflationary mode in the most personal of keys. The article is on the 
use of philosophy in changing law to feminist ends. The subject 
satirized is a philosopher by training, a feminist, and Professor of 
Rhetoric at Berkeley. The title of the piece is quite direct - "The 
Professor of Parody " - and if that was not clear enough, the subtitle 
reads: "The hip defeatism of Judith Butler."200 
Observing a structure of argument that is very close to Posner's, 
Nussbaum deflates Butler by eviscerating the parodic professor's 
"fancy words on paper."201 Butler's prolixity is contrasted with 
concrete projects and actual social change.20 2 Where Posner thought 
that the theory-mongering duo of Binder and Weisberg were instances 
of decadence, Nussbaum sees Butler as plain occult. Butler is a 
practitioner of a politics that is merely "verbal and symbolic."20 3 If that 
seems a surprising reprimand from a philosopher, Nussbaum 
immediately specifies that Butler is merely an academic and writes 
with "lofty obscurity and disdainful abstraction. "204 That is not good, 
we must suppose, and soon enough we learn this style is the bearer of 
the stigmata of "quietism and retreat."20 5 The hipster Butler is smart 
but ponderous. She is casually allusive and aloof. She uses hierarchy 
and mystification as her tools. She wants to be a star and wraps herself 
in "an aura of importance,"206 but there is nothing there. Just verbosity, 
name-dropping, sophistry, and rhetoric. And the ultimate put-down or 
200. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 
37. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 37, 42. 
203. Id. at 38. 
204. Id. at 42. 
205. Id. at 48. 
206. Id. at 39. 
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meiosis: "One afternoon, fatigued by Butler on a long plane trip, I 
turned to a draft of a student's dissertation on Hume's views of 
personal identity. I quickly felt my spirits reviving. Doesn't she write 
clearly, I thought with pleasure, and a tiny bit of pride."2 0 7  Butler 
doesn't even make it to the level of student prose. 
Poor, errant Butler. She wouldn't even get into the graduate 
program at University of Chicago. That is because, in case you weren't 
clear on this, she cannot write and those who cannot write cannot 
think. Butler is a pessimist, a nihilist, a masochist in love with her own 
bondage.2 0 8  She is just another self-indulgent academic lamenting the 
insufficiency of signs from the safety of the campus. It remains to add 
that Butler has written on law, but is not located in a law school. But 
should you doubt that Nussbaum's boundary demarcations apply 
within the law school then just compare her criticisms of Butler's 
hapless prose to Professor Brian Leiter's defense of analytic legal 
philosophy2 0 9  or David Saunders on the virtue of the rule of law.2 10 
Leiter singles out two suitably successful legal theorists, Pierre Schlag 
and James Boyle.21 1 Schlag and Boyle are not analytically inclined but 
rather propose continental philosophy as their inspiration. And in the 
humorous law journal the Green Bag, they are ponderously informed 
by Leiter that their writings would not even qualify them for a 
graduate program in philosophy.2 1 2  To this Leiter adds a list of those 
select few, his network, his philoi, or "friends," who do good philoi­
sophical work in law. It is charmingly nominate, disarmingly direct, 
entirely assertive, and distinctly bizarre. Well worth a chuckle in fact. 
David Saunders makes a similar if more reasoned point at a political 
level, and accuses Schlag and his ilk of basking in the freedom that the 
rule of law has garnered for academics, while denouncing the hand 
that freed them.213 
By way of recapitulation, the contemporary Horatian genre of ad 
hominem or indeed ad nominem deflationary satire serves to maintain 
boundaries, to deflate and protect an extant order of academic merit. 
207. Nussbaum, supra note 200, at 40. 
208. Id. at 44. 
209. Leiter, Objectivity, supra note 182, and Leiter, The End, supra note 182. 
210. Saunders argues that the critics of law are the inheritors of religion, offering the 
appalling spectacle "of critical intellectuals offering up their own moral interior to endless 
publication." Which sounds pretty horrible. SAUNDERS, supra note 45, at 10. 
211. Leiter, The Law School Observer, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 101, 101 (2001). On Schlag and 
Jack Balkin, see Leiter, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 187 n.4. 
212. Brian Leiter, The Law School Observer, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 101, 101 (2001) 
[hereinafter Leiter, Law School]. 
213. SAUNDERS, supra note 45, at 31,  discussed in Goodrich, Law-Induced Anxiety: 
Legists, Anti-Lawyers, and the Boredom of Legality, 9 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 143, 155 (2000) 
[hereinafter Goodrich, Anxiety]. 
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Posner protects law and economics, Nussbaum is busy saving liberal­
feminist political philosophy, and Leiter is idiosyncratically keen to 
shore up an analytic legal philosophy that remains - local squabbles 
aside - the dominant school in contemporary jurisprudence. For 
Saunders, too, the purpose of the satirical mode is to show that fact 
and norm, how things are (or more precisely how he says they are) is 
how they ought to be. Nostalgia greets "retrolution," the return of the 
archaic in a modernized form.214 "Is" and "ought" are pretty much one 
and the same in the realm of philosophical self-analysis. Anyone who 
thinks differently is a free target of censorship, humorous or otherwise. 
And along the way, the rhetorical structure of deflationary self­
aggrandizement exhibits a number of constants. Order is opposed to 
chaos, clarity to obscurity, the real world to the merely academic. In 
whatever manner it is couched, the conclusions are also somewhat 
uniform: the subject punctured is worthless. For all their smartness, 
their cleverness, their long words, they are in the end what Placentinus 
termed pseudolegists, the sadly agnostic proponents of impracticalities 
far removed from the tellurian concerns of any extant lex terrae, or 
"mundane law." 
C. Revolting Positions 
If the establishment and status quo motivate the deflationary 
genre, its radical counterpart, the genre of inversion, is propelled by 
the desire for change, and the will to overturn the order of things. The 
irreverent mode of radical satire may well deflate along the way, but 
its primary objective is not directly abasement or aggrandizement but 
rather an overturning of the extant power and a reversal of positions in 
the hierarchy. There is no question, of course, that there has always 
been a satirical strain in the critique of the power of lawyers and the 
endlessness of law. That is a tradition that flourished in the twentieth 
century as well as any other. The nominate or ad hominem expression 
of satirical critique in the overturning of the works of contemporary 
greats, however, was something of a novelty. Such, of course, is 
particularly the case if the Titan - say, Ronald (Hercules) Dworkin -
is still alive. It, at the very least, involves a risk and is most usually 
undertaken in the Menippean mode of confrontation. 
To get a little philosophical, the genre of overturning involves what 
Alain Badiou terms a "logical revolt,'' 215 meaning that it expresses 
214. For the origin and use of the term "retrolution," see ANDREW BLAKE, THE 
IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF HARRY POTTER 16-17 (2002). I develop the theme in relation to law 
in Peter Goodrich, Retrolution, 3 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 23 (2003).  
215.  ALAIN BADIOU, INFINITE THOUGHT: TRUTH AND THE RETURN OF PHILOSOPHY 
39 (2003) [hereinafter BADIOU, INFINITE THOUGHT] (adopted from Rimbaud's "les revoltes 
logiques"). 
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insubordination, a decline in reverence, a certain disrespect for the 
order and sanctity of law.21 6 Such modes of disaffection, even when 
highly personal, have tended to remain innominate. When Lani 
Guinier opens her discussion of "Models and Mentors " in Becoming 
Gentleman with an anecdote of how her professor of Corporations at 
Yale Law School opened every class by announcing "Good morning, 
gentlemen,"217 she politely or otherwise does not name him. That is 
kind of old-school leftism on her part, or at least deference to an 
accountability that is greater than any singular individual. Of course 
we could discover the name, but the point is that she chose to gloss it 
over with anonymity. The move towards accountability for text and 
name, begins though somewhat slowly with the textualist turn and its 
reversal of the traditional priority of speech over writing, and of 
author over text. 
We can take a classic instance of overturning from a jointly 
authored study, Postmodern Jurisprudence.218 The essay was originally 
published in a symposium volume on critical legal studies in Britain in 
1987, back in the early days of the Critical Legal Conference.219 There 
was a spirit if not, in general, a practice of a situationist kind.220 There 
is, in other words, an element of play and of performance in the 
overturning of the superior in the hierarchy. This essay is a 
deconstructive reading of a work on the philosophy of natural law 
authored by one John Finnis, a law professor at the University of 
Oxford.221 We learn in the preface to Natural Law and Natural Rights 
that Finnis was actually in Africa, at Chancellor College of the 
University of Malawi, "in an environment at once congenial and 
conducive to contemplation of the problems of justice, law, authority, 
and rights,"222 while doing most of the writing. His permanent position, 
however, as the back cover announces, was as a Fellow and (fully 
Latinate) 'Praelector' in Jurisprudence at the time of the book being 
put to bed with the Clarendon Press, the more prestigious branch of 
Oxford University Press. Just to fill the story in a little, Finnis was also 
the external examiner of the doctoral dissertation of the first-named 
216. See DOMINIQUE LECOURT, THE MEDIOCRACY: FRENCH PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE 
MID-1970S, at 128-29 (2001). 
217. LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN 85 (1997). 
218. DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 74. 
219. Costas Douzinas & Ronnie Warrington, On the Deconstruction of Jurisprudence: 
Fin(n)is Philosophiae, 14 J.L. & SOC'Y 33 (1987). 
220. Nathaniel Berman, Against the Wrong and the Dead: A Genealogy of 'Leftlmpm', 22 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1005 (2001). More broadly, see PLANT, supra note 93. To this, one should 
add DEBORD, supra note 93, for a brilliant sense of the situationist philosophy of life. 
221. JOHN FlNNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
222. Id. at vii. 
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author of the deconstruction of his work that is published under the 
personal and punning title, Fin(n)is Philosophiae.223 
The deconstruction of Finnis's text has a trinitarian thematic. At 
the level of legal-philosophical polemic, it seeks to evidence that 
although Finnis argues for the vitality of natural law, his text, style, and 
tone is encased in positivism, a position quite antithetical to the 
natural law conflation of law and morals. At the level of method, the 
critics argue that while Finnis claims the self-evidence of natural law 
values, their truth or independence of the persuasions of their 
proponent, his text is in fact rhetorically laden and suffused with floral 
metaphors. Finally, at the level of satire, the logic of revolt leads to the 
inexorable conclusion that Finnis's text mirrors his name, is about the 
end of life and obsessed throughout with death: "Human flourishing 
becomes a black joke, an ultimate deferral. Our Fin(nis) becomes our 
aim."224 It is no more than a death-bound subjectivity. 
The satirical dimension of the overturning lies in the linking of the 
name Fin(n)is to the project (or end) of the paper. Finnis argues for 
self-evident values by using a string of metaphors. He claims to be for 
life, but promotes death. He promises truth, but he proffers lies. To 
that, we are offered the additional satirical image of the philosopher as 
seducer and pedagogue. Finnis's self-perception, his textual position, is 
that of taking the side of the philosopher against the skeptic, and of 
seduction against destruction.225 Here is how he is portrayed: 
Seduction: the gentle(man) pedagogue, the father of light. The text 
knows truth and can seduce the willing (though as yet ignorant) reader 
into the garden of knowledge, provided foolish objections are 
abandoned . . . .  And there before the unknowing reader stands the father 
figure or pedagogue: "The clear-headed and wise man." By promising 
fragments of "his" wisdom the writer/text can woo the reader/sceptic 
towards the tree of knowledge.226 
So who wouldn't follow a Praelector into the garden of knowledge 
as published by the Clarendon Press? It is a tough question, high status 
stakes, but the postmodern authors are concerned to undermine this 
seemingly omniscient textual progress by pointing out how coercive it 
is: "Ultimately, the text does to objectors what Caesar's henchman do 
to Marullus and Flavius; they 'are put to silence."' 227 It is that extreme 
textual violence - the expulsion of the critic, the deriding of the 
literary at the same moment as it is being manipulated for the ends of 
truth and so as to administer the finis, or "execution " of the skeptic in 
223. See Douzinas & Warrington, supra note 219. 
224. DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 88. 
225. FINNIS, supra note 221, at 84. 
226. DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 84 (citation omitted). 
227. Id. at 84-85. 
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the text - that brings on the satirical critique. It is an exemplary piece. 
It is both poetry and payback, a fine dramatization of a prosaic 
philosophical essay, an engaging satirical foray into an elite 
jurisprudential preserve. Mainly it is irreverent, not quite as in awe of 
the philosopher and his garden as should be the case according to the 
norms of the prior doctrinal tradition. 
D. Tones 
The radicalism and novelty of the analysis of Finnis's ends lies in 
the play upon the name and specifically the use of the persona as a 
personification of the import of the text. It is irreverent, ludic yet 
political. It is Menippean, both satirical and personal, and therein lies 
the rub. The Praelector is demoted, from prae to post, as it were, 
although the pun upon the etymology of the name and the nomination 
of the positive and positivistic argument is not a necessary feature of 
ad hominem criticisms. In a piece that is critical of the critics, to take 
an antithetically inclined example, Matthew Kramer takes Alan Norrie 
to task for incoherence and error in his analysis of the subjectivist 
approach to recklessness in criminal law.228 In footnote one, praenotitia 
one might say, Kramer praises Norrie for avoiding the "silliness and 
bluster " of British critical legal scholarship but then decries the fact 
that such a "refreshingly mature tone ... has not resulted in a cogent 
analysis. "229 Footnote two refers incidentally to "a fine recent 
discussion "23 0 of the generality of concepts authored by N. Simmonds, 
Kramer's doctoral supervisor at Cambridge University - and note, if 
you please, how important these insignia of status are to the 
maintenance of boundaries or, alternatively, to the deflation of egos 
strung out on a fog of long words. That is the very stuff of satire, 
nothing more and nothing less. With the range of personal reference 
now clarified or at least footnoted, the philein cited, Kramer embarks 
upon proving sloppiness, stumbles in reasoning, and failures of 
understanding. He finally opines that "[f)ar from having achieved a 
breakthrough, [Norrie) is in fact trumpeting to the world what 
everyone knows already."23 1 Norrie, the false trumpeter, the pied piper 
of normative error, has "misused " reason and drawn insupportable 
conclusions on four occasions in his article: "In each case, a largely 
228. Matthew H. Kramer, False Conclusions from True Premises: Warnings to Legal 
Theorists, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 111  (1994) (discussing Alan Norrie, Subjectivism, 
Objectivism and the Limits of Criminal Recklessness, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (1992)). 
229. Id. at 1 1 1  n.l. 
230. Id. at 1 1 1  n.2. Nigel Simmonds is acknowledged as Kramer's supervisor in 
MATHEW H. KRAMER, LEGAL THEORY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND DECONSTRUCTION: 
AGAINST RHADAMANTHUS, at xii (1991 ). 
231. Kramer, supra note 228, at 1 19. 
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creditable thesis has become inflated into a hyperbolic caricature of 
itself," to which we can add that there have been "unsupportable 
leap[s]," "invalid " arguments, and "distortive[) " affinities to "much 
more solid pathways of reasoning."23 2 
Kramer's lavish criticisms arguably perform precisely the "silliness 
and bluster " he denounces in those he criticizes. Or perhaps it is 
simply zest for his project, his beloved self-presence of reason. In 
either event, the tone of these warnings is somewhat apocryphal and 
whether intended or not as satire, there is a strong dimension of ad 
hominem dismissal and derisive overstatement placed ironically 
alongside the path of pure reason. Norrie was and is an established 
figure within the critical legal tradition. He is daringly overturned by a 
younger competitor who is far from afraid to name names and cite 
satirically inflated errors. Interestingly, Kramer was himself a lapsing 
leftist. His thesis had been on deconstruction and legal theory, and 
some of the charge in his "Warnings"  comes with the scent of burning 
rubber and a vehemence that befits the exorcism of a former self. 
It is my suspicion, to take one final example, that the relation of 
teacher to student, and now of editor to subject, plays a significant role 
in the highly amusing ad hominem attack upon the work of Gunther 
Teubner to be found in a debate on globalization and contracts. 
Professor David Campbell was asked to comment on an article on 
relational contracting published by Professor Teubner, an 
internationally acclaimed social theorist and philosopher of law. 
Leaving aside the various arguments as to relational contracts, the ad 
hominem satirical theme begins with the first sentence of the article in 
which Campbell ironically expresses the fear of being unfashionable, 
behind the trends, and unhip.23 3 The very name of Teubner invokes in 
him what might be termed the anxiety of the lack of influence. He is 
worried that he is not up-to-date, that he will seem inadequately 
knowledgeable in the latest social theory, but then he immediately 
points out "the utter worthlessness " of most if not all of sociological 
theory. He goes on to legitimate his view somewhat ironically by 
stating that "sociological literature confirms my opinion."23 4 Having 
proffered this meaty paradox, Campbell moves then to a humorous 
put down of Teubner's trendiness: 
Reading [Teubner's paper) gave rise to a feeling akin to one I remember 
from my days as a putatively upwardly mobile teenager going to a party 
in flares long after wealthier adolescents had discarded theirs. This 
feeling was made worse when, not content with being, as it were, at the 
232. Id. at 120. 
233. David Campbell, The Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science, 9 Soc. & 
LEGAL STUD. 439, 439 (2000). 
234. Id. 
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party himself, which was bad enough, Teubner introduced another guest, 
Jacques Derrida, who is even more hip, being, as Teubner tells us, 
"arguably the greatest expert in the reconstruction of private law," which 
was something I didn't know.235 
After this ironically flattering dismissal, Campbell in essence goes on 
to make the point that when it comes to the law of contract, and 
specifically the relational theory of contracts, Teubner has no idea 
what he is talking about, and quite possibly has not read the work of 
Ian Macneil, the author that he is criticizing. 2 3 6  
The latter satirical overturning is subtle and worthy of citation. 
Campbell has lavished Teubner with praise. He has set him up as an 
academic star, as a master of theory, and as a leader of academic 
fashions. Teubner is definitely someone in the know. Campbell then 
slips in a seemingly incidental anecdote. Discussing his decision, all 
those years ago, to abandon social theory and study law, he has the 
following to say: "In studying law as it were internally, in the sense of 
being able to reason as a lawyer, and especially to handle the sources 
of the law, one immediately gains the advantage so often lost in 
general social theory, of tending to know what one is talking about."23 7 
That certainly makes the point, though if any doubt remained, 
Campbell adds that insofar as Teubner relies upon Derrida as his 
guide to private law, this "amounts to a joke."23 8  
Campbell plays David to Teubner's Goliath. He overturns the 
greater figure and in doing so he expressly decides "to give voice to my 
disdain . . . .  "23 9 That is powerful, novel, and unusually direct. It is 
satire with a very specific purpose, namely, that of unmasking false 
theory and the unnecessary multiplication of terminologies. Campbell 
goes after Teubner as a pseudolegist. It is in the finest of traditions and 
is as much an expression of realism as it is of any ulterior satirical 
intent. To borrow a phrase that Posner hates, Campbell is determined 
"to speak truth to power": Teubner may be a fancy theorist; he may be 
hip and well connected; he may even have been, for a while, a 
colleague of Campbell's coauthor Hugh Collins of the passingly trendy 
London School of Economics,240 but Campbell will neither flatter nor 
spare him from the excoriation of the error of his ways. 
235. Id. at 440. 
236. Campbell, supra note 233, at 441, 446 n.4 (opining on whether Teubner had read 
anything more than IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980)). 
237. Id. at 441. 
238. Id. at 445. 
239. Id. at 446. 
240. See, e.g. , David Campbell & Hugh Collins, Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of 
Contracts, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 25 (David Campbell, Hugh Collins & 
John Wightman, eds., 2003). 
446 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:397 
E. Conclusions 
Before leaving the genre of ad hominem satire, in both its 
deflationary and rebellious, Horatian and Menippean genres, a few 
interim conclusions are in order. The two genres share much, including 
the dangerous novelty of their unflinching willingness to name and 
account. The ad hominem gets personal. It names names, and it calls 
individuals to responsibility for what they actually have said and done. 
In getting personal, it is interesting that the genre also expresses and 
exposes the person. There is an element of nominal embedding in that 
it is impossible to expose the person of the subject satirized without 
also exposing oneself. The beauty of the satirical enterprise is precisely 
its honesty in the exposure of motive and character, the latter simply 
being motive extended over time. In each of our examples, in other 
words, there have been clear indicators of personal investment. 
In Fin(n)nis Philosophiae, the authors overturn what is obviously a 
personally invested hierarchy. Finnis was the doctoral examiner of the 
first named author. Finnis was at Oxford University, and a Praelector 
to boot, whereas the authors of the satire were at a left-leaning 
Polytechnic law school or third-tier institution in London. They used 
literature to topple law and, in doing so, enacted the revenge of the 
marginal. Professor Kramer praises his doctoral supervisor and acts as 
the aggressively satirical guard of a legal reason that he had only 
recently come to espouse. David Campbell's satire is also located in 
the days of his PhD and in the protection of his mentor. He tells the 
story of abandoning a first love, social theory, for the rigors and 
possibilities of law. When Leiter, to use an example that will crop up 
again, rails against Dworkin, it is his teachers of philosophy at 
Michigan - and fine school it is too - that are in part and curiously 
defended.24 1 Why Dworkin attacks Coleman nobody knows. He 
doesn't even disagree with him: "his account is stunningly like my 
own. "24 2 So what is the beef? I can't be having a theory of everyone but 
it could be to do with Coleman being his successor at Yale Law 
School, it could be a question of respect, a matter of competition and 
status, or maybe just a matter of mood. A case of green eggs and ham. 
But at the same time, the Empire must be defended, and the local 
hierarchy maintained. For Posner and for Nussbaum, it is also a 
question of boundary maintenance. They (and Dworkin) are older, 
however, and so it is their school, law and economics and liberal 
feminism, respectively, that gains the protection of satire. 
In each of the instances cited, the manifestation of motive and the 
display of personal investment, however momentary, signal a desire to 
241. Leiter, The End, supra note 182, at 21 and 13. 
242 Dworkin, Thirty Years On, supra note 182, at 1656. 
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engage, to move, and to persuade. When a text gets satirical it is a sure 
sign that the subject is one that matters to the author. They inveigh 
and convey. They are taking sides, they are seeking to seduce so as to 
confirm a boundary or to topple a superior. And their engagement is 
in many senses compelling. That is at one level because names and 
reputations are the very stuff of the academic public sphere or 
symbolic economy of legal scholarship.24 3 It is worth fighting over one's 
name not only because the ego requires it but also because the 
currency and value of the professional persona in large measure 
depends upon it. Most everything else can be ignored or reduced to 
abstractions. Only satire calls directly to the name, incites the face of 
the author, and makes a demand for responsibility. It is hard to resist 
getting down and dirty when your name is impugned, and few ever do. 
When the dogs bark, the game begins. 
III. TRAGEDY AND FARCE 
A. Theater and Norm 
Satire is by its nature intrusive, affective, and radical. It dramatizes 
the realm of ideas and pushes serious proposals in a humorous and 
often-biting form. It shocks the reader to pay attention. It does so in 
the generic mode of allegory or by telling a story in an extreme 
manner. Satire stages the realm of ideas, and it is that dimension of 
enactment, the performance of the normative that deserves closer 
scrutiny. A display of the structural workings of social relations, of the 
laws that determine how laws get applied, is never likely to be too 
popular with those for whom the mystery and obscurity of law, the 
classical arcanum iuris, is a professional axiom, or modus vivendi. The 
law is the law, and there, quite honestly, all explanations run out. It is 
pure, the jurisprudes say, and we all know that to engage with purity is 
to stain or adulterate or defile. Law is neither to be translated nor 
practiced by the imperite, those unlearned in legal science, Sir Edward 
Coke opined in the early years of the modem tradition.24 4 When it is a 
question of passing over from the professional to the popular, the 
normative to the factual, from juristic abstraction to life, then leave the 
law alone, respect the vocabula artis, or "foreign tongue, " of its 
esoteric custody, implausibly termed the language of geometers, or a 
sign system unadulterated by use and of an alegebraic precision. Such 
is the principal refrain of the professionals all the way from Alciatus to 
243. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER (1993). 
244. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 1832) (1608) [hereinafter 
COKE, INSTITUTES]. 
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Zuluetta. If "all the world's a stage, " then law is in the main a player 
behind closed curtains. 
That law has always existed in a complex and competitive relation 
to theater has only recently begun to gain the attention it deserves. 245 
The satirical text is always dramatic, and historically this means that it 
has threatened law. For instance, a fragment in the Digest of Roman 
law records that any citizen who "appeared on the stage to act or 
recite " was subject to the penalty of infamia, meaning "loss of 
citizenship " or civil death.246 They would become what common law 
termed an outlaw. Historical reconstruction suggests that this ban 
upon theater, a censorship that lasted for nearly two centuries, was a 
reflection of the proximity of theater to law rather than of their 
separation. Roman authorities originally directed the ban against 
Athenian tragedy, a foreign influence representing the drama of social 
life in a manner that Roman authorities believed best restricted to the 
forums of law. 247 Law did not need competition from a foreign 
comparison, it sought a singularity or status of truth that secular 
variations upon its providential themes might impede - res judicata 
pro veritate accipitur, meaning that legal judgment emanates from the 
space of truth.248 
Law sought to be the singular drama of justice and truth, the sole 
theatrum veritatis et iustitiae, as it was later coined.249 In its classical 
form law was indeed an expressly theatrical enterprise, and lawyers 
were known as actors (actores). To this day, lawyers in some 
jurisdictions still wear costume, usually gowns and sometimes also 
wigs, occasionally breaches, and buckled shoes.25 0 Legal actors served 
to promote specific types of social performance, to enact, but also to 
dramatize and display the discourse of the fates and the unraveling of 
245. RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN 
LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); Cornelia Vismann, Tele-Tribunals: Anatomy of a 
Medium, 10 GREY ROOM 5 (2003). Both address the impact of new media upon law. See 
FLORENCE DUPONT, L'ORATEUR SANS VISAGE: ESSAI SUR L'ACTEUR ROMAIN ET SON 
MASQUE 66-73 (2000) (on the relationship of law to theater and the competition between the 
two); LAW IN LITERATURE: LEGAL THEMES IN DRAMA (Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette ed., 
1995) (for a selection of texts); Florence Dupont, La scene juridique, 26 COMMUNICATIONS 
62 (1977). 
246. 1 THE DIGEST OF THE JUSTINIAN, supra note 105, at 82, discussed in Peter 
Goodrich, Law, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 417 (Thomas 0. Sloane ed., 2001). 
247. Dupont, supra note 245, at 64-66. 
248. COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 244, at 103a. 
249. "Theater of justice and truth." The phrase dates back to a treatise of the same name 
by Jean-Baptiste de Luca (1614-83) Discussion of the source and the maxim can be found in 
PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'INESTIMABLE 0BJET DE LA TRANSMISSION 42 (1985). 
250. See, for example, COURT DRESS (1992), a Consultation Paper issued on behalf of 
the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, replete with some fine or at least surprising 
images of various levels of the English legal profession in their full regalia, from wigs and 
gowns, to breeches, and buckled shoes. 
December 2004] Satirical Legal Studies 449 
life in terms of good and evil as experienced during the slow march of 
the body towards death.251 These were dramatic themes, and they did 
not take competing representations particularly well. When in the era 
of the reception the cleric Andreas Capellanus authored a dramatic 
text, a dialogue with a number of set-piece trials in courts of love, the 
Church banned the work fairly rapidly as being heretical.25 2 The 
alternative trials of women's courts were too close to law to be left 
unscathed or uncensored. Law could not be put in such a popular form 
nor exposed to the common eye in a language free of argot in a space 
not yet solemnized. The theater of the Basoche was the work of 
disaffected law clerks and satirized law and lawyers by holding mock 
trials, or causes grasses, as well as staging theatrical farces. It was also 
banned and revived at various points in the fifteenth century.25 3 
To the above elliptically critical satires, and for the sake of 
completeness, we can add more literary satires of legal method and 
form. There is the later tradition of judgments handed down by courts 
of love. It includes a statute establishing a High Court of Love in Paris 
in 1400,25 4 and encompasses The Judgments of Love, fifty-one decisions 
reported by the jurist and poet Martial d' Auvergne in 1462.25 5 That 
tradition later produced a number of further reports of legislation 
from the Parliament of Love 256 and other decisions of literary courts of 
love.25 7 England too had a vigorous tradition of juristic dramatics, and 
the Elizabethan era witnessed numerous farces performed as part of 
251. COURTING DEATH: THE LAW OF MORTALITY (Desmond Manderson ed., 1999) 
(usefully collecting a disparate array of perspectives upon law and death). 
252 See ALEXANDER J. DENOMY, THE HERESY OF COURTLY LOVE (1947); see also 
Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capel/anus and the Judgments of Love, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641-44 (1996) (reviewing the sources). 
253. 1 E. PARFAICT & c. PARFAICT, HISTOIRE DU THEATRE FRAN<;:OIS (Burt Franklin 
1968) (1745). The authors explain: 
En 1422 les Clercs de la Bazoche ayant represente leurs Jeux, malgre la deffense qui leur en 
avoit ete faite, le Parlement, pour punir cette desobeissance, rendit un Arret le 14 aoilt de la 
meme annee, qui condamna les Acteurs a quelques jours de prison, au pain & a l'eau. Le 12 
may 1473 le Parlement en prononca un autre dont le motif etoit tout contraire; puisqu'il 
ordonnoit a la Bazoche l'execution de ses Jeux, & a ne se departir de cet usage, que par une 
permission expresse de la Court. 
Cited in LYSYK, supra note 62 as being at Vol. I, 101; see also HARVEY, supra note 62. 
254. LA COUR AMOUREUSE DITE DE CHARLES VI, supra note 139. 
255. D'AUVERGNE, supra note 138. 
256. HONORE D'URFE, LES EPISTRES MORALES ET AMOUREUSES (photo. reprint, 
Slatkine Reprints 1973) (1619). For discussion of these sources and their legal implications, 
see Peter Goodrich, Amatory Jurisprudence and the Querelle des Lois, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751 (2000). 
257. As, for example, MADELEINE DE SCUDERY, CLELIE (London, Mosley & Dring 
1656). The final expressions of the tradition are to be found not in the work of the precieuses, 
but in FRAN<;:OIS CALLIERES, NOUVELLES AMOUREUSES, ET GALANTES (1678); JEAN 
DONNEAU DE VISE, LES NOUVELLES GALANTES, COMIQUES ET TRAGIQUES (photo. 
reprint, Slatkine Reprints 1979) (1680). 
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the revels at the Inns of Court in London. Lawyers authored many 
such melodramas by inverting or mocking established legal forms 
while offering little by way of sustained satirical critique of law.25 8 
While legal authors of farces tended to devote their dramatic skills to 
burlesque forms of amusement, some more polemical plays addressed 
topics of contemporary political concern such as the status of women 259 
and the corruption of judges.260 
B. Genres of Dialogue 
The other face of the ban on theater is the use of dialogue and 
dramatization in legal treatises and works of doctrine. Quite aside 
from the theater of trial itself, scholarly and doctrinal writers have also 
resorted to dialogic forms. Authors frequently defended the law by 
using the dramatic mode of dialogues between, for example, a Doctor 
of Civil Law and a common lawyer, an attorney and a student, or a 
defender of the law and a critic. In rhetorical terms, it had long been 
axiomatic that what could be made present through dialogue, through 
the enargeia, or "visually orientated figures of conversation," was 
much the most likely to persuade. Same thing today, with Presidential 
debates, on-the-air interviews, talking heads, and the like. Historically, 
when the stakes were high, then dialogue was the most likely mode in 
which to seduce the citizenry back to the path of true law. The most 
famous examples in the common law tradition are probably Sir John 
Fortescue's In Praise of the Laws of England and Saint German's 
Doctor and Student. 261 These two works were what would now be 
termed dramatic dialogues in which a pedagogue instructed a student 
in the virtues, the uniqueness, and antiquity of common law. The 
drama and the instruction were necessary because of the threats that 
Roman law and foreign intervention posed to the nascent native 
tradition. On the other side of the divide, Thomas Starkey's dialogue 
on the common laws actively proposed codification and Roman law as 
258. For an excellent recent account of the revels, see RAFFIELD, supra note 158. 
259. Famously, the anonymous SWETNAM THE WOMAN-HATER ARRAIGNED BY 
WOMEN (Meighen 1620) puts the author of a misogynist tract on trial before a "Ladie Chiefe 
Justice." He is sentenced to be muzzled for his barking humor. See also ESTHER 
SOWERNAM, ESTER HATH HANG'D HAMAN: OR AN ANSWERE TO A LEWED PAMPHLET 
(photo reprint, n.d.) (1617). 
260. RICHARD BRATHWAIT, MERCURIUS BRITANNICUS (n.p., circa 1640) puts the 
judges in Hamden's Case on trial before the court of literature. See Peter Goodrich, Amici 
Curiae: Friendship and Other Juristic Performances in Renaissance England, in LORNA 
HUTSON & ERICA SHEEN, LITERATURE, POLITICS AND LAW IN THE RENAISSANCE 
ENGLAND 23, 31-34 (2004). 
261. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, In Praise of the Laws of England, reprinted in ON THE LAWS 
AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 1 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) 
(1468); CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. 
Barton eds., Seldon Society 1974) (1528). 
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remedies for the abuses and irrationality of the leges terrae, or "local 
and common laws. "26 2 In a formally similar vein, Sir Thomas More's 
Utopia was comparably in the genre of dialogue and was famously 
quite dismissive of law and lawyers.263 
In each of the instances cited so cursorily, the threat or the urgency 
of the need for change impelled recourse to the dramatic form. It is a 
genre that still gains expression, great and small, in twentieth-century 
legal thought. There are some instances of minor drama, as for 
example Glanville Williams's comic dialogue, 'A Lawyer's Alice', 
which deals with the issue of meaning in the hands of lawyers.264 There 
were critical dramas, correspondences,26 5  the dialogue of the 
trashers,266 the theatre of the threshold,26 7  and the extended 
conversational narrative of the Rodrigo Chronicles and their 
sequelae.268 The origin of the form, however, was principally 
apologetic; the defense of the faith is the more normal role for lawyers. 
Most pertinent to our theme, therefore, is the grandiose drama 
enacted apologetically by Ronald Dworkin in Law 's Empire.269 It may 
not take the form of an explicit dialogue but it is clearly both fictive 
and theatrical in tone. 
Whatever other functions it may seek to fulfill, Law's Empire is 
both radically dramatic and extremely apologetic. Its project is the 
delineation and defense of a law that only philosophy can properly 
uncover and propound: "The courts are the capitals of law's empire, 
and judges are its princes, but not its seers and prophets. It falls to 
philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for itself, 
the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have."27 0 That is 
262. THOMAS STARKEY, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN REGINALD POLE AND THOMAS 
LUPSET (Kathleen M. Burton ed., Chatto & Windus 1948) (1535), discussed in GOODRICH, 
LANGUAGES, supra note 103, at 71-82. 
263. SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Clarence H. Miller trans., Yale Univ. Press 2001) 
(1516). 
264. Williams, supra note 54. 
265. E.g., Peter Rush, Killing Me Softly with His Words: Hunting the Law Student, 1 
LAW & CRITIQUE 21 (1990); Christopher Stanley, Killing Them Softly with My Words?: 
Responding to Peter Rush, 1 LAW & CRITIQUE 39 (1990). 
266. E.g. , Freeman & Schlegel, supra note 47; Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll 
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
267. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON 
MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 1-22 (1988). 
268. RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC 
TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE (1996); RICHARD 
DELGADO, JUSTICE AT WAR: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS DURING TIMES OF 
CRISIS (2003); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLE: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
AMERICA AND RACE (1995); Richard Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: 
Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2003).  
269. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 48. 
270. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 48, at 407. 
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the project, and it is neither devoid of ambition nor hesitant in its 
claims to truth. Dworkin, from the Hebrew dvorin, or "prophet,"27 1 
takes on the role of the seer and spells out the true form of law. It is 
not an intentionally satirical work but it does perform most of the 
moves of the morality play, the defensive genre of satirical drama. In 
defending the integrity of law, Dworkin calls into being the 
personification of the philosopher judge, a figuration of the social, the 
mask of legal truth, a Titan, a God, of whom Dworkin simply says: 
"Call him Hercules. "27 2 
C. The Figure of Hercules 
Much has been made of the figure of Hercules and of the 
hyperbole and other indiscretions of Law's Empire, the work in which 
Hercules gains his most extended depiction.27 3 The metaphor of 
precedent as the equivalent of a chain novel was satirized early and 
very effectively by Stanley Fish who uses the first verse of a Crosby, 
Stills, and Nash song to explain how Dworkin "Don't Know Much 
About History," and in fact, he points out a little further on, Dworkin, 
like the protagonist in the song, actually doesn't know much of 
anything at all.274 Which is a pretty serious and perhaps risky put down 
of a man who clearly likes to fantasize that he is at the very least on 
nodding terms with Hercules. In any event, the criticism only 
encouraged him, maybe he liked the attention, but whatever the 
reason, whether his heart was open or his shoes too big, it didn't stop 
Dworkin or even give him pause. Put it like this, the theatrical 
grandeur of Law's Empire and the allegorical extremity of its 
heroically Herculean protagonist seemed, indeed, to encourage further 
criticism. Certainly, whether intended or not - and who doesn't feel 
flattered by a little controversy? - the later work elicited some 
radically satirical responses in experimental forms that matched the 
thespian quality of the book, the tome, the scriptural imperium itself. 
Law's Empire is nothing if not a boundary-defining work. If you 
are calling on Hercules, then it is a fair guess that the author views the 
stakes as high and that foundational questions of the legitimacy of law 
are on display. Such scholarly drama may well seem melodramatic to 
the world of legal practice but the point is that there is evident charge. 
It is manifest most obviously in the liberal use of rhetorical figures that 
271. See Goodrich, Omen in Nomen, supra note 56, at 1330 (entry for Dworkin). 
272. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 48, at 239. 
273. See, e.g., DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 55-73. 
274. Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary 
Criticism, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (1982) reprinted in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed.,1983). 
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are usually less prominent in texts that engage with or speak as law. 
There is a dimension of experiment and novelty of form in Dworkin's 
literary reconstructions. It inspired a classic of satirical legal studies, a 
review by Allan Hutchinson of the spurious movie of the book, 
entitled Indiana Dworkin and Law 's Empire.275 
Hutchinson's review is a satire in the manner of Swift. It endeavors 
to make a series of serious and politically engaged points by means of 
an absurdist and highly entertaining review. Borrowing perhaps from 
Sony Pictures, though this would be an instance of reverse causality, he 
starts by citing invented prerelease praise for the movie. Socrates is 
quoted as giving a resoundingly favorable preview: "A new look at 
ancient problems of judicial romance, philosophical mystery, and 
academic adventure. "27 6 John Locke calls it "(a]n enchanting 
performance - it will leave you breathless. "27 7 The plain grandiosity of 
the book is the first butt of satire but it is Dworkin, the Indiana Jones 
or comic-book hero of Law's Empire, and his sidekick, the 
"superhuman " Hercules, who are most remorselessly lampooned. 
After outlining the narrative sequence of the movie and detailing 
certain of the set pieces, Hutchinson moves to present a series of spoof 
reviews purportedly culled from a cross-section of journals - The 
Journal of Film Optics to the Lizard.278 
The reviews get down and personal. The first one cites no less a 
figure or figures than Shakespeare to make the claim that Dworkin is a 
"lunatic " and the author of "airy nothing. "27 9 Written as a review in 
The Journal of Film Optics, probably coda for the actual (and 
appropriately titled) journal Camera Obscura, the rest of the review 
plays with the figure of vision and the gender of the gaze. Dworkin is 
"uniocular " in his approach and Law's Empire "is a land of the blind 
in which the one-eyed lawyer has become king. "28 0 The Empire is also 
a male bastion in which women are invisible, defective, or just 
occasionally, by accident or indecision, "as important as men. "28 1 In 
other reviews, we are treated to excoriations of Dworkin's 
megalomania, his imperialistic designs, his sexism, and his racism. In a 
review purporting to be from the Lizard, a short-lived journal to which 
275. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin, supra note 35. 
276. Id. at 637. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 650-60. 
279. Id. at 650 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM, act 
V, SC. I, IL 7-8, 14-18). 
280. See id. at 652. 
281. Id. 
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I will return,282 Dworkin is shown to be self-serving, incoherent, lazy, 
and a coward. 28 3 
Let us conclude with the simple overall observation that the satire 
seeks to expose and politicize a contradiction. For all his talk of justice 
and principle, Dworkin perpetrates numerous injustices of textual 
interpretation. That is not a hopeful sign in a work that seeks to 
become "the . .. silent prologue to any decision at law."284 And when it 
comes to the social reality of inequality, Dworkin is simply fraudulent 
in his refusal to even acknowledge let alone address the plight of 
"many women, gays, blacks, or Indians," to which Hutchinson adds 
those who live below the poverty line, who have no medical insurance, 
who are unemployed, homeless, incarcerated, put to death, and much, 
much more.28 5 They are simply not part of the Herculean world or 
domain of philosophical presupposition that Law's Empire promotes. 
The heroic dream that the figure of Hercules serves to promulgate is 
unconsciously elitist - racist, sexist, and overwhelming committed to 
the status quo. That at least is what the Lizard critic thought. The view 
from the radical center. 
D. Literary Criticisms of the Law 
Hutchinson derides and overturns in a manifestly unusual literary 
form, at least unusual for the law review. His satirical send-up borrows 
from earlier traditions of dialogue but offers an immediacy and 
experimentalism that was and remains highly unusual. The textualist 
turn had pitched literature against law, interpretation against truth. All 
of the earlier ad hominem satires cited were engaged not simply with 
demarcating the boundary between law and literature but also with 
questions of style, and related issues of the avoidance or espousal of 
supposedly nonrhetorical rhetorical figures. Law's Empire adopted a 
literary motif and was challenged satirically by critics who believed 
that his annexation of interpretation to a singular philosophical 
position was self-contradictory and disingenuous. For all such praise of 
the literary, it has been rare to see experimentation in the drama or 
style of critical works. It is too hard to get such essays published in law 
reviews claimed an author in the short-lived satirical broadsheet the 
Lizard.286 To which the answer, presumably, should be: Why try? 
Hutchinson published, and republished, as is the modern way, 
several dialogues, a play, an invented judicial opinion, and a fairy tale 
282. See infra Part III.F. 
283. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin, supra note 35, at 657-58. 
284. Id. at 640 (quoting DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 48, at 90). 
285. Id. at 660. 
286. Notes from the Margin, LIZARD, Jan. 6, 1984, at 6. 
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in a collection bearing a title from a Van Morrison song and with a 
quip at the end of the preface: "Finally, for the convenience of 
reviewers, if I am so blessed, I have left in a number of glaring 
inconsistencies and blatant contradictions. "287 The book was published 
in Canada, and in truth it did not get that many reviewers, but those 
who did take it on all found cause to mention and disapprove of that 
final prefatory remark.288 God forbid, as it were, that a satirical work 
should make fun of itself. There was an element of self-criticism in 
Hutchinson's humor, a dimension of satirical self-mockery, that can 
also be detected in the other signal works of stylistically experimental 
legal satire. A few further examples follow. 
There is, for instance, the drama that unfolds in the final chapter of 
Postmodern Jurisprudence. It starts with a trio of lecturers - law 
professors in U.S. parlance - stealing a postgraduate student's essay 
and seeking to publish it as their own. A case of plagiarism. One which 
raises some issues of copyright law, authorship, and authenticity. To 
complicate matters and make things more interesting, the article is 
rejected by the journal to which it is sent. It forms the object of 
analysis of a nontriumphal concluding essay in which the collision of 
literature and law is finely staged. It ends with the narrator deciding to 
abandon law for a career in literature. He will devote himself to 
criticism, or that at least is the plan, because there are already too 
many "failed English profs pretending to be writers. Now the lawyers 
are getting into it. "28 9 
So the lawyer protagonist of the law review style of article moves 
into the domain of the literary, and as is common among neophyte 
novelists, starts out with criticism. A book arrives in the mail. No 
choice but to review it: 
I have heard that some unscrupulous reviewers read only one chapter of 
the book, chosen randomly, and then write reviews twice the length of 
the original. Not me, sir. Not Peter. I have morals, a system. I read the 
first and the last sentence. Entry and exit. You see the actor get in and 
you know the rest. Spend a couple of hours looking at the audience. 
More interesting. The play's the thing; the more they get into the play, 
the more you can see of them. And then when the actor leaves, you know 
who's got style. Entry for interest. Exit for style.290 
287. HUTCHINSON, supra note 267, at ix. 
288. E.g. , Alison Young, Dwelling on the Threshold, 9 lNT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 315, 318 
(1990) (finding the ludic and parodic features of the essays both annoying and insightful). 
289. DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 270. 
290. Id. at 271. I cannot help myself from mentioning the allusion to "Not me, Sir. Not 
Peter." Id. It is a subtextual issue but the eruption of names and other attributions in 
academic texts is not without significance, and that significance is all too easily lost or rapidly 
deflated by the passage of time and changes in geography or circumstance. So the Peter in 
question is as likely as not the Peter on the back cover of the book who extols its virtues of 
radicalism and erudition. (The blurb reads, in part: "Postmodern Jurisprudence is a work of 
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It is a scene that certainly challenges most conceptions of legal theory 
as a prosaic discipline descriptive, if not of doctrine, at least of rules. It 
is a scene that led one reviewer to observe quizzically that what he had 
in his hand appeared to be a book.29 1 But he clearly wasn't too sure. 
The review of Law's Empire the movie, and the novelistic ending 
in the form of a disputed essay and an imaginary copyright case are 
both fairly explicitly satirical interruptions of the usual form of legal 
discourse. They function to expose the rhetoric or implicit drama of 
the text being studied, they offer an alternative dramatization and the 
opportunity of thinking about the law differently, of changing the 
political currency, of calling attention to how it is that law gets 
thought. To be effective, such alternative dramatization needs to 
compete effectively with the dominant prosaic form.29 2 That is a 
difficult task according to Bierce's Unabridged Devil's Dictionary, 
because it requires a sense of humor, and that is rare among lawyers 
(or at least reserved for the off hours).29 3 Its appeal, such as it may be, 
granted that it is published in law reviews and monographs, in book­
length articles or, more precisely, reprints of door-stopping stature, is 
remarkable scholarship and of a Renaissance erudition of disciplines." - Peter Goodrich, 
Faculty of Law; Birkbeck College, University of London.) Had he really, and would it be 
moral for him simply to scan the first and last lines? The first line, Chapter 1: "There is an 
old and beautiful story; once, in some long distant past, people lived in a state of peace, 
plenty (or at least sufficiency), truth and beauty." Id. at 3. And last line, same theme, circle 
rounded, too long to quote in full. After referencing the fact that "(a]ny reference to real 
persons in this novel essay is purely fictitious and coincidental," it goes on to say that " [t]he 
authors have exercised every possible care to avoid misrepresenting the views of any 
characters . . . .  " and intend no libel. Id. at 271. The beautiful fiction of the beginning has 
become an inoffensive coincidence by the end. A strange deflation or loss of nerve perhaps. 
A defense of the irreal by irreal means, and a quiet subversion notwithstanding. And it also 
gives a clear frame, a good marker of the status of the work, its interdisciplinary ambition, its 
elision of antique and ultramodern, law and fiction. Indeed, why read more than one would 
remember? Why not admit to a system? The attribution is pretty good, in other words, but 
the method is wrong. Not first and last lines, "enter" and "exeunt," but rather a reading of 
law's petrae, and so of the textual structure. Here that means scanning of names, looking for 
Peter or for the foundations, the tables of law, the law of text in the texts of law. Not what 
was said, but where it was said and to whom it was sent. Not the fiction but the actors and 
their play. 
291. B.S. Jacksori, The Wisdom of the Inessential, 12 LEGAL STUD. 103 (1992) (reviewing 
DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27) (starting, "[t]he object in my hand has all the appearances 
of a book, indeed an academic book from a reputable publisher . . .  " and ending the opening 
paragraph, "[i]n short, the book is a glorious contradiction in terms"). 
292. THOMAS MATHIESON, THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION 1-19 (1974) (describing 
competing contradictions and the politics of the unfinished). 
293. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 308-09 (Albert & Charles Boni, Inc. 
1925) (1911). Bierce defines "satire": 
Id. 
An obsolete kind of literary composition in which the vices and follies of the author's 
enemies were expounded with imperfect tenderness. In this country satire never had more 
than a sickly and uncertain existence, for the soul of it is wit, wherein we are dolefully 
deficient, the humor that we mistake for it, like all humor, being tolerant and sympathetic. 
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clearly to an audience based in the academy, students and professors, 
pedagogues and future lawyers, thinkers skilled in the art of 
photocopying more often than reading, in citing more copiously than 
they or their assistants have had time to peruse. 
E. Critical Legal Studies and Beyond 
Dramatizations seek to lure law out of its lair. Their aim is to show 
law for what it is, either the theological ground of the social or the 
yoke under which the oppressed are forced to march. In either case, 
the use of the theatrical or novelistic itself threatens the boundaries of 
legal scholarly discourse; it is precisely such use of the literary and 
theatrical form that invokes the defensive satire or simple dismissal, 
the Horatian scorn, of scholars such as Posner, Nussbaum, Finnis, and 
Dworkin. 29 4  One might say that satire incites satire in response. When 
the comfortable are afflicted, they tend to inflict discomfort upon 
those whose temerity has led them to challenge the order of things, the 
truth, the proper forms. A defense ensues in which invective is met in 
kind. The legitimacy of the legitimate has to be verified and reaffirmed 
even if in affirming the purity of the orthodoxy it is tarnished a little 
with the venom of the ad nominem and the impurities of passion. The 
hegemonies have to be watered. It is necessary sometimes, as Paul was 
wont for a while to do, to kick against the pricks. If it is a question of 
legitimacy then, to coin a phrase, you need to start talking. No accident 
it turns out that one of the inaugural critical legal texts, the accessible 
one,29 5 was a dialogue, replete with kitchen scenes, the roll call of 
friends, a kettle boiling, and an element of self-parody in the use of 
arcane terms and other legalisms. 29 6  Wittingly or unwittingly, the 
dialogic form opens up legal education, and to a lesser extent legal 
doctrine, to the lives of those who profess it and to the experience of 
those who study it. Dialogue brings the law professor together with the 
law that is professed, it forces the somnolent archive into the diurnal 
space of the living. All of which means that the rhetorical effect of 
dialogue is broadly to attach legal doctrine and rules to persons and 
places, and that in and of itself renders the beginnings of an 
accounting. 
The dialogue that founds critical legal studies as a movement with 
a satirical wing borrows more or less selfconsciously from Situationist 
294. See supra Part Il.B-C, III.C. 
295. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 266, at 9-1 1 .  The inaccessible one was Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983). See 
Carrington, supra note 47; Peter Goodrich, Law and Modernity, 49 Moo. L. REV. 545 (1986) 
(rebuttal). 
296. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 266, at 5-9. 
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and related theories of staging the politics of law.29 7  The use of the 
theatrical, of scene and dialogue, is a mode of attempting to compete 
with the drama of law, indeed to seize its dramatic qualities for radical 
or, in other eras, apologetic goals. One of the earliest critical legal texts 
in Europe, Bankowski and Mungham's Images of Law, expressly 
presents the theory of satirical re-enactment of law's dramas. Under 
the rubric of "seizing the law," it argues precisely for a method of 
parodic dramatization. Bankowski and Mungham's emblematic parody 
is taken from the Chicago Conspiracy Trial and, specifically, Abbie 
Hoffman's attempt to turn the trial into a farce - a genre of popular 
legal theater that dates back, as we have seen, to the Basoche. Most 
famously, in cross-examination as to whether he had pissed in the 
direction of the Pentagon, the dialogue went as follows. 
Q.: Did you ever on a prior occasion state that a sense of integration 
possesses you and comes from pissing on the Pentagon? 
A.: I said from combining political attitudes with biological necessity, 
there is a sense of integration, yes. I think I said it that way, not the way 
you said it, but -
Q.: You had a good time at the Pentagon, didn't you, Mr. Hoffman? 
A.: Yes I did, I am having a good time now. Could I - I feel that 
biological necessity now. Could I be excused for a slight recess?298 
Far-fetched or irresponsible though the theory of the trial as farce may 
seem to contemporary eyes,299 the project of challenging the 
established theatre of law and exposing its dramatic qualities, its 
routine staging or choreography of the scene of reason, is a key 
dimension of satirical critique. 
There is an element of stylistic hedonism to dialogue and theater. It 
draws an audience in, it helps a reader to identify with the theme being 
expounded, and it takes the law outside of its normal doctrinal or more 
properly dogmatic modes of exposition. There is nothing directly 
satirical about Patricia Williams's The Alchemy of Race and Rights, to 
use the example of the most stylistically controversial of critical texts, 
but its use of biography, conversation, and anecdote capture a world 
297. See Berman, supra note 220, at 1005-07. 
298. ZENON BANKOWSKI & GEOFF MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW 132 (1976) (quoting 
THE TALES OF HOFFMAN 149-50 (Mark L. Levine et al. eds., 1971)). For further discussion 
of the trial as farce, see Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: 
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 1 1  N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 381 
(1983), discussing the use of ridicule and resistance in the courtroom. See also Peter 
Goodrich, Zenotypes: On the Modes of Reproduction of Critical Lawyers, 1 1  Soc. & LEGAL 
STUD. 425 (2002) [hereinafter Goodrich, Zenotypes]. 
299. For a contemporary accounting of the trauma of trials, see SHOSHANA FELMAN, 
THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND TRAUMAS IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 
(2002). 
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that dogma strives to exclude.300 It was in that sense a gentle satire, and 
all the more powerful for the apparently mundane and descriptive 
quality of its narratives. Richard Delgado's dialogues, The Rodrigo 
Chronicles, filled the law reviews in the 1980s and 1990s and perform a 
similar formal function: they force the question of style and aesthetic 
to consciousness and open up the generally repressed question of the 
subjective experiences of law students as well as of professors and 
lawyers. The radicalism of the latter function lies also in the 
historically marginal quality of the experiences being expressed. To 
read an essay on property that bases its argument upon biographical 
reminiscences of forebears who were slaves was shocking to the 
genteel and secluded preconceptions of the legal academy.3 0 1  There 
hadn't been many such authors in the academy before. And in the 
same vein, Rodrigo was able to capture a diversity and spirit that had 
previously not simply been excluded but unimagined in law school.3 0 2  
Rodrigo was a student who, both literally and metaphorically, called 
Socratically on his professor. He would walk in to his office, phone 
him at home, quiz him on the literature, challenge his politics, run into 
him at the market, and more. The professor, like Prufrock, was 
allowed to have 'doubts', frustrations, a biography indeed, and even 
prior and subsisting failings. He even had tone - skin tone. Radical 
stuff for a profession that has historically claimed that the lawyer, the 
iurisperitus, or "the legally wise," carry all the texts of the law in their 
breast.3 0 3  
Every new relationship, according to the psychoanalyst Julia 
Kristeva, leads to a new correspondence.304 Every new correspondence 
is expressive of a new love. So too with style. A new style expresses 
novel experiences, a different relationship to both world and law. That 
is particularly true of the dramatic style, which was historically foreign 
300. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 51; PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 
(1995) (hereinafter WILLIAMS, ROOSTER'S EGG); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR 
BLIND FuTURE (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, COLOR BLIND]. On reactions to Williams's 
work, see Goodrich & Mills, supra note 182, at 26-29. 
301. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 51, at 17-19, 216. 
302. See especially, Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of 
Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Richard Delgado, The Imperial 
Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1349 (1992). 
303. The Latin maxim is omnia scrinia habet in pectore sua - "the emperor carries all of 
the texts in his breast." Or heart, or head. Doesn't really matter. The point is that what is 
inscribed internally, the word of the heart (verbum cordis as it used to be called) can hardly 
be challenged. Or at least to admit you were wrong would be to question your innards which 
is not a trait in which lawyers excel. On all of which, see Peter Goodrich, A Theory of the 
Nomogram, in LAW, TEXT, TERROR (Lior Barshack et al. eds., forthcoming 2005). 
304. JULIA KRISTEVA, TALES OF LOVE 15 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 1987), discussed in 
Peter Goodrich, Epistolary Justice: The Love Letter as Law, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 345 
(1997). 
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to dogma and law except in the moments of its greatest crisis, of 
juridical reformation and counter-reformation. It is a style, we should 
recollect, that for long periods of time was censored by law as being 
too competitive and too seductive, two things that lawyers particularly 
fear, namely, the judges being judged or their erotic attraction to law 
being exposed.3 0 5  With the diaries and the chronicles, with dialogue 
and drama, came radical new visions, new colors, and new bodies. 
Borrowing from Arthur Leff's fine though only partially completed 
dictionary of law, it was as if B, "another frequent participant in legal 
hypotheticals, with a tendency toward victimization, as in 'A hits B,"' 
had turned the tables on A.306 
Feminism and critical race theory ineradicably changed the style of 
legal scholarship, but they were not often explicitly satirical 
enterprises.3 0 7  Their contributions to the dramaturgy of legal writing 
come as substantive contributions, as criticism, as the expression of 
historical exclusion, and hence will be addressed more fully in looking 
at criticism as the content of satire. For the moment, in relation to 
drama as a genre of legal satire, the manner of politicizing law through 
calling attention to the mode of its scholarly or professional staging, its 
language and literary forms of life, plays upon the most fragile of 
boundaries between rule and expression, as also between self and 
other in both disciplinary and existential senses. It is, in sum, a 
destabilizing intervention, and the fact that it is necessarily so is 
nowhere better evidenced than in the little-remembered, generally 
unloved, short-lived, yet satirically exquisite pages of the Lizard. 
F. The Lizard 
The Lizard was the unofficial, indeed disclaimed, organ of the 
Critical Legal Conference for a brief interlude in the 1980s. Right at 
the beginning of the movement, not that the movement lasted very 
305. That Jaw operates according to a strange scene of love, and that it is as a discipline 
an obscure object of desire, is an argument interestingly elaborated upon in JUDITH BUTLER, 
THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER (1998). She is not easy to read - I am not above admitting 
that Nussbaum is on to something, see supra notes 200-207 - but the point is a good one. 
Fuller elaborations of the connections and occlusions around desire and Jaw can be found 
most usefully in LEGENDRE, L'AMOUR, supra note 1 15; PIERRE LEGENDRE, JOUIR Du 
POUVOIR (1976). 
306. Leff, Dictionary, supra note 179, at 2113. Contrast B with A: "In legal hypotheticals 
'a', usually capitalized, is ordinarily one of the important parties, with a composite 
personality more aggressive than that of any other Jetter, e.g., 'A hits B' . . .  and so on." Id. at 
1855. 
307. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 51, at 8, posits that literary devices such as 
parody, parable, and poetry were the textual hallmarks of feminism and critical race theory. 
DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 
(1994) [hereinafter BELL, CONFRONTING] addresses the issues of confrontation and allegory. 
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long,308 it spawned a satirical newsletter that lampooned the 
composition and leadership of the Conference as well as mocking the 
established dogma of the academy. Juxtaposed with a scathing parody 
of the boredom of AALS sessions on doctrine are a series of self­
mocking debates about the role of theory in critical legal studies, the 
exclusion of feminists, and a nicely realistic Ann Slanders's advice 
column giving homilies to your averagely timid, moderately radical, 
tenure-track crit.309 In later issues, after the inaugural Conference in 
Wisconsin, the divisions of age, race, and gender that were later - in 
fact quite rapidly - to fragment critical legal studies, are proleptically 
sent up in parodic pieces on the hierarchy of the movement, on the 
exclusivity of the network, on the status obsessions of the members, 
the sexism of their practice, and even an essay by Mark Tushnet on 
being a bad teacher.310 There is a remarkable exchange of letters 
generated by a confession of erotic desire for female students made by 
a male professor to the Ann Slanders column.3 11 Ann Slanders 
immediately admits that she is a man. There is a piece on the "trashers 
trashed," 31 2 and a thoughtful note on "the diagonal focus syndrome "31 3 
that affects lower-status law professors and unemployed teachers at 
AALS conferences. 
My sense is that the Lizard, the Lizard Reborn, the Reptile, and 
Casual Legal Studies were unpopular - against the grain of 
professional self-enhancement or contrary to the antagonistic 
seriousness of sixties politics - and short-lived publications that 
people rapidly placed in the back burners of their memories. Telling 
Roberto to learn how to write, confessing to failing as teachers, 
pointing out that the critical legal studies movement was in practice a 
job-seeking network for estranged middle-class white men, or exposing 
the fact that these antilawyers were professionally committed and 
taking good money for teaching law, wasn't helping. The spirit of the 
308. It was always an endangered species according to DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE 
OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS: A Comment on the 
Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013 (1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Psycho-Social 
CLS]. For commentary, see Peter Goodrich, Duncan Kennedy as I Imagine Him: The Man, 
the Work, His Scholarship, and the Polity, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 971 (2001) [hereinafter 
Goodrich, Duncan Kennedy]. For the alternative view, see Fischl, supra note 13. 
309. Ann Slanders, Advice to the Forlorn, LIZARD, Jan. 5,  1984, at 3; Debates About 
Theory Within Critical Legal Studies, LIZARD, Jan. 5, 1984, at 3; Feminism and Critical Legal 
Studies, LIZARD, Jan. 5, 1984, at 3. The Reptile also had an advice column written by Ms. 
Demeanor. See REPTILE, Feb. 5, 1987, at 3. 
310. E.g. , Mark Tushnet, On Being a Bad Law Teacher, LIZARD REBORN (Conference 
on Critical Legal Studies, Buffalo, N.Y.), May, 1987, at 22. 
311 .  Ann Slanders, Forbidden Love: Towards an Erotics of Law Teaching, LIZARD, Jan. 
7, 1984, at 3, 5. 
312 Trashers Trashed!, supra note 47, at 1-2. 
313. The Diagonal Focus Syndrome, LIZARD, Jan. 7, 1984, at 7. 
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times was revolutionary, and proletarian sympathizers wanted 
seriousness, praxis, or activism, a road map to the here and now of 
fundamental contradictions and structural change, not jokes, student 
rebellion, or self-analysis in the mode of ridicule. The traditional left 
was never big on communication skills, social competence, humor, or 
self-analysis, and they certainly didn't like having those failings 
exposed. Satirical legal studies, to use the jargon, fast became an 
infantile disorder. 3 14 That, or in a more sympathetic and directed vein, 
the humorists came too close to the bone, they were too prone to 
telling the truth, and just to lick the wound a little, the satirists were 
right. Mark Tushnet is now (or rather was until recently) President of 
AALS, the bastion of law school normal science, leader of the 
establishment forces, and there were not a few other career gear shifts 
that I won't detail here. I have gotten into enough trouble before.3 15 
Leave it at that. 
Look back over the short run of the Lizard - I know it is hard to 
get ahold of so I can happily send you copies or provide you with a 
reference for the librarian - and conduct a structural analysis of the 
contents. First off, the Lizard fairly uniformly takes the critical legal 
left to task for the conservatism of its positions, institutional origins, 
and positions of power. It is all about Harvard Law School, and, as the 
Casual Legal Studies cartoons in particular show, that means it is about 
everything and about nothing. Harvard Law School is exemplary of 
corporate buyout, of aggrandizing status credentials, and of a symbolic 
economy that the legal left participated in and benefited from while 
purportedly trying to bring it down.3 16 It is that paradox, that 
unavoidable irony, that inevitable uncertainty that the Lizard in 
essence plays upon and dances around. The themes that the Lizard so 
deftly and brazenly addressed are precisely those that spelled out the 
internal contradiction, the bad faith of the legal left on an existential 
plane. The Lizard early on predicted what would happen in practice -
the very site that the traditional crits were claiming in moralizing 
314. VLADMIR IL'ICH LENIN, "LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM, AN INFANTILE DISORDER 
(1920). For those too young to be disordered, the phrase referred to the immature or merely 
rebellious spirit of those bourgeois radicals who could not bring themselves to comprehend 
the importance of structural change: dictatorship of the proletariat, destruction of the state, 
in particular, as the only feasible or scientific path to communist idyll. For a comprehensive 
study of the new left in these terms, see NIGEL YOUNG, AN INFANTILE DISORDER? THE 
CRISIS AND DECLINE OF THE NEW LEFT (1977). 
315. Peter Goodrich, The Critic's Love of the Law: Intimate Observations on an Insular 
Jurisdiction, 10 LAW & CRmQUE 343 (1999) [hereinafter Goodrich, Critic's Love]. 
316. Though that is not one hundred percent true. One consequence of critical legal 
studies was undoubtedly that it brought the political troubles and tenure wars at Harvard to 
national attention. It was bad press - or good press, depending on where you stood - but 
whichever it was, one effect was that it lowered the currency of Harvard Law School and 
loosened its grip upon the academic job market in law. Not a great deal, but some. And that 
is something. 
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fashion to be their own. Thus the Lizard focuses on the interior of 
practical questions. Why are law students depressed? Why is law 
school so intellectually unadventurous, so dull? What are law 
professors afraid of? Why are law professors so often moonlighting, 
teaching on the side, or writing briefs for corporations or novels for the 
market? If that is what they are doing, why not teach the novels, admit 
the fictions as well? Why set blind exams? Why not have relationships 
with students? Or at least, when half the faculty has married students 
or former students, why not recognize that teaching does involve a 
relationship and that there will be erotic charge or antagonism in them 
if the teaching is good? And then again, with great proleptic insight: 
Why hasn't Harvard Law School appointed any women of color? 
What is the relationship between whiteness and knowledge? And in 
cartoon form, here is how the tenure wars, the Dean search, and the 
everyday classroom, look. 
Politics is the art of the possible. The crits didn't win but they did 
change the coinage. The Lizard, the organ of the satirical wing, is 
much the most entertaining and accessible record of what the 
movement wanted, what it was, and what it bequeathed in the end. 
The satirists dramatized the all too human failings of the movement. 
They marked what was great and what was small, what would survive, 
and what would fall apart. It was satire that most directly tabulated the 
change in the symbolic economy, the alteration in the currency, the 
shifting form of legal knowledge. Satire wasn't everything but it was 
the satirical, the outrageous, the humorous, and the boundary crossing 
that was picked up in the media, made it to the magazine section, and 
gave the movement a political edge in the domain of politics and in the 
international forum of the reproduction of lawyering. In a very 
positive but - until I spelled this out - unrecognized form, it was a 
return or a renewal of the tradition of the Basoche and of the revel, 
carnival encountering law, theater facing off against prose, the 
jocoserium, or "humorously serious." 
Given a history that began with the banning of theater, it is 
unsurprising that lawyers should not pay overmuch or willing attention 
to the dramatic either inside or outside law. It is their fond belief, their 
necessary fiction, that law is staged as argument and advocacy rather 
than as selfconscious forensic theater. Lawyers study the rhetoric of 
trial for instrumental reasons, not as a symbolic form intrinsic to the 
social meaning and political purposes of the legal order. No, that 
would be much too political; only social anthropologists or 
ethnographers acknowledge the theatrical bent of lawyers, the 
choreographical skills of judges, or the baroque intricacies of 
legislative performances. To study the costumes, stages, and players, 
the roles and performances, good or bad, is not law but only para-law, 
marginal legal studies, work that cannot make it into the solemnized 
space of the discipline performing its rites of reproduction. The object 
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of study seemingly permeates the method and the reception of the 
study itself. 
A personal anecdote, though I am sure it will get removed 
somewhere along the line by one of the Homerically talented fact­
checking teams. I fondly recollect the Arthurian-styled Round Table 
of the Semiotics of Law, which used to meet annually in Reading, 
Pennsylvania. It had its purity as well as its invisibility but the cause 
was a good one: Why not study law as a system of signs? What about 
the communicative and symbolic dimensions of legality? The 
aesthetics of trial? The literal visibility of justice being done? These 
weren't questions that interested the normal law professor - if that is 
not too much of a misnomer, I have yet to meet one - but the 
interesting point is that it was a site of humor and curiously 
informative performances. There was the tax barrister from Sydney, 
Australia, who showed a slide of himself in his underwear and then 
superimposed his formal legal dress upon a map of those parts of the 
city where he was legally entitled to wear them. The sartorial in 
Sydney. From classroom to courtroom but nowhere else in the 
metropolis could he wear his formal legal attire. A matter of traditions 
and manners and so of the very essence of law. But it would take a 
stretch (a limo at least) to get the Faculty to leave the metropolis for a 
comparative thesis on court dress.3 17 
To all of which it simply has to be said: Don't let them grind you 
down - nil carborundum. Where critics of the law have pointed out 
the dramatics and the melodrama of law, its tragic-comic self­
importance, its burlesque mystery, its labyrinthine obscurity, they may 
well have been dismissed and their own texts, dialogues, and other 
disquisitions have been treated as theatrical, as merely comedic or 
satirical. What did you expect? Short-term victories or immediate 
profit? No. This is a question of the long term, the backgame. Let's see 
who wins in the end. For the meantime, it is no big surprise that satire 
and semiotics alike are deemed to be outside of legal studies proper or, 
as Leiter likes it, simpliciter. To put it in aphoristic form, scratch a 
lawyer and find a Latinist. Distrust both. 
317. The English press labeled semiotics "semi-idiotics" way back in the early 1980s 
when it made its first Anglophone appearances in literary criticism. That kind of scholar was 
consigned to a satellite campus of a State University squarely in the midst of the death of the 
East Coast. The record and monument of the Round Table, its Camelot as it were, can be 
found in the ten or so volumes of annual proceedings. 1-3 LAW AND SEMIOTICS (Roberta 
Kevelson ed., 1987-89) (first through third Round Tables); 2, 3, 6-8, 10 SEMIOTICS AND THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1991-95) (fourth through ninth Round Tables); 1 1  
SEMIOTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (John Brigham & Roberta Kevelson eds., 1996). 
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IV. THE SUBLIME AND THE RIDICULOUS 
There can be no doubt that a significant dimension of satirical legal 
studies resides in the deflation of the pretensions of authority. As the 
Lizard exemplified, the pretensions of authority are not confined to 
the established legal academy or AALS, but they rear their head 
within the hierarchy that any process of institutionalization requires.31 8  
The Critical Legal Conference did not lack for efforts at the sublime, 
and it stood to reason that these should be deflated. The sublime is 
made for satire and exists so as to become ridiculous. That is the ethos 
and justification at least of satirical legal studies. The dogmatic and the 
doctrinal are there to be trashed. It was the legal realists who made 
this an art and a practice. They brought the dogma down to earth for a 
while. Law, in Holmes's aphorism, is not a brooding omnipresence in 
the sky. Failure to recognize that fact lends itself to the production of a 
legal science that is in the main a theological pursuit, 3 1 9  and to the 
proliferation of legal abstractions that are best described as 
transcendental nonsense.3 20 It was not, however, the judicious Holmes 
who made the latter and trashing statement but rather Felix Cohen.3 21 
A. The Legal Realists 
The scions of substantive satire in the twentieth century were the 
legal realists. Their historians have tended to miss this point or in the 
usual manner of legists they have simply regarded it as incidental and 
frankly irrelevant to the serious doctrinal and methodological points 
that the realists, their mentors, 3 22 or forebears had to offer. Yet it was 
humor, satire in fact, that brought the edifice of legal science crashing 
down in the first half of the twentieth century. Judicial formalism and 
academic legal positivism were reduced to rubble by satire, not by 
seriousness or the subtleties of critical dogmatics. Indeed, when it 
came to teaching law or writing casebooks, Karl Llewellyn's self­
criticisms could easily have appeared in the Lizard. Discussing, in a 
footnote, the slavish traditionalism of the course books produced by 
318. Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS, supra note 308, at 1013-16. 
319. Holmes, Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880). 
320. On Holmes's metaphysics, see DUXBURY, PATTERNS, supra note 47, at 33-65. 
321. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809 (1935). 
322. WILLIAM TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT, at viii 
(1985). Though Twining himself did go in for some bizarre if not particularly funny modes of 
self-expression. He has been wont to discuss the University of Rutland School of Law, see 
TwINING, BLACKSTONE'S, supra note 37, at 66-67, attending juristic bazaars, and the 
jurisprudence of Xanadu. William Twining, The Great Juristic Bazaar, 14 J. SOC'Y PUB. 
TCHRS. L. 185 (1978). 
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even the most "freakish" of realists, himself included, Llewellyn had 
this to say: 
The Man from Mars would find trouble finding significant differences 
between these books, or between any of them and a case-book of 
Langdell or Beale, or Costigan. It is not merely that all butterflies have 
wings, but that within one species of butterfly, color and spots are much 
alike; and all lay eggs that hatch out after their own kind. You need a 
micrometer to measure the freak-component. Yet that is the component 
which gives the books such value as they have.323 
The text accompanying the self-deprecatory footnote is a classic of 
trashing. It trashes "so-called legal education," for its normality and its 
"deadly sanity." 3 24 It pleads for "freak persons and freak policies" and 
deplores their absence from Columbia, Harvard, and Yale: "But I wish 
to make it clear that I am not attacking these three schools, as such, or 
any of them. Shabby and silly as they are, I know of no schools less 
shabby or less silly."325 It is a classic piece of trashing: funny, inventive, 
and iconoclastic. It ends by saying that so-called legal education, even 
in the so-called best schools, is "inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul" 
and the parting words are: "Altogether it makes one think of Pilgrim's 
Progress. But whether the stage be Slough of Despond or Vanity Fair 
is hard to tell." 3 26 That, as one might say, is way harsh, and that is the 
point. Satire should be. 
Llewellyn's complaint was that legal science was an otherworldly 
venture. In common with the other legal realists, Scandinavian and 
American, he wanted to turn the attention of legal educators away 
from the nether world, the heaven of concepts, the afterlife of rules, to 
the present tense practicum: "'My brother Gray,' runs one garbled 
version of a story, 'has taught you what the law Used to be; my brother 
Ames has taught you what the law Ought to be; I intend, with your 
indulgence, to give some attention to what the law Is."' 3 27 In the rest of 
the piece, Llewellyn goes after what Pierre Schlag, a contemporary 
legal satirist, has called "the jurisprudence of the holding pattern," 3 28 
by way of analogy to the flight path of planes rerouted while coming 
into O'Hare Airport in Chicago. Legal concepts were just never 
making it to the ground. They were staying in nubibus as we Latinists 
are fond of putting it. 
323. K.N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 651 ,  652 n.1 (1935). 
324. Id. at 651 .  
325. Id. at 651-52. 
326. Id. at 678. 
327. Id. at 672. 
328. PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW 21 (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, 
LA YING DOWN]. For an analysis in terms of the failure of reason, see PIERRE SCHLAG, THE 
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT]. 
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The major point made by the first trashers was one that had earlier 
and coincident expressions in Scandinavian legal realists' belief that 
legal words were magical, and in truth no more real than any other 
chimera or fantasm.3 29 Legal science was predicated upon an 
unwarranted metaphysics, a holdover from earlier theological systems 
of belief, the equivalent of astrology or magic. Lawyers, according to 
Jerome Frank, were playing wizard long before Kennedy was 
publishing the Lizard.330 In truth the legal realist critique of the make­
believe worlds of legal concepts are well documented and much 
discussed, both back then and now. There was quite a debate and 
much of it was satirical but the medium got lost for the message. Let's 
return for that reason to the question of critical humor and the 
trashing form. 
The most direct and fluent statement of the trashing mode comes 
under the auspices of no less an authority than the "Shade of Von 
Jhering," a tum-of-the-century German historical jurisprude.3 3 1  In a 
rightly celebrated article debunking the "transcendental nonsense " of 
legal theory, the felicitous Cohen begins with "a curious dream."3 3 2  A 
German jurist dreamed he had died and was taken to a special heaven 
reserved for legal theorists. "In this heaven one met, face to face, the 
many concepts of jurisprudence in their absolute purity."3 3 3  The spirits 
of good faith and bad faith, property, possession, laches, and right in 
rem were all there and hanging out together with the logical 
instruments needed to transform these legal concepts and "to solve the 
most beautiful of legal problems."3 3 4  Among the machines was a 
"dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an 
indefinite number of meanings out of any text or statute, an apparatus 
for constructing fictions, and a hair-splitting machine that could divide 
a single hair into 999,999 equal parts and, when operated by the most 
expert jurists, could split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal 
parts."3 3 5  The punch line - wait for it - was that this heaven was 
"open to all properly qualified jurists," with only one entry 
329. On which school, see M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE 731-781 (6th ed. 1994) (1959). Specifically on legal concepts as magical 
thinking, see KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 1 12-122 (1939), arguing the close link 
between "imaginary notions in the law and in magic."  
330. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
62-79 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter FRANK, COURTS) (on "wizards and lawyers"); see also 
RODELL, supra note 161, at 1-20 (on "modern medicine-men"). 
331 . Cohen, supra note 321, at 809; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN 
MIND 217-221 (2d ed. 1931) [hereinafter FRANK, MODERN MIND). 
332. Cohen, supra note 321, at 809. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
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requirement: they had to drink the Lethean draught (an early version, 
I suspect, of interstellar Romulan ale) "which induced forgetfulness" 
of all human affairs. "But for the most accomplished jurists the 
Lethean draught was entirely superfluous. They had nothing to 
forget. ,,3 36 
The debunking of transcendental nonsense that follows upon the 
noble dream of a heaven reserved entirely for jurists is a paean of 
parody. The courts and other dogmatists regularly, even and especially 
the brightest, "hypostasize" and "thingify" concepts such as 
corporation, or property, or right, to such a degree as to make them 
supernatural entities, metaphysical beings, angels, nonsense.3 3 7  The 
question of the status of these imaginary legal beings approximates 
closely the question fondly and frequently asked by theologians: "How 
many angels can stand on the point of a needle?" 3 3 8  Put a few such 
concepts together and you have modern legal reasoning and, Felix 
continues, " [s]trange as this manner of argument will seem to laymen, 
lawyers trained by long practice in believing what is impossible, will 
accept this reasoning as relevant, material, and competent. " 3 39 It would 
be improper to abandon Cohen's argument without observing at least 
that the satire keeps flying throughout the article. The metaphysical 
circularity of legal abstractions, indeed all of the "magic 'solving 
words' of traditional jurisprudence" add precisely as much to our 
knowledge of legal practice "as Moliere's physician's discovery that 
opium puts men to sleep because it contains a dormitive principle." 3 40 
To this are added footnotes to Lewis Carroll's The Hunting of the 
Snark and from that old favorite of legal and other satirists, Through 
the Looking Glass.341 
It is philosophically too dismissive to regard trashing as the 
expression of a mood, as does Duxbury,3 42 but it is proper to attempt to 
336. Id. 
337. Cohen, supra note 321, at 811. 
338. Id. at 810. An incisive and entertaining modern version of this argument can be 
found in W.T. Murphy, Reference Without Reality: A Comment on a Commentary on 
Codifications of Practice, 1 LA w & CRmQUE 61 (1990). 
339. Cohen, supra note 321, at 811 (citation omitted). 
340. Id. at 820. 
341. See id. at 820 nn.7 & 31; see also GILLES DELEUZE, ESSAYS: CRmCAL AND 
CLINICAL 21-22 (Daniel W. Smith & Michael Greco trans., 1997) (discussing Through the 
Looking Glass). 
342. Et tu Duce. Duxbury explains: "Yet even 'movement' seems too strong a word in 
this context. Realism was more a mood than a movement. That mood was one of 
dissatisfaction with legal formalism . . . .  " DUXBURY, PA1TERNS, supra note 47, at 69. Which, 
you have to admit, is pretty damning. The realists, he appears to be saying, were law 
professors in a bad mood. They were, horrible to say, dissatisfied. Not quite themselves, 
perhaps. In need of Zoloft? Maybe so, because for Duxbury it is clear as day, plain as a 
pikestaff, that law is necessary, good, and will continue in its age-old form. 
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capture the tone of critique that the realists developed. Their polemic 
was based upon a juristic version of the Twilight of the Idols. 3 4 3  The 
legal world, to paraphrase Nietzsche, had become a myth, and the 
realists were dancing in the freedom that such a realization produced. 
Trashing was their way of showing that law was human, indeed all too 
human. The excoriation of transcendental nonsense was obviously 
enough a critique of religion, of the belief in pure forms, of faith in the 
legal absolute tout court.344 Trashing, in other words, represents a 
sudden bout of freedom, release from the pilgrim's burden, a 
liberating moment of renewal, of pluralism in legal thought. If the 
talismanic concepts of legal rectitude were simply some of many 
archaic beliefs, if the word magic of doctrine was really no more than 
the expression of a neurosis, if the ceremonies of law were just 
medieval rites aimed at inducing dread, then freedom was fun, and 
imagination could take hold of doctrine and scholarly texts alike. 
The most polished of the polemicists, aside from Felix Cohen, were 
Frank and Llewellyn. Frank was wonderfully scathing on key realist 
topics such as the infantile docility of the legal profession,3 4 5  and on 
lawyers' tendency toward father worship of judges,3 4 6  on "word­
magic,"3 4 7  and other evasions. Here is what he has to say about legal­
magic addicts: "a magic-addict betrays schizophrenic attributes. The 
legal-magic mongers might then be described by a wag as mildly 
schizoid, since they insist on portraying as existent a legal system 
which plainly does not exist. "3 4 8  The schizophrenic, he remorselessly 
continues, "'lives in a world of words, which he so completely 
identifies with - or mistakes for - reality, that reality as others know 
it, hardly exists for him. "' 3 4 9  And he concludes wonderfully with the 
343. On how the real world became a myth, see NIETZSCHE, Tw!LIGHT, supra note 110, 
and for commentary on how the real world became a myth, see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, 
SIMULATIONS (Paul Foss et al. trans., 1983). 
344. On this theme, there is the somewhat labored Thurman W. Arnold, Apologia for 
Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L.J. 729 (1935); and more expansively, THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE 
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935), on the mystery of jurisprudence, and on spiritualism in 
law. The roots of this position go back, though not without some irony, to Holmes's dictum 
that Langdell was "the greatest living theologian." Holmes, Review, supra note 319, at 313. 
See also the explicit argument of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40; 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LA w (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881 ). 
345. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 331, at 69-75. 
346. Id. at 243-52. 
347. Id. at 57-68; FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 292-309. 
348. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 65. Frank again foreshadows much that was to 
come later. On the schizoid, see GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: 
CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1983) (1977); JEAN­
JACQUES LECERCLE, PHILOSOPHY THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (1985); and, for brief 
commentary on the theme, Peter Goodrich, Tristes Juristes, 12 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 109 
(2003). 
349. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 65 (citation omitted). 
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view that "the modern magical legal thinkers resemble - remotely to 
be sure - the case, reported by a psychiatrist, of a man who wrote the 
word 'beefsteak' on a piece of paper and then ate the paper."3 5 0  
Eating psalters, books of the law, or legal texts, is an antique image 
captured in the Latin maxim, omnia scrinia habet in pectore sua, 
meaning loosely that the legal subject ingests, or better injests the texts 
of law, a practice captured in a number of medieval images of kneeling 
legal subjects receiving the book of the law in their mouth.3 51 One can 
note further, though largely incidentally, that the image gained judicial 
recognition many years later from Justice Traynor, who in a footnote 
already alluded to, 3 5 2  observed that the legal formalist's belief in the· 
talismanic fixity of legal words is a taboo equivalent to the Swedish 
peasant belief that a page torn from the Psalter and fed to sick cattle 
would cure them.3 5 3  Traynor and Frank both take the view that 
democracy requires a conversation about laws that is not consistently 
obstructed by the compensatory metaphysics of "verbomania. "3 5 4  
Legal technique, Jerome reports frankly, "needs liberation from the 
mental outlook of the Dark Ages."3 5 5  
A similar Reformist zeal is found in Frank's ridiculing of legal 
robes. The judicial robe, and in other legal cultures less modern than 
that in the United States, the wig and gown, indeed breeches and 
buckled shoes, "are historically connected with the desire to thwart 
democracy."3 5 6  He goes on to point out that the belief that donning a 
gown will give you access to a higher law, that it will provide a brush 
with divinity, or an essentially costume-based access to the inaugural 
and oracular just doesn't hold up to the harsh corrections of 
experience: 
Of. course, no such change occurs in a man with the mere donning of a 
robe. At least in my case it didn't. When I woke up one morning a federal 
judge, I found myself just about the same person who had gone to bed 
the night before an SEC Chairman.357 
350. Id. 
351. See PIERRE LEGENDRE, DIEU Au MIRROIR: ETUDE SUR L'INSTITUTION DES 
IMAGES 41-66 (1994), partially translated in LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A LEGENDRE 
READER 211-54 (Peter Goodrich ed., 1996) [hereinafter LEGENDRE READER]. 
352. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
353. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643 n.2 
(Cal. 1968). 
354. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 331, at 63. 
355. Id. 
356. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 255; see also Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: 
Slips in Interpretation and Law, 13 LEGAL STUD. 381, 394-95 (1993). 
357. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 255-56. Thurman Arnold is said to have taken a 
different view. When asked how he could hold the scholarly opinions that he did and still sit 
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Costume, make-believe, wousining (word magic), hallucinations, 
the great illusion of legal science, and the idols of the theater all 
needed deflating. Thurman Arnold dryly satirized the inordinate 
reverence that was paid to the Supreme Court as being no more than 
an emotional prop and a transposition of English monarchism. The 
Great Illusions, the Delphic Oracles, the myths and the madness of 
lawyers were all fair targets of the realist's philosophical hammer or 
satirical polemic. The realist, to paraphrase Llewellyn, paraphrasing 
Holmes, abhors the vacuous. Thus the law teacher's disillusion, 
occasioned by "long and sad " experience: 
We have discovered in our teaching of the law that general propositions 
are empty. We have discovered that students who come eager to learn 
the rules and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take 
away the shell and not the substance. We have discovered that rules 
alone, mere forms of words, are worthless.358 
All that nothingness, in other words, just waiting for exposure and 
deflation. 
The last word, however, on the realist's penchant for satirical 
polemic of the trashing kind has to go to Fred Rodell. Frank had 
curiously remarked in Courts on Trial that Rodell's critique of lawyers 
had gone too far - it was "sometimes excessive. "3 5 9  It is true that Woe 
Unto You, Lawyers! was at times parodic, but its purpose was on all 
fours with Frank's own, slightly more modulated satire. The argument 
of Rodell's that perhaps holds the greatest satirical charge was his 
wonderful farewell to law reviews.360 Llewellyn had already 
commented upon the common legal disease of "Cititis ": "Victims of 
this mental disorder hold the delusion that nothing is, except in print; 
and that even what is in print is tabu to use unless some print is cited. I 
have been fighting Cititis, especially in law reviews, for many years."361 
Llewellyn had also invented the Principle of Anonymous Non-Citation 
and its subcategory, the Principle of Mutual Anonymous Non-Citation 
to cure the evils of Cititis. 3 6 2  The principles of anonymity were key to 
Llewellyn's ridiculing of what he coined "Pseudea" and 
on the bench, he is said to have replied that when he put on the judicial robe, everything 
changed. 
358. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 15, at 2. 
359. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 321 n.8. 
360. Rodell, Goodbye, supra note 21. It generated, among other things, the second series 
of the Green Bag, an occasional journal of legal humor specifically intended in its second 
series to act as an antidote to the prolixities and "cititis" of law reviews. See David P. Currie, 
Green Bags, 1 GREEN BAG 20 1 (1997). The second series has featured some extraordinarily 
funny pieces, some with considerable - generally Horatian - bite. 
361. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 15, (foreword) at 8. "Cititis" is a close 
phonetic and linguistic relation of Cystitis, or urinary tract infection. 
362. Llewellyn, Neophytes, supra note 2, at 176. 
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"Pseudiscussion." The cure that his satire offered had the dual 
advantages of ensuring that the vulgar could be kept at bay through 
the avoidance of any chance of checking the references, and that both 
sides in generalized arid largely imaginary controversy could equally 
claim victory. 
The crown for humor and directness has to go, however, to Rodell. 
In a brief and unfootnoted contribution to the Virginia Law Review, 
Rodell observes with a stringent and properly unmodulated humor: 
"There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its 
style. The other is its content. That, I think, about covers the 
ground. "363 In five-and-a-half full pages, Rodell then goes on with 
unshirking vigor to excoriate the use of footnotes, the "dumpy dignity 
and fake leamedness,"364 the "strait-jacket of law review style,"3 6 5  the 
"follow-the-leader mentality,"366 the mountains created "out of 
tiresome technical molehills,"36 7 and the general "diddling while Rome 
burned. "368 It is heartfelt stuff propounded with humorous flair and a 
very precise rhetorical appreciation of the general levels of stylistic 
conformity, pedantry, indirectness, self-effacement, bombastic 
pomposity, and utter unreadability of the usual product which, in his 
view, should be tried "for wilful murder of [its] reader's (all three of 
them) eyesight and patience."36 9 In all, it is a classic of satirical humor 
and of rigorous trashing, largely unequalled in the subsequent seventy­
odd years of the tradition. 
B. Trashing 
The trashing strategies of the realists are characterized by 
rhetorical inventiveness and literary imagination. They brought a 
humor and wit to polemics that have seldom since been anything more 
than deadly serious. There are some instances in the second half of the 
century of neorealist revivals. The work of William Twining had many 
of the allegorical attributes of his mentor and hero, Karl Llewellyn -
some of the humor but little of the trashing. As depicted above, he 
gives us the juristic bazaar, Pericles and the Plumber,370 as well as 
Blackstone's Tower, the University of Rutland, and the jurisdiction of 
363. Rodell, Goodbye, supra note 21, at 38. 
364. Id. at 41. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 44. 
367. Id. at 43. 
368. Id. 
369. Rodell, Goodbye, supra note 21, at 41.  
370. William Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 LAW Q. REv. 396 (1967). 
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Xanadu.3 7 1  Similarly, Arthur Leff revived some of the wit and grace of 
the realist tradition with a certain bite,3 7 2  but it was the Critical Legal 
Conference that really inherited and honed the technique of trashing, 
and specifically the risus acri, the ridicule of conservative or more 
broadly establishment traditions. It has to be said, however, that the 
critical legal studies movement was broadly Marxist in theoretical 
derivation and its roots were mired less in humor than worthy 
dialectical materialist constructions. The early works of the movement 
trumpeted world-saving clarions such as the "fundamental 
contradiction,"3 7 3  "false consciousness " along with "counter­
hegemonic consciousness," "ideological state apparatuses " alongside 
"deviationist doctrine,"3 7 4  with little room behind or between the long 
words for very much in the way of satirical or amorous asides. 
Kelman's article on trashing, on the "technique that we in Critical 
Legal Studies often use," defines it in the baroque form of an equation 
replete with italicized key terms, perilunar parentheses, and bracketed 
instructions: "Take specific arguments very seriously in their own 
terms; discover they are actually foolish ([tragic]-comic); and then look 
for some (external observer's) order (not the germ of truth) in the 
internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed."3 7 5  That is 
his opening paragraph and things can only improve, humorwise, from 
that. It is fair, I think, to say that Kelman doesn't really appreciate the 
satirical force of trashing or of the textual dismissals proffered by the 
antitrashers, but he does have some good lines. His best idea is to treat 
the antitrashers' work "as yet another text to be trashed."3 7 6  As to the 
rest, let's just summarize the few glimpses of trashing as satire that do 
emerge between the graphs, the figures, the footnotes, the status 
insignia, the capitalized and talismanic words. 
First off, there is an element of irony: Kelman regrets being a 
trasher, but it is the best-available position. He wishes it wasn't, but it 
is (or so he claims here). Next, and importantly, he acknowledges that 
trashing questions the vacuous norm of politeness that U.S. legal 
academics have imbibed, seemingly from birth: 
371. See sources cited supra note 322. 
372. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 
1229, 1240-49 (1979). 
373. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 
205, 211-13 (1979). For commentary on the fundamental contradiction, see Alan Hunt, The 
Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Hunt, 
Theory]. 
374. Unger, supra note 295, at 576-83. 
375. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984). 
376. Id. at 296. 
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[They] were told (repeatedly) by their moms and dads, "If you don't have 
anything nice or constructive to say, say nothing at all." In the eyes of 
these academics, to violate this wholesome norm is an unquestionable 
disgrace, and they generally take for granted that we in CLS would bow 
our heads in deep shame if "all we'd done" was to make it impossible to 
wallow happily in the familiar ooze of traditional legal discourse, 
humming the same old tunes without embarrassment.377 
It is not Diogenes, but it does make the point that trashing is precisely 
about being bad, having fun, and looking at the inside of law from the 
outside. 
Trashing really made its reappearance with the second wave of 
critical legal studies, influenced by European theory - specifically by 
deconstruction, or a dubious interpretation of it, and the postmodern 
turn. Even then, trashing never really made it back to the level of the 
realist moment. It never quite had the confidence or the status of the 
realists, there aren't any critical legal scholars on the bench for 
example, and the tenure wars kept most of them out of the top law 
schools. What trashing there was tended to a certain Oedipal 
rebelliousness; it was stylistically a little puerile, a touch overstated, 
and a tad insecure. That would be my reading of the rather 
academically orientated trend in what were usually, though not always, 
trashing book reviews. Trashing became very internal to the academy, 
and as a consequence, more narcissistic than usual; and I can modestly 
claim a certain personal expertise. The trashers in general fell within 
the rueful sway of Kelman's own observation that, " [l]aw professors 
are, in fact, a kiss away from panic at every serious, self-conscious 
moment in which they don't have a bunch of overawed students to 
kick around."3 7 8  Status rather than satire, satura lacunae rather than 
satura lanx, seemed to be their driving force.3 7 9  There is little fun in 
insecurity, and there is seldom humor let alone any satirical 
selfconsciousness in status seeking. It makes sense then that the main 
works of generic trashing came from those few crits who hung on to 
jobs in high-status institutions, or who, for political reasons, resigned 
themselves to, and reveled in their lack of status. 
The themes of realist trashing reemerged in the early 1980s. 
Roberto Unger's book-length address on the critical legal studies 
movement can hardly be accused of satirical intent.3 8 0  I wasn't there 
but I have heard the accounts of this "after-dinner talk" that lasted 
377. Id. at 297. 
378. Kelman, supra note 375, at 322. 
379. Similar points are well and humorously made in LIZARD, supra note 32, especially 
volume 3. See also Goodrich, Sleeping, supra note 10; Goodrich, Critic's Love, supra note 
315. 
380. See Unger, supra note 295. 
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three hours or more. A while afterwards, I was staying with a 
colleague in Amherst, and occasion had it that I was relegated from 
the guest room to the T.V. room on account of a more important 
visitor (perhaps simply someone they had actually invited to come to 
stay). Chance landed me in a room full of cassette recordings of 
lectures that my host had attended. He had Unger's critical legal 
studies movement lecture, and so I listened to the tape of Roberto 
delivering the big speech. Not the whole thing, I hasten to add. I am 
not a masochist, and I am slow but not that slow on the uptake. In any 
event, personal reminiscences aside, the incantatory intonation, the 
mellifluous chanting manner, the almost oneiric rhythm in which he 
poetically pronounced this distended lecture as an after-dinner talk has 
an element of the deliciously self-parodying. It is an otherworldly 
intervention, priestly in style, and takes on in legal studies what was 
pronounced in the last line of Knowledge and Politics, namely, the 
valedictory diktat: "Speak, God." 3 8 1  That final incantation now seems 
to have meant that God should speak through me, his servant, his 
prophet, I, Roberto.3 8 2  The lecture on the critical legal studies 
movement does trash formalism (and objectivism), and it ends by 
talking famously of how law professors are like priests before "cold 
altars." 3 8 3  Which itself was a captivating and much-discussed image, 
although in theological terms I would have thought that altars were 
always cold. It was the idolaters who danced around the fire. But that 
is a much longer discussion and probably not to be had with Roberto 
who tends not to answer my letters. There is certainly satire in Unger's 
treatise, but it is hardly a defining feature of that work or of his later 
elaborations. The more satirically inclined Harvard law professor, my 
sometime correspondent, is Duncan Kennedy, the charismatic team 
leader of the legal left. 
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy was a subversive's 
manual for surviving law school and overthrowing the legal institution. 
It politicizes Felix Cohen's more theological critique of transcendental 
nonsense, and replaces the vacuity of "solving words" with the vacuity 
of policy words. Interestingly, it uses the term nonsense in describing 
the subtext of the first-year law curriculum: "The whole body of 
381. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 295 (1975). 
382. Unger's tendency in recent years to send out preprinted postcards with aphorisms 
such as "Every man should be his own prophet" as their message seems to me to confirm this 
interpretation. 
383. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 119 
(1986). The crits, he says, form "a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs. 
They stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars." The theological metaphor is both 
antique and attractive. It was taken up by Carrington, supra note 47, at 227, amongst others, 
arguing that the crits, the lapsed priests of law, should leave law schools. See also Neil 
MacCormick, Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response to CLS, 10 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 539 (1990). 
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implicit messages is nonsense. "3 8 4  The law is too full of drek to take 
that seriously.3 8 5  As to law teaching, it is "silly " and "irrelevant."3 86 
Then, with immortal satirical wit, Kennedy ends with a series of 
utopian proposals such as assignment of law students to law schools by 
means of a lottery. Kennedy concludes with the following 
recommendation: "Equalize all salaries in the school (including 
secretaries and janitors), regardless of educational qualifications, 
'difficulty' of job, or 'social contribution. "'3 8 7  Which is a pretty complex 
thought, a subtle and inspired modern version of William Morris's 
News from Nowhere, in which the honest usages of the artisan's 
practice, an equality of art and empathy, ruled the day in the aftermath 
of law.3 8 8  
Kennedy's oppositional - samizdat - tome was unusual both for 
its humor and for its positive proposals. Most of the trashers, left and 
right alike, avoided any positive outcome to trashing. It was fun, said 
Freeman,3 8 9  and that is true and sufficient. The rest was the future, and 
that, as Leonard Cohen puts it, we ought to leave open. Arthur Leff 
made the same point, indulging in a little retro-trashing of the 
neotrashers: 
Whereas the Marxists place their "community" in the foggy sea of the 
future, and Nozick and Unger place theirs like dots of butter in a 
buttermilk of potential strife, Posner leaves his version of sanctified 
human interaction to moments of firefly-like flash. When the flashes go 
out, or fail to go on, then there is nothing at all but the dark. 390 
And in the darkness, to conclude the metaphor, there are "Godlet[s)," 
Leff's term for petty sovereigns and other phantoms.3 9 1  
C.  Book Reviews 
The last refuge of trashing, of negative satirical critique, was the 
book review. This, as Rodell wearily pointed out, was the poor 
384. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 20 (1st ed., 4th prtg. 1984) (portions first 
printed in THE PoLmcs OF LAW, supra note 7, at 40). 
385. Id. at 24. 
386. Id. at 27. 
387. Id. at 123. 
388. WILLIAM MORRIS, NEWS FROM NOWHERE (Boston, Roberts Bros. 1890). It is an 
underused tradition, full of gems, satirical and otherwise, including SAMUEL BUTLER, 
EREWHON OR OVER THE RANGE (Hans Peter Breuer & Daniel F. Howard eds., 1981) 
(1870), a work that should be mandatory reading for law professors, critical or traditional. 
389. Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 
1230 (1981). 
390. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, supra note 372, at 1245. 
391. Id. 
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relation, the marginal genre usually put at the end of each issue of the 
law review. 3 92 Historically and for the most part, the Article, the 
Comment, and the Note precede the Review in lexical order of 
priority. The Note, written by students - even the Note! - often gets 
ahead of the Review. It is a ranking that renders the Review 
peripheral, a feature that was expressed historically in the use of a 
smaller font for the review than for the big ideas and big type of 
important Articles like this one. Which suggests, of course, that 
satirical legal scholars should treasure the book reviews, and for that 
matter the other precious marginalia, the glossatorial comments, the 
scribblings, and even the rejections that litter the files or all too often 
the office floors of the lower echelons of the academic hierarchy. 3 9 3  But 
enough about my problems, I will take one example of trashing as 
systematic and witty ridiculing of the book being reviewed. 
Alan Freeman and Jack Schlegel's review of Bruce Ackerman's 
Reconstructing American Law begins with a dialogue in defense of 
trashing.3 9 4  "What we trash,"  they declare, "is simply not serious and 
we refuse to act as if it were!"3 9 5  It is a nicely formulated paradox. If 
the book being reviewed is not taken seriously then the Review, to 
borrow from John McEnroe, cannot be serious. 3 9 6  But, of course, it is 
serious about being satirical. It is direct, it is entertaining, and it 
proceeds "to offer a Bronx cheer, " a zero grade, to Ackerman's 
"intellectual aerial acrobatics."3 9 7  These, we are told, amount to little 
more than falling off a building and crashing, flailing, to the ground. 
This is trashing at its purest. It is ad hominem, raunchy, and brave. No 
kow-towing here. They take the trash can of a book and they upend it, 
to marvel at the plenitude of silliness that it contains. 
There are six axiomatic sillinesses in the book, an aggregate of 
foolishness so supreme that "one wonders why this book was written 
in the first place."398 You get the picture. They don't think much of the 
book, and they are refreshingly candid in their view of the author. The 
book is "pompous, arrogant, condescending, self-involved, and self­
aggrandizing."3 9 9  So, not much good. And then, shortly on, the authors 
of this tour de force of trashing resort to the scientific terminology of 
392. Rodell, Goodbye, supra note 21, at 44. 
393. I offer an accounting of this genre of the marginal in Goodrich, Cnutism, supra note 
83. 
394. Freeman & Schlegel, supra note 47, at 847-48. 
395. Id. at 848. 
396. No reference without a cite, and so here goes: JOHN MCENROE, You CANNOT BE 
SERIOUS (2002). 
397. Freeman & Schlegel, supra note 47, at 849. 
398. Id. at 856. 
399. Id. 
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behavioral psychology. Ackerman's conceited tone is defensive. It is 
generated "by his desperate need to protect his empty liberal center," 
and they conclude that "the book may best be described as an instance 
of 'male-chimp display behavior. "'400 A footnote explains this in terms 
of "charging displays," that are often accompanied by loud "pant­
hoots," "pant-grunts," or "waa barks."4 0 1  In short, it is in the end to be 
understood as an exercise in "aggressive male competition."4 0 2  Or, to 
borrow a metaphor from William Twining, it is rutting behavior at the 
University of Rutland. 
Trashing got personal. It referenced sex and the body. It was bad 
and that was one of its virtues. Ackerman could never have been quite 
the same after reading a Review like that. Although few others 
attained the grace or nerve of Freeman and Schlegel, there were many 
similar trashing reviews. There was Tushnet's Dia-Tribe,403 Robin 
West's comparison of Posner to Kafka,404 Richard Weisberg 
lampooned as Billy Budd, 4 0 5  Twining's Tower,406 and many further 
minor instances. Whether realist, nee-conservative, or critical, trashing 
produces responses. It is a mode of vehemence or stylistic force; it 
changes things, engages people, produces responses. Certainly I 
imagine, and word has it, that Ackerman was far from pleased. And in 
the end, what more can scholars who wish to politicize law ask for? 
The discourse of the academy and the pronouncements of 
dogmatics from the bench tend to take the form of a conversation with 
the dead. That is an aspect of the fraternal and backward-looking 
character of the humanist tradition. 4 0 7  As Derrida put it, the brothers 
cannot fight in public, and no cursing or maligning is allowed in the 
400. Id. at 857. 
401. Id. at 857 n.43. 
402. Id. at 857. 
403. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 710 (1980) (reviewing 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) and asking "how could so 
morally obtuse a work be taken so seriously?"). 
404. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral 
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985), 
reprinted in ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW27 (1993). 
405. John Ayer, Weisberg: The Very Idea of "Law and Literature, " 85 MICH. L. REV. 895 
(1987) (reviewing RICHARD WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984)). 
406. Peter Goodrich, Twining's Tower: Metaphors of Distance and Histories of the 
English Law School, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 901 (1995) (book review). 
407. This point is made well in PETER SLOTERDIJK, REGLES POUR LE PARC HUMAIN: 
UNE LETTRE EN REPONSE A LA LETTRE SUR L'HUMANISME DE HEIDEGGER (2000), 
although the source of this observation is JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POSTCARD: FROM 
SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND (Alan Bass trans., 1987). This and related texts are 
discussed in Peter Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 199 (2004) 
[hereinafter Goodrich, Rumor]. 
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history of thought.40 8  For his generation, it would be too unsettling, too 
real, and too hurtful to the fragile egos of those criticized.409 Trashing 
had the purpose and the glory of actually refusing that norm of 
unnecessary self-satisfaction. The reason that satire names names and 
offers unmediated judgments is because the norms of vagueness and 
innominate abstraction precisely hide the influences and effects of 
scholarly texts and the institutional acts that they express. Theory is in 
this sense a banner that relieves the author of any need to account for 
her place in the text. Trashing reverses that tendency and trend to 
anonymity, and it does so in profoundly ethical terms. Reversing the 
norm always looks exaggerated or extreme to those in the 
establishment who rely upon its continuance. The satirical 
exaggeration, the trashers' hyperbolic humor, is no worse than the 
inflated abstraction of the theory that they criticized. It was just that in 
a sense, from conventional perspectives, they were being bad. But 
what is bad is good, and what is good is bad. And it is precisely to that 
figure of the bad, and specifically of the "bad man " that I will now 
turn. 
V. ON BEING BAD AND GETIING CRITICAL 
A. The Bad Man 
I have ignored Oliver Wendell Holmes in a rather studied way. 
That is partly because he is very next-but-last century, and partly 
because he was generally much more serious than satirical. Holmes, 
however, did have one supremely important satirical moment. More 
an aperc;u than a theory, but along the path of the law he stumbled 
upon the figure of the "bad man. "410 The famous statement took the 
form of an observation which Holmes offers early on in his celebrated 
address: "If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look 
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict."4 11 Slightly later in the lecture, 
the bad man has become "our friend the bad man."412 For our friend, 
we learn that all that matters is "what the courts will do in fact. "413 
From this Holmes deduces, and even though he has just noted that his 
friend the bad man "does not care two straws for the axioms or 
408. JACQUES DERRIDA, POLmCS OF FRIENDSHIP 305 (George Collins trans. 1997). 
409. See id. ; see also JACQUES DERRIDA, NEGOTIATIONS 153 (Elizabeth Rottenberg ed. 
& trans., 2001); Goodrich, Rumor, supra note 407, at 200-04, 221-26. 
410. Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40. 
411. Id. at 459. 
412 Id. at 460. 
413. Id. at 461. 
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deductions," 41 4 that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 4 15 
The concept of the bad man, the general theory that law is a 
prediction of the quantum of force, deprivation, or pain that will be 
inflicted on the bad man, the law breaker, had a very considerable 
impact upon twentieth-century jurisprudence. It has been revisited 
many times. 4 16 There are many sources of its appeal, but one of them 
surely has to be that it was a risky and humorous satirical send up of 
the formalists and their putative science of law. The emblem of 
common law was historically the "reasonable man," a vir constans,411 a 
fellow of common sense and prudence, an experienced citizen of 
ordinary phlegm. One could argue, as it was put in Fardell v. Potts, that 
"this legendary individual occupies the place which in another science 
is held by the Economic Man, and in social and political discussions by 
the Average or Plain Man. He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment 
of all those qualities which we demand of the good citizen." 4 18 Holmes 
indeed, in a slightly later piece, himself referred to "our old friend the 
prudent man. " 4 1 9  His first love, as it were, his fall back, his fate. 
The bad man arrived upon the last-but-one tum-of-the-century 
jurisprudential scene as something of a ludic scourge upon the vacuity 
of legal science and the transcendental nonsense of legal abstractions 
long before they were actually termed "transcendental nonsense" by 
the felicitous Cohen.42 0 The study of law is the study of social 
pathology and its juristic resolutions. A science of law that refuses to 
study the bad man, the viewpoint of the lawbreaker, was in Holmes' 
view the equivalent of a science of medicine that refused to study the 
internal dynamics of disease because it harmed the body. So the bad 
man was the lawyer's friend. He not only paid the bills, but he was the 
epistemic endpoint of the legal rule. And he was also the opposite of 
the reasonable man. Not good but bad. Not logical but practical. 
Concerned not with reason but experience, and specifically with 
avoiding any unnecessary encounter with public force. Which was a 
whole new way of thinking about law. 
414. Id. at 460. 
415. Id. at 461. 
416. See, e.g., William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 275 
(1973). 
417. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 684 (1901). For discussion of that decision, see 
Owens v. Liverpool Corporation, 1 K.B. 394, 400 (1939). 
418. A.P. HERBERT, M.P., UNCOMMON LAW 1-2 (1945). 
419. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 
418 (1899) (hereinafter Holmes, Interpretation]. 
420. See Cohen, supra note 321. 
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The bad man symbolizes a secularizing turn in legal thought. He 
represents a move away from the vagaries of conscience and the 
dogma of divine or at least sovereign dictates of pristine legal rules. 
There is a sense, of course, in which the common law had always taken 
the practical path. The judges, who discovered and relayed customary 
law, had generally believed in a rose-tinted proposition most often 
attributed to Plowden: semblable reason, semblable fey - "if it seems 
reasonable it seems that it is law." 4 21 The ultimate source of reason, 
however, was custom and practice so immemorial as to be part of the 
law of nature, and so in the end even custom was attributed to a divine 
rather than human inspiration.4 22 Holmes's friend the bad man was a 
radical departure and a satirical step towards addressing the law as a 
mode of life, as experience in an all too human form. As satire, 
however, it was only a first step. Holmes cannot be accused of 
following through with the bad man. He didn't himself get down and 
bad, he immediately backtracked. 
Holmes wanted to escape the theological reveries of abstract legal 
thought and its broodingly aloof doctrines. He wanted to escape God 
in law, but he ended up outlining a jurisprudence defined as the study 
of nothing but prophecies. 4 23 Which sounds a bit religious to me. 
Rodell ridiculed lawyers as "medicine men,"4 24 and Frank was harsh on 
magicians and wizards.4 25 Prophets fall pretty much into that category 
as well, only that Holmes seemed to think that rather than being 
reducible to divine, natural, or simply scholastic reason, rules could be 
derived from history and empirical research. Not content with that, he 
went on to suggest that such a history was "the history of the moral 
development of the race." 4 26 So here, to follow through, Holmes is 
trying to move away from religion, but he does so by resorting to 
prophets. He wants to separate law from morals, and the way that he 
does so is by recourse to the figure of the "bad" man, which sounds 
pretty much like a moral judgment to me. His language betrays his 
purpose. He intended one thing but said another. 
Finally, just in case the rest of Holmes's piece tricked you into 
thinking that prophecy was actually a secular endeavor in which the 
421. See FRAUNCE, supra note 154, at 73 (citing Plowden's definition); GOODRICH, 
LANGUAGES, supra note 103, at 36 (discussing same). For a recent and interesting though 
limited discussion of this theme, see Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law 
Jurisprudence (Pt. l), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155 (2002). 
422. See FORTESCUE, supra note 261, at 33-35 (making the strongest version of this 
claim), discussed in Goodrich, llliterate, supra note 99, at 1 1-14. 
423. Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40, at 458, 461. 
424. RODELL, supra note 161, at 3-6. 
425. FRANK, COURTS, supra note 330, at 62-70; FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 331, 
at 196-200. 
426. Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40, at 459. 
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bad man had some kind of say or stake, read to the conclusion, make 
the stroll through to the end of the path of the law. Enter the garden. 
Happiness, we are told, comes in the final accounting from the 
"remoter and more general aspects of law . . . .  It is through them that 
you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your 
subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of 
its unfathomable process, a hint of universal law." 4 27 Holmes and his 
friend the bad man had, I suspect, by this point in time long parted 
company. Echoes of the infinite would have had the bad man running 
for the street. He was a rhetorical figure all along, and now he is 
zapped by the good guy, the reasonable man, the successful lawyer 
whose ear turns out in the end to be tuned to nothing more solid than 
glimpses of the unfathomable and hints of the universal law. Just so 
much snake oil to the bad man, or at least that is one point of view. 
B. The Unreasonable 
The issue that the figure of the bad man raises here is that of satire. 
Being bad is precisely the function of satire. It lampoons the 
pretensions and the conceits of the self-important, the overconfident, 
and the serenely vacuous. That is the role of the bad man; he is there 
to upend the assumptions of lawyers, to empty the trash can, and to 
deflate the complacency of unworldly legal claims to science. You have 
to take account of the bad man in whatever guise he appears. He may 
become an unreasonable woman, as in Fardell v. Potts.428 Or, in a less 
distant version, he may be a bad woman, a lesbian-feminist legal 
scholar riding a bicycle on the footpath when the Road Traffic Act 
forbids it.4 29 That is kind of an academic's example, not hugely bad but 
bad enough. It is a version of pissing in the direction of the Pentagon, 
it is going beyond the rules, putting life ahead of law, and pleasure in 
front of the norm. It is a way of playing with the rules, and it has a less 
obvious significance that transcends the specific examples, and of 
which Holmes was only dimly aware. 
The bad man was an emblem of difference in law. His introduction, 
brief and seemingly incidental though it was, marked a significant 
departure and was a radical gesture. It was not so much that prior to 
the bad man, law had been obsessed with the good, though that was 
part of it. More to the point, the good, the reasonable, the prudent, the 
cool, the phlegmatic, and all the other similar-sounding figures of law 
were precisely similar, familiar, and the same. They had different 
names but as Holmes put it elsewhere, idem sonans, they sound the 
427. Id. at 478. 
428. HERBERT, supra note 418, at 1. 
429. MARGARET DA VIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION 122-23 (1994). 
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same and can only be differentiated by recourse to external 
circumstances. Holmes is discussing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, where the 
same name, Peerless, referred famously to two different vessels. 43 0 He 
then goes on to mention not the bad man, but now his purer form, his 
transcendental self or soul, the bad itself: "In the use of common 
names and words a plea of different meaning from that adopted by the 
court would be bad . . . . "43 1 Well, let's take the cue: the bad man is 
attracted to bad interpretations, uncommon meanings, difference plain 
and simple. And having let the bad man out, Holmes could hardly 
deny him a few bad interpretations. The century that followed was full 
of them. In fact, I think one could say that the bad man proliferated in 
law and in legal studies, and when critical legal studies emerged in the 
1980s it just picked up and revived a much-lengthier tradition of the 
bad man and his bad interpretations. I will take a few examples. That 
should be enough. A few more footnotes to keep the good guys happy, 
sort out next year's editorial board, that kind of thing. 
The bad, I am suggesting, represents the emergence of difference, 
and to be brutally direct about it, the experiences, the languages, and 
histories of those whom historically law had excluded. I doubt that 
Holmes intended such, but that is what he opened the door to, and for 
a moment at least, acted as the theoretician for. The old harmony of 
common law, the notion that there was one community, one language, 
one set of experiences that we could all agree upon as reasonable, as 
good, just turned out to be bad. At the least it was inaccurate. There 
were the poor, the working class, women, ethnic minorities, those with 
disabilities, gays, lesbians, transsexuals, who as the century progressed 
all had to be bad so as to do good and make themselves heard. The 
importance of the bad man lies not in his existence, after all, because 
religion, canon law, and common law have all been predicated upon 
dealing with the bad man, chucking him out, as it were, for being the 
devil that he is. That said, what is novel is the presence of the bad man, 
the visibility of bad interpretations, the bad man as norm or voice. 
That visibility and voice constituted the wittiest element in Holmes's 
introduction of his friend. The bad man, Moriarty as it were, soon 
turned out to be the indispensable sidekick of Holmes and the law. 
You couldn't have one without the other, and realistically speaking it 
was time to admit it. There is bad in the good and there is good in the 
bad, and no amount of law can get around it. 
Bad is a moral category, and used as an adjective it constitutes a 
judgment. The bad man, as friend or as ex-friend, is a prosopopoiea, 
430. Holmes, Interpretation, supra note 419, at 418; see also A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, 
LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 135 (1995) (discussing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H & 
C 906 (Ex. 1864)). 
431. Holmes, Interpretation, supra note 419, at 418. 
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the rhetorical figure of personification. It is the linguistic means of 
creating a presence, and of giving an abstract idea a face, the iconic 
body part, and oftentimes a voice as well. The bad referred directly to 
the uncommon meaning, to the different, to the immoral and excluded. 
It refers to the opposite of law: not to the ethical but to the pragmatic, 
not to the spirit but to the body. Each aspect forms an important 
attribute of the Menippean branch of satirical legal studies. The 
Corpus Juris became the literal body before the law. Satire is indeed 
often scatological, usually organic, and most emblematically concerned 
with the body. Diogenes, the first and greatest of the classical satirists 
precisely imposed his body into the discourse of philosophy. The 
stories are well-known and need not be noted in detail here: he 
masturbated in public saying "he wished it were as easy to relieve 
hunger by rubbing an empty stomach."43 2 He stayed in temples, he 
lived in a wine jar, he walked barefoot in snow, he ate raw meat and 
vegetables, slept in the sun, pissed in the market place, farted at 
philosophers, and so on.4 3 3  Diogenes, according to his critics, lived like 
a dog, would bark and belch, laugh and cry in the cause of physically 
embodying his philosophical beliefs and satirizing the abstractions of 
the philosophers. If we turn to satirical legal studies in its more explicit 
manifestations in the critical legal scholarship of the second half of the 
twentieth century, there is a significant element of classical cynicism, 
of bodily intrusion, of embodiment and incorporation of the physical. 
There is a short piece on reductionism in an early issue of the 
Lizard. It starts with the words: "There was in the beginning a dense 
fog: " and what follows the colon is a blank square frame. It continues: 
People began to study this fog, for all the reasons people tend to study 
things like fog . . . .  Some studied the fog hoping thereby to improve the 
conditions of their class, or race, or sex; others hoped to advance 
someone else's class, or race, or sex. Still others hoped to advance 
humanity, or the universe; and, finally, some people studied it from 
habit.434 
The history referred to runs as follows. The sociology of law had a 
strong historical-materialist wing, and from the 1960s onward radical 
sociological accounts of law would attack the idealism of legal doctrine 
and counterpose the bodies, the actual life processes, or the materiality 
432. 2 LAERTIUS,supra note 81, at 47. 
433. See generally Andrew Long, The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and 
Hellenistic Ethics, in THE CYNICS, supra note 78, at 33. 
434. Reductionism, LIZARD, Jan. 7, 1984, at 1, 10. For a divagation on that same theme 
in an historical context, see Peter Goodrich, The Iconography of Nothing, in LAW AND THE 
IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LA w 89 (Costas Douzinas & 
Lynda Nead eds., 1999). 
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upon which law was inscribed.43 5 Class was the generic term for the 
aggregate body of laborers, the workers tied ineluctably to the means 
of production. For historical-materialist accounts of law, it was not 
consciousness - ideas - that determined social reality but rather 
socio-economic reality that determined consciousness. 
Critical legal studies inherited much of the ethos of historical 
materialism, and it offered, initially at least, a class-based analysis of 
law.43 6 One aspect, though only one of many, in critical legal 
scholarship was the epistemic manipulation of the body. Bankowski 
and Mungham 43 7 make numerous and often satirical use of the body in 
criticizing the law. They advocate for disruption of the trial, for 
theatrical protests, for the momentary staging of an alternative to 
law.43 8 Carlen's study of courtroom interactions in the lower courts 
borrowed its motif from Artaud's theater of the absurd. It is pretty 
funny. The dialogues she reports are droll or mad to a lay reader, but 
they are also politically frightening and poignant in a deflationary kind 
of a way.43 9 They do what all critical legal accounts of law ought to do: 
shock the complacency of the reader by addressing, noticing, and 
giving representation to the "bad man" - the people and bodies who 
were excluded, voiceless, and routinely processed by a system that was 
deaf to their pleas.4 4 0  They mine the satirical potential of the real and 
resort to the shock value of the historical record.4 41 
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C. Exiles 
Part of the breakup of critical legal studies as any kind of coherent 
conference or movement lay in the emergence of a second generation 
of critical legal scholars who were tired of the pieties of Marxism and 
the transcendental nonsense of class struggle. That is how it seemed 
and the resolution was in part to tum to satire of the texts of law. The 
old order of the real was collapsing. Baudrillard announced the reality 
of simulacra,4 4 2  Umberto Eco embarked upon travels in hyperreality,44 3 
and in law, Pierre Schlag and a team of other disconsolate law 
professors started changing how law review articles were going to be 
written. Suddenly, it was not legal doctrine as worthily reported from 
the lips of the judiciary that was taking pride of place. The 
conversations in the law school faculty lounge were appearing in 
scholarship;444 cocktail-party indictments of legal radicalism became 
the theme of self-critical reflections;4 4 5  a law school bulletin photo 
portrait of the Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard 
Law School was the visual text used in one review as the starting point 
for the analysis of the work.446 And there was much more. Critical 
fictions multiplied. There was the law professor as a failed cab 
driver,44 7 an imaginary dinner party organized at Stanford Law 
School,4 4 8  a book-length study of the "enchantment" of reason,44 9 and 
an account of law as an addiction for which some twelve-step program 
is probably the cure.4 5 0  Experience, conversation, things seen and 
noted as absurd or different, as boring or amusing, started to litter the 
margins of the law review. It was a new generation offering a little 
more realism: the body in front of the text. It was not library lawyering 
in the sense of the legal realists, but it was library bound, a rather 
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literary questioning, as Derrida put it, of "Scribble " and the relations 
between writing and power.4 51 
The critical legal scholars were not the only ones to have fun. They 
too had their satirists. There was the very amusing and quite 
unreadable diatribe of Arrow on pomobabble.4 5 2  There was a finely 
ridiculous application of deconstruction to commercial law that 
bemoaned the "trail of anguish " that postmodern legal scholarship has 
left in the legal academy. 4 5 3  The author, Professor DeLong, goes on to 
ask: "Does it have to be this way? Can there be hope for people who 
think a 'dangerous supplement' is an outdated pocket part? Who when 
they hear the word norm think first of the fat guy on Cheers?"4 5 4  And 
the answer was no, but your average commercial lawyer could play the 
role of soi-disant literary theorist and highbrow hermeneut if he (or 
just possibly she) read through the two short steps that DeLong had to 
offer on postmodern theory made simple.4 5 5  And just to add a footnote 
or two, there were a few parodic pieces on the "paranoid " style in legal 
scholarship,4 5 6  the interdisciplinary law professor as a schizophrenic,4 5 7  
the capture of the academy by leftist legal academics,4 5 8  the 
relationship of law and the river, or the nihilism of the long-worded 
and hard-to-understand critics of law, the apostates of the legal 
academy, 4 5 9  and even Brian Leiter regularly dissing the sophomoric 
practices and nonexistent philosophical credentials of critical legal 
theorists 460 and other competitors near and far. 
Take the example of Leiter's most recent invective, the latest 
instance of analytic boys gone wild, and here the object is Dworkin ad 
deridicula, or Ronald ridiculed. You don't believe me? You can't 
451 .  Jacques Derrida, Scribble (Writing-Power), 58 YALE FRENCH STUD. 1 17 (1979). 
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make this stuff up, and I speak as one who has no mandate for the 
subject of this lampoon. Leiter begins in exemplary scientific fashion 
with an empirical claim "it is increasingly the sotto voce ...  consensus " 
within legal philosophy that Dworkin has made no contribution and 
has had no influence.4 6 1  This important assertion of fact, this 
unmuddled yet slightly rococo claim, is then given the benefit of 
further fulsome proof: it is what "those who work in legal philosophy 
say privately ".4 6 2  A later footnote adds well-researched additional 
evidence: there are "widespread perceptions about the argumentative 
feebleness of his . . .  views." Glad we nailed that down. Can't argue 
with the facts. And if that isn't clear enough, follow it up with: 
"Dworkin tried to lead [the] field down a deeply wrong-headed path." 
No lack of precision there. Could go to court on the strength of that. 
Put money on it. But let's see it through. Dworkin's work has been 
"largely irrelevant . .. implausible, badly argued for, and largely 
without philosophical merit."4 6 3  He is "the quintessential 'sophist' of 
legal theory,"4 64 and his arguments are "so baroque and muddled that 
they have been completely ignored."4 6 5  
Overall Dworkin's oeuvre is impugned as implausible, 
"spectacularly wrong-headed."4 6 6  And we are told somewhat 
disingenuously that it is a puzzle that his jurisprudential contribution 
"turns out, sadly, to amount to so little."4 6 7  If the puzzle seems 
paradoxical and self-defeating as an argument, thankfully help is on 
the way. Mirabile dictu the puzzle is solved. We learn that Dworkin 
and his rhetoric "borders, I'm afraid, on the 'unhinged. "' 4 6 8  So that's 
it.4 6 9  Good that it got clarified. And so it goes on but at the risk of 
infuriating Brian I have to say it would become tedious. Yet maybe 
just a word or two more. According to Leiter, Dworkin circulates 
"falsehood, "470 he is committed to "anti-intellectualism "471 and where 
461. Leiter, The End, supra note 182, at 1-2. 
462. Id. at 20. 
463. Id. at 2. 
464. Id. at 16. 
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he has had an impact 47 2, he didn't have an impact. He was very 
influential but he had no influence at all. Or, to get a little personal, he 
just doesn't measure up to the "seminal Neil MacCormick."47 3  So he 
doesn't get to play with the boys, can't hold a candle to the theatrum 
lucidum of Larry Alexander, Jules Coleman, George Fletcher, 
Matthew Kramer, Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, Stephen Munzer, 
and all the other present day greats, the "unparalleled theoretical and 
philosophical prober[ s ],"47 4  the "most prominent ones,"47 5 the 
household names, and presumably the band of murmurers with whose 
sotto voce mutterings Leiter began his polemic. That is the flavor. A 
few lemony snickets, a series of unfortunate events, but as a defense, 
apologia pro amici mea, it is an exemplar of the satirical, a perfectly 
honed invective that puts the name back in nomos, and draws up a 
positively Posnerian list of the top ten legal philosophers. 
Brian is being bad. But note also that his piece is brilliantly open, 
unabashedly polemical, and not afraid to display an endearing 
emotional honesty in the mode of the ad hominem. Nor is he afraid to 
exemplify what he criticizes. He is too busy putting the Horatio back in 
the Horatian genre. He has returned to Thermopolae, or its juridical 
equivalent, and he is telling it as it is, or at least how he sees it by his 
own Leiters. The city must be defended. And of course there are 
various subtexts. I won't discuss them here, I only want to say that the 
text illustrates well the culture wars in legal scholarship, the battle over 
turf, and the pervasive belief that we are all exiles at some level. And 
hence the play between structure and name, between the serious and 
satirical, and the charting of a path in between invective and the 
defense of friends. It is also, by this very token, a staging of loyalty, a 
positioning of friends, a demarcation of enemies. All that stolen 
enjoyment. Dworkin is "an extremely good writer," "his rhetoric is 
compelling," he comments on "pressing legal issues,"476 he gains 
attention, and we might add that he gets on Posner's A list, that he 
held the most prestigious of jobs in legal philosophy - Yale, Oxford, 
NYU, UCL: he has the status and he is not afraid to use it. Or be 
specific - why don't I? - there was the "drama " of "Dworkin's 
hatchet job . . .  on Jules Coleman's book."477 There was the dismissive 
reference "to Legal Theory, which I edit with Larry Alexander and 
Jules Coleman,"47 8  and then there was Dworkin's claim that Leiter's 
472. Id. at 3. 
473. Id. at 10. 
474. Id. at 3. 
475. Id. at 5. 
476. All at id. at 16. 
477. Id. at 18. 
478. Id. at 18. 
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teacher Peter Railton - "the standard of excellence in philosophy" 4 79 
- isn't "relevant."4 8 0  And finally the plain outrageous statement that 
legal positivists are scholastic, hermetic, and worst of all, "not 
interesting."4 81  The very idea. Most rumbunctious. 
D. Critical Race Theories 
So there are exiles all over. You cannot ignore that Leiter thinks he 
and his friends have been pushed to the side, implausible exiles or at 
least on the margins despite their top-notch work and mutual 
admiration. It is a salutary story with its own vivid self-expressions but 
I must needs move back now to the historical trajectory of the sense of 
exile and the actual dispersion of the radicals. What followed or 
represented the flowering, take your pick, of the short-lived critical 
legal studies movement was a much more diverse assertion of the 
body.4 8 2  The crits had divided as much as anything else upon 
generational lines. The young wanted to be noticed, needed to be 
different, and sought a post-Marxist or postmodernist voice. Class just 
didn't capture the complexity of material differences. Neither 
classroom nor class struggle were heuristically adequate to the 
pleasures of the I-Pod, the multitasking of the wireless environment, 
or the sound bytes of the first Internet generation. To this one has to 
add the retro concerns that class analysis excluded women, and later 
that it excluded race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. If critical legal 
studies generally tended first to earnestness and latterly to flippancy, 
the subsequent generation was much more satirical, even if that satire 
was caused as much by the juxtaposition of contraries as it was by any 
more explicit satirical intention. I will start with a characteristic image. 
The story comes in the course of an argument about the need for a 
multiplicity of voices, of multiple life experiences, that are currently 
missing, circa 1991 that is, from legal scholarly dialogue. The anecdote 
is titled The Elevator and reads as follows: 
One Saturday afternoon I entered an elevator in a luxury condominium 
in downtown Philadelphia with four other Black women law professors. 
We were leaving the apartment of another Black woman law professor. 
The elevator was large and spacious. A few floors later, the door opened 
and a White woman in her late fifties peered in, let out a muffled cry of 
surprise, stepped back and let the door close without getting on. Several 
479. Id. at 21. 
480. Id. at 13. 
481. Id. at 17. 
482. On the flowering and diversification of CLS, see Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS, 
supra note 308, at 1016-23, or GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995). 
December 2004) Satirical Legal Studies 491 
floors later the elevator stopped again, and the doors opened to reveal 
yet another White middle-aged woman, who also decided not to get on.483 
The first incident, Banks reports, puzzled the women, and the second 
one made them laugh. Once was idiosyncracy, twice was farce. In fact 
positively absurd. 
That gives you a vivid image of the shock value of the body 
adorned with colors and clothes but without words. What you don't 
know, the unfamiliar, the strange, the outside, are all so many 
synonyms for one meaning of bad. The shock value of the body is 
precisely the basic premise of satire. It is the oldest tradition. Read 
Placentinus, Rabelais, or Freeman and Schlegel on Ackerman the 
chimp, Hutchinson on the one-eyed Dworkin, on the principles of 
Cyclops, Douzinas's drunken narrator, or the jurisprudence of Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer,484 and it is awash with body parts, bodily 
functions, organs, faces, mouths, and more. It is embodied, hedonistic, 
shocking to the norm, and somewhat exterior to the preceding style of 
legal scholarship. The function of legal satire is to introduce what law 
excludes. More than that, satire gives a competing voice to the 
experience, the languages and forms of life, that law excluded along 
with the bodies that were bad or simply too different to gain entry into 
the Pantheon of recognized legalisms, or Holmes's community of the 
shared meanings qf words. 
Why this concern with genre, with the aesthetic or style of critiques 
of law?485 The answer is layered, both historically and theoretically. I 
am going to have to apologize to Professor DeLong (who you will 
remember really doesn't like theoretical terms) but exclusion is both 
conscious and unconscious. In Taunya Banks's anecdote about the 
elevator, the middle-aged white woman reacted without thought -
she let out a muffled cry, she stepped back, a physical response to 
sensory data that got under her skin. Her response was ingrained, 
habitual, prior to thought, which means it was prejudiced, decided in 
advance. And you will also have noticed that the law professors in the 
elevator didn't say anything, didn't reassure, or persuade, criticize, or 
comfort. And that is probably because it all happened too quickly, and 
it wasn't really a context conducive to speech. If the lady jumped at the 
sight of four Black women, I don't think she would have been calmed 
483. Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law 
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46, 49 (1990-91) .  
484. See William P. MacNeil, "You Slay Me"!: Buffy as Jurisprude of Desire, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2421 (2003); Anthony Bradney, Choosing Laws, Choosing Families: 
Images of Law, Love and Authority in "Buffy the Vampire Slayer," 2 WEB J. CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES (2003), at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2003/issue2/bradney2.html. 
485. A theme pursued well in ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS (John Gardner 
ed., 2001). 
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down by the fact that they could talk. It would probably just have 
made them seem a whole lot more dangerous. 
It is hard to say it, but Taunya and her colleagues just had to be 
there to break the norm, to shock the order of things.48 6 Their 
difference was in their appearance, but that difference was somehow 
structural. It fed into deeply ingrained fears, perceptions way below 
the level of immediate articulation. There are plenty of similar stories. 
Patricia Williams being locked out of Benetton's,487 or Regina Austin 
being turned down by Harvard Law School,488 or Lani Guinier being 
flamed in the popular media as the "Quota Queen."48 9 All that 
negative affect is expressive of something, at the very least of deeply 
felt emotion, animation and excitation, desire and fear. Those are 
visceral responses, bodily states, and we refer to them in that way in 
part by dint of recognition that inclusion and exclusion, similarity and 
difference, recognition and rejection are both conscious and 
unconscious. When Charles Lawrence starts a law review article by 
reporting a dream in which he confronts a racist white law professor, 
one question to ask is "who is the dreamer? "490 In Freudian terms it is 
the unconscious, the sleeping body. That, in fact, was the argument 
that he made: Racism is unconscious and so too are many of our 
responses to it.49 1 That is the level at which the discourse takes place, in 
the theater of self and other, in the mime of visceral gestures, in the 
shock of the satirical as well as through the relative calm of legal prose. 
Legal feminism in its various forms introduced the body into the 
discourse of law. Sexual difference,49 2 the masculine gender of the legal 
use of pronouns, the maleness of the reasonable man, the assumption 
that the disembodied reason of legal abstraction - the transcendental 
nonsense - was universal, common to all bodies, to both sexes, to all 
cultures.49 3 Feminism and most specifically "difference feminism " 
486. For a powerful discussion of appearance and identity, on "seeming" to belong to a 
stereotype or class or image, see Maria Grahn-Farley, Not for Sale!: Race & Gender Identity 
in Post-Colonial Europe, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271 (2000). 
487. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 51,  at 44-51. 
488. See BELL, CONFRONTING, supra note 307, at 104-09, 1 14-15. 
489. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 217, at 99. 
490. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992) [hereinafter Lawrence, River] . 
491. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
492. LUCE IRIGARAY, I LOVE TO You: SKETCH FOR A FELICITY WITHIN HISTORY 
(Alison Martin trans., 1996) [hereinafter IRIGARA Y, I LOVE); LUCE IRIGARA Y, THINKING 
THE DIFFERENCE (Karin Montin trans., 1994) (1989) [hereinafter IRIGARA Y, DIFFERENCE); 
see also DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS (1993). 
493. IRIGARAY, DIFFERENCE, supra note 492, at 37-67; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
Tow ARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STA TE (1989). 
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impugned the disembodiment of law by placing the female body and 
the female voice,49 4 biography and embodiment, onto the agenda of 
legal studies. That meant seizing a space and finding representation in 
the dialogue of universals which was in fact no more than the male­
gendered monologue of scholarship and doctrine. In Irigaray's 
elaboration, women needed their half of the public space of 
representation. They needed access to the sites of social enunciation. 
They needed legal definition and recognition. Women had to become 
legal subjects, which meant for her that they needed to grasp an 
objectivity of their own.49 5 
The emergence of the female body in the discourse of law required 
new forms of representation. Irigaray argued for a baseline civic 
identity and recognition for women, a status that would allow women 
to develop their own modes of representation, their own aesthetic, 
politics, science, religion, and mythology.496 It was an argument that 
Drucilla Cornell developed in wonderfully Joycean terms by arguing 
for a "mamafesta," a carnivalesque language of feminine self­
definition.49 7 It was precisely taking the body seriously, addressing the 
unspeakable,498 that expanded the ambit of legal studies to include 
attention to the multiple differences of the subjects upon whom the 
law was inscribed. Sex was a primary difference, for sure, but then so 
were race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. 499 What has the law got to 
say for me, as a woman, a person of color, a foreigner, a stranger, a gay 
man, a lesbian, a transsexual, or a"horsexe "?500 
The body sprung onto the legal stage, with all its colors, tones, 
modulations, and rhythms. It was an expanding world of race theory, 
sansei legal feminism,5 0 1  LatCrit legal studies, and sexual-orientation 
494. The most influential work was CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
See also CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989); Ann C. Scales, The 
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). 
495. IRIGARA Y, I LOVE, supra note 492, at 18. For comment, see Peter Goodrich, 
Writing Legal Difference: Helena Kennedy's Eve Was Framed and British Justice and Luce 
lrigaray's J'aime a toi: equisse d'une felicite dans l'histoire, 4 WOMEN: A CULTURAL REV. 
173 (1993). See also GOODRICH, OEDIPUS, supra note 142, at 144. 
496. IRIGARA Y, DIFFERENCE, supra note 492, at 20-23. 
497. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION 1 (1991); Drucilla Cornell, The 
Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 688 n.108 
(1990). 
498. NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS (1998). 
499. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGALF. 139 (1989). 
500. CATHERINE MILLOT, HORSEXE: ESSAY ON TRANSSEXUALITY (1990). 
501. MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, 
GENDER AND THE LAW 182-83 (1996) [hereinafter MATSUDA, WHERE?] . The term sansei 
refers to third generation Japanese-Americans. Id. at 181. 
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law. 5 0 2  Introducing the body - asking, as did Matsuda, Where is Your 
Body? - proposed a radically different connotation for the old legal 
writ of habeas corpus, meaning where is the body, and who will 
account for its being there? The body took to the stage, and that of 
course means that it became the object of legal discourse and the 
subject of legal texts. If the body was the expression of difference then 
that was because it appeared to be different. It needed different forms 
of expression, and that meant different modes of representation would 
reflect the differences of lived experience. Dreams, anecdotes, fictional 
characters and allegories, reminiscences, biographical diaries, poetry, 
emotion, fire music, jazz, and law were the new and corporeally 
embedded directions in the study of law. That was the radical critical 
style. 
For Derrick Bell, writing differently, elaborating fictional 
characters in imagined worlds, talking about the experiences of 
outsiders and of the forgotten, was simply and directly a question of 
confronting authority. 5 03 The subtle and persistent shock produced by a 
Harvard Law Review Supreme Court Term Foreword written in the 
form of a fictive chronicle recounting imaginary events was a 
selfconsciously satirical intervention.504 It was confrontational but in a 
stylish and understated form. It confronted and it shocked by 
challenging the forum and the scholarly jurisdiction of the law review. 
Bell's Chronicles begin on precisely that question of jurisdiction or 
right to speak. The author, the lone minority member of a committee 
planning bicentennial constitutional celebrations, tells a friend of a 
fantasy in which he returns to report back to the Framers on the 
progress made in the two centuries since they signed. The friend is 
"kind," and she tells him that he will have "to explain to the framers 
how you, a black, had gotten free of your chains and gained the 
audacity to teach white men anything. "5 0 5  Adopting a common literary 
device, Bell later addresses the question again by indicating that the 
Chronicles are not his, but told to him "by Geneva Crenshaw, a civil 
rights lawyer who experienced them while recovering from an injury 
she suffered in Mississippi during the Freedom Summer campaign of 
1964."506 Bell does not state that she is a fiction until later. Instead, he 
502. CRffiCAL RACE THEORY, supra note 441, collects some of the most important 
writings. Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and 
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), is an important early guide to LatCrit theory. See also 
MA TSUDA, WHERE?, supra note 501. 
503. BELL, CONFRONTING, supra note 307, at ix-xiv. 
504. Bell, supra note 49. 
505. Id. at 4. 
506. Id. at 13. 
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proceeds in "a tone of dead seriousness "5 0 7  to record the narrative of 
the Celestial Curia, and the dialogue that followed its recounting. 
Bell's Chronicles article was followed by a whole series of 
comparably confrontational literary interventions. Geneva Crenshaw 
returned fulsomely in Bell's book And We Are Not Saved,508 again in 
Faces at the Bottom of the Well,509 and in Afrolantica Legacies.510 She 
was Bell's vehicle and, as is well known, she was also his political 
cause. He resigned from Harvard Law School precisely because no 
African-American woman had been appointed to the faculty. 5 11 It is 
work that helped found the critical race theory movement, and it 
helped define the style of the work. It demanded a change of voice and 
of forum that was picked up on or played with by many other authors. 
If legal discourse and scholarship expressed a white-male norm, a 
different form of scholarship and different sites and modes of 
enunciation were necessary to the inclusion of novel experiences, 
cultures, and their anomalous norms. 
Bell's Chronicles adopted the literary and often utopian device of 
the found manuscript and the report from an inaccessible place. 
Geneva Crenshaw arrived at the Celestial Curia after "what seemed a 
long joumey. "5 1 2  When we encounter Geneva again, it is by means of 
the same literary device, rhetorically topothesia, or the figure of an 
imagined geography,5 13 through a daydream during the plenary session 
of an unsatisfactory conference. Afrolantica, to take a further 
example, was an explicitly utopian space which "rose slowly, fully 
formed from watery depths in about the location of the mythical, lost 
continent of Atlantis. "5 1 4  The form signaled the novelty of the content 
and of the cause: if law was here and now, critical race theory wanted 
to take it elsewhere and into a future that was as of yet genuinely 
unknown. Critical race theory was abolitionist in the sense that it did 
not want substitutes of this for that, or simple inclusion and repetition 
of a prior norm. In its radical early modes it wanted recognition and 
enunciation for modes of life, of culture, experience, speech, and 
507. MATSUDA, WHERE?, supra note 501, at 49. 
508. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987). 
509. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1992). 
510. DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES (1998) (hereinafter BELL, 
AFROLANTICA ] .  
511 .  BELL, CONFRONTING, supra note 307, at 50-65, tells the story from Bell's 
perspective. 
512. Bell, supra note 49, at 17 (emphasis omitted). 
513. Peter Goodrich, La Nouvelle Vague: Epiphanies, Encounters, Events, 10 FEMINIST 
LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002). The figure is defined by PEACHAM, supra note 123, at 141-42. 
514. BELL, AFROLANTICA, supra note 510, at ix. 
496 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:397 
writing that were distinctive in genre and outside of prior law if not 
expressly unlawful. 
Charles Lawrence began his critique of the white norm with a 
highly confrontational dream in which he elaborated upon the 
significance of fear and the differences in the experience of fear as 
between that of "the oppressor, or master, and that of the oppressed, 
or slave. "5 15 The force of the criticism is both smoothed and extended 
by its location in a dream. Its shock value is augmented by its 
accessibility, its resonance with experience. Here is how Matsuda 
relates it: "The conceptualization of fear as a motivational force in life 
and in law - intertwined with a critique of meritocratic legal lies, all in 
a short account of one man's dream - was stunning to readers who 
identified with Lawrence's experience."5 1 6  It was a dream of a voice, 
and of the social change that speaking our dreams could bring. 
Patricia Williams begins her most famous work with a fable of the 
Celestial City, and then moves immediately to the state of waking: 
Since subject position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve 
to know that it's a bad morning. I am very depressed. It always takes a 
while to sort out what's wrong, but it usually starts with some kind of 
perfectly irrational thought such as: I hate being a lawyer.517 
So Williams begins with the bad, and being bad, appropriately enough, 
means feeling unlike a lawyer, and unlike Holmes's other and 
probably better friend, the prudent man who listens for the echoes of 
the universal. A later set of radio lectures that Williams delivered on 
the BBC in London, which both threatened and infuriated the English 
tabloid and middlebrow media,5 18 started with an anecdote about the 
experiences of her child in the schoolyard playing "good guys. " The 
teacher had told her students that there was no color line between 
good and bad. Good could be black and bad could be white (or pink or 
gray). She had said color didn't matter, best to ignore it in fact. 
Williams pointed out that this was bad advice, so bad that her chiid 
had to be taken to the eye doctor when he kept saying that he didn't 
know the color of things because, in essence, his teachers had taught 
him that color didn't matter.5 19 
John Calmore, to take one final example, begins with jazz. His 
argument for jazz jurisprudence was that it was a musical form that 
515. Lawrence, River, supra note 490, at 2233. 
516. MATSUDA, WHERE?, supra note 501, at 49. 
517. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY, supra note 51, at 3. 
518. WILLIAMS, COLOR BLIND, supra note 300. On the press reaction in England, see 
Goodrich & Mills, supra note 182, at 27-29. 
519. WILLIAMS, COLOR BLIND, supra note 300, at 3-4. 
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expressed dissent from traditional forms.520 It is a form that allows 
improvisation; it is generally unrehearsed and democratic, a 
countercultural practice in fact. Jazz is fundamentally critical and 
multicultural, and it is its oppositional, border-crossing character, its 
appeal across racial divides, its heterogeneity that appeals to Calmore. 
That, and the fact that it is based in performance, in doing something, 
in lived experience and its expression. Calmore does not think that 
mixing jazz and law, black and white, "is necessarily a bad thing."5 21 
Well of course it isn't a bad thing, but in Holmes's terms, Calmore, and 
Comel West, 5 22 and Archie Shepp, Derrick, Patricia, Charles, and 
Mari, Kim, and Kendall, they are all versions of his friend the bad 
man, bringing bad interpretations - the music of difference - into 
the law. Play on. 
VI. KYNICS, SATIRISTS, AND CRITICS OF LAW 
In his essay on the path of the law, Holmes, in backtracking rapidly 
from the radicalism of introducing his friend the bad man says the 
following: "I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will 
misinterpret what I have to say as the language of cynicism."523 Well, 
one implication of that is surely that while the hearer may not, the 
reader most certainly will. Holmes wasn't much of a philosopher, but 
his reference and anxiety are highly telling. Of course it was cynical, or 
more accurately, to borrow the German term that Peter Sloterdijk 
coins for subversive or antiestablishment Menippean cynicism, it was 
"kynical."5 24 That means that it was classically cynical, in turn playful, 
irreverent, critical, harsh, at times shocking, and throughout fiercely 
realistic. The kynic was political through and through, classically an 
activist and one who would hound authority and privilege in search of 
authenticity and in search of something new. The kynic belonged to a 
political tradition that was insolent, audacious, and hedonistic: " [T]he 
tradition of kynicism, embodied in Diogenes . . . privileged satirical 
520. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an 
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2135 (1992). 
521. Id. As a side note, Kellis Parker, cousin of Charlie Parker, was a professor at 
Columbia Law School and kept a trombone in his office. See Kendall Thomas, Remarks at 
Memorial Service for Professor Kellis E. Parker, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 699 (2001 ). 
522. CORNEL WEST, PROPHETIC FRAGMENTS (1988). West later went on to produce a 
rap CD, to the distress of Lawrence Summers, the new President of Harvard University. 
West subsequently moved to Princeton University for that very reason. 
523. Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 40, at 459. BIERCE, supra note 293, at 61, 
defines "cynic" as follows: "A blackguard whose faulty vision sees things as they are, not as 
they ought to be," which ably captures Holmes's friend and gives us a lucid entry into a 
world turned upside down. 
524. SLOTERDUK, supra note 93, at 101. For useful discussion, see THE CYNICS, supra 
note 78. 
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laughter, sensuality, the politics of the body, and a pleasure-oriented 
life as forms of resistance to the master narratives of Platonic idealism, 
the values of the polis, and the imperial claims of Alexander the 
Great."5 25 Times have moved on, Alexander is no longer Great, we've 
moved from Plato to NATO, but the satirical technique, the 
irreverence, the cheekiness, the laughter and lampooning, are arguably 
still significant attributes of contemporary kynicism and of satirical 
legal studies in its twentieth-century forms. Who was Diogenes, after 
all, if not the first bad man? 
It is kynicism, I will suggest, that is the common link, the theme 
that draws together legal realism, the diverse forms of critical legal 
theory, the social parodies of public intellectuals, the critics of 
postmodernism, and the practitioners of the lighter side of law.5 26 The 
thread that I have traced under the aegis of satirical legal studies, from 
the legists to the Lizard, from Renaissance legal farces to the Green 
Bag, from amici curiae to amici humoriae, is that of a satirical tradition 
that is properly the heir to classical kynicism. Looking back may 
enable us to move forward. There are key elements, consistencies 
even, that the tradition of kynicism exhibits. They can be drawn 
together to aid in developing the project and prospects of satirical legal 
studies, not, I hasten to add, as a movement but rather as an idea, a 
sentiment, a critical mood, and an as-yet-neglected genre of legal 
writing. It may be that there are costs to making this subculture visible. 
The squibs and jibes, the jokes and barbs are secretly what jurists 
enjoy reading but they fear to take them seriously, they rather 
ironically have trouble thinking them through. We all have our blind 
spots, lawyers perhaps more than most, it being a sedentary life, but 
let's take a look. There are, at the very least, certain key themes that 
can be drawn from the earlier tradition, various impulses and 
commitments, a tone and a style, and addressing these directly can 
help define the philosophy of satirical legal studies as we inherit it and 
may yet build upon it. 
525. Andreas Huyssen, Foreword to SLOTERDIJK, supra note 93, at xv. 
526. I refer here, and admittedly or intentionally only in a footnote, to the healthy levity 
of some of the contributions to the Journal of Legal Education, which has long had a periodic 
section titled "On the Lighter Side," that includes some fine if local satire of law review 
footnoting, scholarly prolixity, law school hierarchy, and other academic vices. Every so 
often an almost-blank page will appear. The first series of Green Bag, a journal that 
announced itself, in its first issue in 1889, as intentionally useless, and defended that position 
in the second issue, had a longstanding section called "Facitiae" and varied sections of 
humorous antiquities or bizarre anecdotes. Other period pieces of juristic entertainment 
from that era include BALLADS OF THE BENCH AND BAR OR IDLE LAYS OF THE 
PARLIAMENT HOUSE (1882); LYRICS OF THE LAW (J. Greenbag Croke ed., 1884); and 
POEMS OF THE LAW (J. Greenbag Croke ed., 1885). My favorite of contemporary legal poets 
is Robert Rains. See, for a good illustration, Rains, R, supra note 1 19. 
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When Plato put forward the definition of the human as a 
featherless biped and was praised for it, Diogenes grabbed a rooster 
and plucked the feathers from it. He then brought it into Plato's school 
and said: "Here is Plato's man "; as a result of which, the phrase 
"having broad nails " was added.5 27 For Diogenes and the Kynics, it was 
the materialization of thought that mattered. What was significant was 
not the philosopher's teaching, but rather it was the philosopher's 
practice that determined their importance: "It was their very life that 
bore meaning within itself and implied an entire doctrine."5 28 In this 
aspect, Diogenes has much in common with Socrates in imagining that 
the function of philosophy is to dispel reliance upon easy abstractions 
or the vacuities of established practice. Knowledge of oneself and care 
of oneself were the primary sources of philosophical thought and 
entailed a decision that grounded a life. 
Honesty, vitality, and humor went together in establishing a 
lifestyle as "an ethical practice that others could imitate."5 29 In this 
dimension, life was a stage upon which thought was acted out. That 
was its freedom and its authenticity, its project and its power. 
Anything else would be dishonest, lazy, and in the end unhappy. What 
has not been experienced, directly or vicariously, can hardly be 
thought, or if thought is liable to stultification. Thus the story of the 
rooster being plucked, a story that is echoed in the title of one 
postmodern law book of anecdotes authored by Patricia Williams 530 
and numerous other enactments of the failure of enlightenment. 
Diogenes, according to Tertullian, carried a lamp in broad daylight as 
an ironic gesture against the metaphor of light, and later of 
enlightenment, as an externally given illumination.53 1 The kynic is 
honest, Gnostic, and realistic: light has its source in the sun, and those 
who value nature will see their way by that. 
The kynic's universitas vitae, or "schoolroom of life," referred to a 
philosophy taught in other places, in the lifestyle of the actor, the 
artist, the player.53 2 It was teaching that took place on the stage of 
public life and through the drama of public events. It was inculcated 
through what was done rather than through the more usual 
retrospective reflections that synthesize what should have happened or 
527. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 81, at 43. 
528. PIERRE HADOT, WHAT IS ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY? 102 (2002). 
529. Long, supra note 433, at 41. 
530. WILLIAMS, ROOSTER'S EGG, supra note 300. 
531. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 81, at 43. The reference to Tertullian is given in THE 
CYNICS, supra note 78, at 361. 
532. SLOTERDIJK, supra note 93, at 120. 
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represent what the judge or philosopher rationalized as the reasons for 
what was not done. It is that thematic of enactment, of honestly 
looking at what occurred, particularly in legal judgment, that 
motivated legal realism from the beginning. Holmes was from the 
outset in search of phenomenology, an account of law that responded 
not to logic but to experience. Satirical legal studies took up that 
theme and derided the many forms of juristic abstraction and 
specifically the disassociation of norm and judgment, fact and 
determination. Its concern was with what happened, what got lived, 
and not with what was represented. 
Legal realism was in large measure a satire of the pretensions, the 
follies and intellectual foibles, of jurisprudence. In their varying forms, 
Llewellyn and Frank, the rule skeptics and the fact skeptics, sought to 
express what happened in the name of law. From the Cheyenne Way533 
to the study of parking regulations,5 3 4  the goal was to account for what 
got done and to juxtapose that with the rules in the books or the 
fantasms in the judgments. The sociology of law continued that pattern 
of satirical or simply negative confrontation between practice and 
judgment, between application of the norm and normative self­
justification.5 3 5  It is in the tradition of the realists, that critical legal 
scholars satirized the grandiose claims of legal reason, of rule and 
policy, in favor of an account of how law affects life. Pierre Schlag's 
Enchantment of Reason, referred to the dream of pure forms, the 
fantasy of a logical order that mapped the anomalous domain of 
events.5 3 6  The "jurismaniac " was precisely an addict of legal resolutions 
to all conceivable social ills and was derided as such: 5 3 7  "Hello, my 
name is Peter, and I am a jurismaniac " is a salutary starting point, is it 
not? The heirs of critique, feminism, critical race theory, sensei 
jurisprudence, Latcrit legal studies, and so on, all share a connection to 
experience, to what is lived, as the primary datum against which to 
measure the follies of legal doctrine and the various other authorized 
accounts of law. Rodrigo continues, at least in one sense, in the 
tradition of Placentinus, and chronicles the experience of the student 
as the outsider, and the demand of the excluded to a place in the social 
contract, the law that underpins law. 
Legal philosophy as a way of life is obviously something of a lost 
art, a distant memory, a tradition now marked by desuetude rather 
533. K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). 
534. Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in 
Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943). 
535. For a striking example, see DOREEN J. MCBARNET, CONVICTION: LAW, THE 
STA TE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (1981 ) .  
536. SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 328, at 3-7. 
537. CAMPOS, supra note 42, at 3-15. 
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than use. It is not obvious what it means, though nor is it necessarily 
particularly difficult. Law as a way of life refers to the relationships 
that law engenders and the practices it supports. The question of what 
law is as an experience, in its time and space, its here and now, is really 
very challenging. As I have shown, irreproachably I believe, law is 
ironically everywhere enclosed, bounded, locked away. It is in law 
schools, in books, in courts and texts and the scarcely comprehended 
argots of statute and decision, codes and their complications. We 
satirists, however, cannot start from these external manifestations of 
law, these passing distractions, but rather look to experience, to the 
interiority of practices, to the affects and comparisons, the proximities 
and distances, that support the rule. As Nietzsche puts it, and he was 
an exemplary kynic, a gay scientist in the extreme, what has to be 
addressed is the color of law, its history as a practice, its affective life, 
the day-to-day of the face-to-face. 
B. Humor as a Rhetorical Form 
I have left discussion of humor until rather late. Purposefully so, or 
at least I shouldn't really be admitting otherwise, because satire 
embraces humor but does so to particular effect. Humor, however, 
underpins and in part defines satire, and it is worth elaborating upon 
one further feature. Humor engages the body, it causes a physical 
eruption, "broken sounds," trembling or convulsion. Here is a 
sixteenth-century definition of laughter: 
Laughter is a movement caused by the jubilant mind and the unequal 
agitation of the heart, which draws back the mouth and the lips, and 
shakes the diaphragm and the pectoral parts with impetuosity and 
broken-up sound, through all of which is expressed a feeling over an ugly 
thing unworthy of pity.538 
Note that laughter ineluctably joins thought to the body, and along 
with blushes and tears, reticence and passion, it is the most real that 
thought can be. Note further that what most helps us in defining 
laughter as the expression of humor is this boundary-crossing 
character which is also expressive of the most direct and honest of 
beliefs. The dread potentate is an ill-working digestive apparatus; 5 3 9  
the judge, to use an English example - and why not? - is dressed as 
a woman or, if female, as a man; the professor is a bore, or drunk, or 
ill-prepared, or passing on someone else's thoughts as his own; the 
Associate Dean is rent seeking.540 Whatever. Call them on it. 
538. LAURENT JOUBERT, TREATISE ON LAUGHTER 73 (Gregory David De Rocher 
trans., Univ. of Ala. Press 1980) (1560). 
539. CARLYLE, supra note 2, at 51 .  
540. See Stewart E. Sterk, Information Production and Rent-Seeking in Law School 
Administration: Rules and Discretion, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1 141 (2003). Just for the hell of it: 
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Humor is perhaps too light a word. Diogenes was often referred to 
as Socrates gone mad,5 41 a characterization attributed to Plato and 
frequently taken up by subsequent, less-affectionate historians. His 
madness was most immediately his opposition to cultural norms as 
arbitrary rules, his aversion to proper manners as modes of 
concealment, and to the general prescription of the tragic as against 
the comedic or simply hedonistic. Humor in the service of satire causes 
laughter, but it also generates shock and outrage because of the 
deflationary cause within which it plays its role. Role reversal, the 
inversion of accepted norms, the parodying of social positions, are key 
elements in all comedy and of particular importance in satirical 
interventions. Diogenes the dog and kynicism as dog philosophy 
together represent an emblematic expression of the limitation of 
philosophy and a surprising inversion of the usually disembodied 
nature of philosophical thought. 
The later tradition constantly returned to the humorous as the 
intrinsic mode of destabilizing or at least desanctifying law. The legal 
equivalent of kynicism is literally "dog jurisprudence " - a barking 
critique of established norms. It is a long-lived tradition that starts for 
us with Placentinus's humorous poem and its juxtaposition of nature 
and law, as vitality waged against the desiccated figure of legal science. 
The figure of Domina Ignorantia was that of a young girl, not that of a 
dog to be sure, but the import was similar, the trigger the same, and 
the humor was equally that of nature - bare life - in insurrection 
against law. This was the theme most evidently of the gai savoir, or 
"gay science," that Nietzsche recalled in his eponymous treatise.5 42 The 
humor of the kynics gained its major modern elaboration in Nietzsche, 
whose philosophy of gay science opened with the opposition of 
tragedy and parody, and the declaration that satirical science, the 
scientist as satyr, was the face of the future.543 
Sterk, whose office is only one floor away from mine, and who seems pretty physically active, 
sporty even, was an interim Associate Dean. He would not make this argument - I will ask 
him next time I see him - but the very fact of writing the article, of "vent[ing] my personal 
frustrations" as he puts it at 1 170, amusingly acts as a partial rebuttal of his thesis. It, at the 
least, exemplifies that we are all part rent-seekers, extracting a personal interest, pushing a 
subgroup cause in the course of running things as they are. It cannot be helped. It is how 
things are. A little pain in your profit; a little prophet in your pain. 
541. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 81, at 43. 
542. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE JOYFUL WISDOM (LA GAYA SCIENZA) (Thomas 
Common trans., Frederick Ungar Publ'g 1960) (1882) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, JOYFUL 
WISDOM). For discussion of the jurisprudential significance and possibilities of that text, see 
Goodrich, Gay Science, supra note 124, at 95, and GEAREY,supra note 485, at 64-73. 
543. NIETZSCHE, JOYFUL WISDOM, supra note 542, at 3. 
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The buffoon, the kynic, the jester, Diderot's Rameau,5 4 4  and 
Foucault's fool 5 4 5  played a hugely important role in the early history of 
the politics of thought. For Nietzsche, the figure of the satiric scientist, 
the kynic or gay thinker, was one of innocence and ambition, of 
honesty and the satisfactions of a loose tongue: " [W]hen any one 
speaks 'badly' - and not even 'ill' - of man, then ought the lover of 
knowledge to hearken attentively and diligently; he ought, in general, 
to have an open ear wherever there is talk without indignation."5 4 6  The 
reason for going with the bad and not with the moralistic or indignant, 
is specified as follows: 
For the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates 
himself with his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or 
society), may indeed, morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing 
and self-satisfied satyr, but in every other sense he is the more ordinary, 
more indifferent, and less instructive case. And no one is such a liar as 
the indignant man.547 
Nietzsche's kynic was an oppositionist and a rebel. He was above 
all honest, and his honesty pitched him against the moral code of 
required points of view. The satyrical scientist was cheerful because 
the Christian God was dead 5 4 8  - no longer worthy of our belief - and 
along with that cheerful cheekiness, the gay scientist opposed humor, 
and the various ruses of parody and jesting, to the weariness, the 
sobriety and humorlessness of the tradition of Christian moral values. 
It was indeed the humorlessness of a norm that was nihilist or life­
defying, in a bland or weak and dreary way.5 49 Humor existed to 
remove the mask of seriousness behind which the moralizing 
philosopher hid. It was the rhetorical mode of the destruction of 
tragedy: "Great things require that one be silent about them or talk 
about them on a grand scale: on a grand scale means cynically and with 
innocence. "5 5 0  
Humor was the genre of resistance and dissent. It accumulated 
many further figures in the literary tradition from the Rabelesian 
544. Actually Rameau's nephew. See DENIS DIDEROT, Rameau's Nephew, in RAMEAU'S 
NEPHEW AND D'ALEMBERT'S DREAM 13 (Leanard Tancock trans., Penguin Books 1966) 
(n.d). 
545. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1965). 
546. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 40 (Helen Zimmern trans., 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1976) (1887). 
547. Id. 
548. NIETZSCHE, JOYFUL WISDOM, supra note 542, at 275. 
549. A suggestion frequently made in SCHLAG, LA YING DOWN, supra note 328. 
550. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER I, at 1 (1909). Translation is taken 
from THE CYNICS, supra note 78, at 354. 
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Doctor of gay science 5 5 1  who philosophized sans culottes - bare assed 
- to the yippies or the Lizard. Issue one of the Lizard begins with a 
defense of the "incivility" of critical legal scholars against an attack by 
the Times. The opening response reads: "Kiss my ass, cigar-breath. 
You guys sound more and more like an organ (you know which) of the 
Pinochet regime. "5 5 2  Which is a classically bad, and specifically bad­
mouthed response. It neatly enacts the position being defended. And 
then, to add paradox, the respondent later denies the accusation: "We 
are not uncivil, unless as you say it's uncivil ever to argue with people 
in authority."5 5 3  
The use of humor, Nietzsche's incipit parodia of gay science, 
develops as much out of a literary and rhetorical tradition as it does 
out of rebellion against the received wisdoms of philosophy. Satirical 
legal humor revised the theatrical genre of comedy for the purposes of 
criticizing law. The poem was the earliest form of such critique outside 
of theater, and it was a form much used by Nietzsche himself, but as 
we have seen, the genre also included dialogues,5 5 4  humorous briefs,5 5 5  
ludic digressions,5 5 6  revels and plays,5 5 7  as well as fictional sallies.5 5 8  As 
satire, these divergent examples of the genre share the rhetorical use 
of humor to make a broadly political point. The recourse to rhetorical 
forms gives the further clue that these uses of humor are aimed to 
engage, or in Saint Augustine's classical formulation, to move, 
persuade, and bend the audience to the purposes of the orator.5 59 
551. RABELAIS, supra note 61, at 67-72. See also, interestingly MICHELE LE DOEUFF, LE 
SEXE DU SAVOIR 371 (1998). 
552. The Civility Issue in Critical Legal Studies: A Dialogue Between The Times and 
Lizard, LIZARD, Jan. 5,  1984, at 1 .  
553. Id. at  2. 
554. E.g. , C.W. Maris van Sandelingenambacht, Nietzsche, Niezky Nijinsky, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2003) (providing a highly staged example); Tung Yin, Really, Who 
is Uncle Zeb?, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 115 (1999) (criticizing law school). 
555. E.g. , Charles Yablon, Suing the Devil: A Guide for Practitioners, 86 VA. L. REV. 103 
(2000). 
556. See, e.g. , DA YID FRASER, CRICKET AND THE LA w: THE MAN IN WHITE IS 
ALWAYS RIGHT (1993) (analyzing cricket-based theories of law); Yablon, Baseball, supra 
note 39 (reviewing the baseball metaphor in jurisprudence). Leff, Law and, supra note 23, 
offers a preliminary analysis of the appeal of the Judie metaphor. SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER 
AND DISPUTE (1979), offers a broad anthropological account of a number of Judie modes of 
dispute resolution in non-Western cultures. 
557. For a recent example, see the two brief scenes in Robert E. Scott, Twenty-Five 
Years Through the Virginia Law Review (with Gun and Camera), 87 VA. L. REV. 577, 580-82 
(2001). 
558. DOUZINAS ET AL., supra note 27, at 199-271 (analyzing the relationship of law to 
literature through a fictional copyright case). 
559. SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (D.W. Roberts, Jr. trans., 1958). 
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Granted that change is usually not immediately desirable to those 
who are being called upon to change - often named the 
establishment, the status quo, or vested interest 560 - and granted 
further that law has always been unusually slow to change, humor is 
often a necessary dimension of arguing for reform. It has to be said 
that it is also usually lacking, but rhetorically it is helpful. The modem 
lawyer studies rhetoric too little and so is not best-equipped to 
evaluate the place of humor. It is a radical dimension to argument, a 
central tenet of kynicism, and an intrinsic aspect of the art of satirical 
legal studies. That said, it can be added that it has philosophical 
significance as well. Satire treats philosophy as also being rhetorical, 
and it deems rhetoric to have a philosophical significance. Humor is 
the best traveled axis of such a radical elision. Humor persuades in 
large part because it attracts attention, it is engaging and engaged, it is 
in brief both thoughtful and accessible. That is its strength as a 
rhetorical form; it allows for the possibility of persuasion, even if it 
does not on the given occasion persuade, or at least not immediately. 
Humor, which of course has close links with the unconscious,56 1 
with the drives, plays upon the ambiguity of words and things. Here is 
not the place to embark upon an account of the genres or manners of 
the different types of humor but it is worth saying that it is a leveler of 
differences and, in principle, contrary in spirit to the pretensions of 
those who deem themselves above the muck of the world, of bodily 
functions, the emotions, the groans and guffaws, the blushes and 
smirks that mark all arguments as also being ex hominem and ad 
nominem. The appeal of humour is what we dull leftists used to call 
praxis, the art of conscious, quotidian political action, of taking things 
on thoughtfully in the everyday. Humor has appeal, a joke can get 
through, a satire can stick. It might even be fun to be a kynic in the 
philosophy of law. 
C. Anomalism as a Theory of Law 
Kynicism is predicated upon a theory of the event. Kynic 
philosophy was a choice of life rather than a discourse or treatise upon 
560. The argument for reform may most often be vested in liberal and left-wing critics of 
law, but it is equally true of right-wing satirists that they view liberal and left positions as 
controlling the relevant public sphere. Thus Dennis Arrow, Rich, supra note 458, takes the 
position that left-wing scholars have taken control of law schools; POSNER, INTELLECilJALS, 
supra note 8, views liberal and left-leaning intellectuals as dominating the media of public­
intellectual presence or, more disparagingly, as a left-wing market. 
561. I have resisted returning to SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO 
THE UNCONSCIOUS (James Stratchey trans., 1960). I have crossed too many lines already but 
he does make the useful observation that humor is necessarily in conflict with the superego. 
He sees the superego as a censor, a wrathful lawyer, as it were, whereas the delightfully light 
Critchley turns the other way and coins the more accurate epithet, "the super-ego is your 
amigo." CRITCHLEY, supra note 147, at 93. 
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modes of living. As a philosophy of embodied thought, a theory of the 
significance of acts, it was responsive, spontaneous, and spoken rather 
than written. Thus the anecdotes of Diogenes are full of paradoxical 
challenges to the received order of thought. When Diogenes saw a 
child drinking with his hands, he threw away his cup and drank with 
his hands as well.5 6 2  When someone declared that movement did not 
exist, Diogenes simply got up and walked away.5 6 3  Among the many 
significances of such symbolic acts is a strong sense of the uniqueness 
of the act as an expression that is authentic to the uniqueness of the 
event. It was anomalous, novel, beyond prior calculation or prediction, 
and so for the kynic, authenticity meant both apprehension of and 
response to the anomalous character or difference of the individual 
event. 
The classical legal tradition traveled under the sign of order. 
According to the ancient jurists, nihil pulchrius ordine, "nothing is 
more beautiful than order."564 For the kynic, the opposite was true -
beauty lay in the particular, in anomaly and dissent. The roots of this 
division between the early schools of law,5 65 derived from the writings 
of one of Diogenes's followers, Crates of Pergamum. It was not law 
but the rule-bound theorems of the grammarians that Crates attacked 
and in doing so established a tradition of anomalism first in linguistics 
and later in law.566 In schematic terms, the dispute looked as follows. 
For the analogists, language was inherently orderly and governed by 
regularity. The analogist grammarian undertook to submit language to 
principles or rules that were predicated upon likeness or analogy. 
Nouns and verbs could be grouped and classified into declensions and 
conjugations on the basis of similarity of form. The verbal similarities 
that the analogists sought to find were not only grammatical, they were 
congruent also with the semantic reference of the word, the context or 
denotata of the sign.5 6 7  
The anomalists were more radical and stressed difference rather 
than similarity of form. Their argument was that language was far from 
562. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 81, at 39. 
563. Id. at 39. 
564. On the maxim nihil pulchrius ordine, see PIERRE LEGENDRE, LES ENFANTS Du 
TEXTE 55 (1992); LEGENDRE READER, supra note 351 ,  17-20. 
565. See Peter Stein, The Two Schools of Jurists in the Early Roman Principate, 31 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 8 (1972); see also PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS 49-67 (1966). 
566. The standard account is that of R.H. ROBINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS 
45-47 (2d ed. 1970). A more technical account can be found in F.H. Colson, The Analogist 
and Anomalist Controversy, 13 CLASSICAL Q. 24, 33 (1919). The most important surviving 
source on this debate is 1-2 MARCUS TERENTIUS VARRO, DE LINGUA LATINA, at bks. V, 
VIII, X. (Roland G. Kent trans., 1951). 
567. See R.H. Robins, Dionysus Thrax and the Western Grammatica/ Tradition, 1957 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE PHILOLOGICAL Soc'y 67, 72 (1958). 
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orderly and that likeness of form, the rules and regularities that the 
grammarians sought to impose were shot through with exceptions. The 
irregularities, disharmonies, and anomalies that could be found 
throughout language use, were as essential and originary to the nature 
of language as were the regularities and rules of analogy that the 
analogists imposed. In Varro's description of the debate, the anomalist 
was focused upon usage, upon the situation and its modes of 
expression, its difference rather than its conformity to a rule: "[I]t is 
our practice to seek utility and not to seek resemblance; thus in the 
matter of clothing, although a man's toga is very unlike his tunic, and a 
woman's stola is very unlike a pallium, we make no objection to the 
difference. "568 The rooms of a house, he goes on to explain, are again 
unlike each other but that lack of resemblance is not an obstacle, it is 
rather a virtue, and he concludes: "Therefore, since difference prevails 
not only in clothing and in buildings, but also in furniture, in food, and 
in all the other things which have been taken into our daily life for use, 
the principle of difference should not be rejected in human speech 
either. "569 
Grammar is presupposed in law. The position of the analogist was 
taken up by the Proculian school of law, while that of the 
antigrammarians became the Sabinian position. Where Crates and 
later Aristarchus accused the grammarians of arbitrarily imposing 
general rules upon disparate practices, the Sabinian jurists attacked 
the abstraction and rigidity of the analogist school, and derided the 
attempts of Labeo to introduce analogy into law. In the view of the 
Sabinians, the truth of law lay not in grammar but in the specific 
contexts of its use. The analogist, in other words, imposed regularity, 
order, rules upon the chaos of law's actual use, its failing historical 
practices. The project of the legal grammarian was that of integrating 
difference and legislating Latinitas, or "abstract proper forms." The 
juristic anomalist argued that this obsessive desire to impose regularity 
upon the life of law was a misrecognition of the uniqueness and the 
difference of the interpretative practices of legal decision makers: the 
analogist's impulse to find or to impose consistency threatened to 
erase the difference of the actual case, the uniqueness or exception 
that is law for us. 
The details of the antique schools are not so relevant today, but the 
general position that there is more than reason, an excess of reason, 
both humor and sorrow in the jurist's compulsive reduction of events 
to rules finds strong expression in satirical legal studies. Reason arrives 
after the event, and it rationalizes a pathology or occurrence that 
escaped all prior prediction. The singular, the subject, and the case are 
568. 2 VARRO, supra note 566, at 393. 
569. Id. at 395. 
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outside of calculation. They exceed and escape the rule, and so being 
true to the event is, as Badiou puts it, similar to being in love: you have 
to change, you have to think something new and outside of the 
calculus of prior rules.5 7 0  The event, as one feminist theorist of law has 
recently phrased it, is a "shock to thought "5 7 1  and truth is in these 
terms fidelity to the event, change, and it requires recognition of 
difference and of anomaly. 
Much of the charge of the debates surrounding legal 
postmodemism and critical legal studies, the endless disputes about 
indeterminacy, the demise of truth, the evil of grand narratives, lay in 
the threat to law's concept of order that anomalism brings. Living with 
uncertainty is an art that few lawyers have internalized. They tend 
rather to live according to lists, memoranda, and other tabulated and 
lexically ordered notations. Uncertainty, attention to difference, 
departure from the paradigm has never been received that fondly by 
lawyers. The same is true of the twentieth century. The realists were 
dubbed nihilists, dark specters of nothingness, harbingers of 
apocalypse.5 7 2  Pierre the anomalist was more or less directly accused of 
being mad,5 7 3  Boyle was derided as sophomoric and unqualified to gain 
entry to graduate school,5 7 4  Unger and his ilk were warned to leave the 
law school,5 7 5  and even I was roundly reprimanded in print - weeks 
before going up for tenure - for failing properly to honor the order of 
law. 5 7 6  The analogists, the believers in the order and rectitude of the 
momentary system of law, the followers of rules, have little time for 
anomaly, for difference, and the "intersubjective zap "5 7 7  of events. 
They would rather be hung than have an anomalous thought, so they 
tend to say, and it perhaps explains why analogists often have rather 
long necks. That or they don't look into your eyes when they speak. 
570. ALAIN BADIOU, ETHICS: AN ESSA y ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL 43 (Peter 
Hallward trans., 2001); Oliver Feltham & Justin Clemens, Introduction to BADIOU, INFINITE 
THOUGHT, supra note 215, at 31-35. 
571. Anne Bottomley, Shock to Thought: An Encounter (of a third kind) with Legal 
Feminism, 12 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 29, 59 (2004). 
572. GOODRICH, READING, supra note 102, at 210-17. 
573. The debate is reviewed in David S. Caudill, On the Naming of Paranoia in Legal 
Scholarship, 33 Hous. L. REV. 215, 218 (1996). 
574. Leiter, Law School, supra note 212, at 101. 
575. Carrington, supra note 47, at 225; see also Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in 
the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TuL. L. REV. 15 
(1990); Peter W. Martin & Robert W. Gordon, "Of Law and the River, " and of Nihilism and 
Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986). 
576. P.S. Atiyah, Correspondence, 50 MOD. L. REV. 267-68 (1987). 
577. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 266, at 4. 
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The history of modern legal anomalies begins, of course, with "my 
friend the bad man " and the realist desire to attend to the pathology or 
event of judgment. The bad man asked in essence what is going to 
happen, what forces, what pleasure and pain, is going to occur to me? 
It was the question of occurrence that intrigued the realists and incited 
the ire of the analogically inclined. No one knows in advance what is 
going to happen. As law indicates time and again, what happens does 
so in spite of the law, beyond the reach of the norm. That is the beauty 
of the event and the pleasure of living. We can try to exclude surprises, 
or we can be open to events and change in light of them. That seems to 
be the choice, the two poles or extremes, and the satirists, for the 
purposes of satire, choose the latter potentiality rather than the prior 
probability. 
D. Hedonism as a Source of Law 
The satirical tends to accentuate the humorous and the absurd. It 
drags the personal into the public domain so as to shock and to 
entertain. It indulges in the ad hominem dismissal and the punning 
play upon words so as to give vitality and presence to discourses that 
tend otherwise to float off into the ether of dormant abstraction. 
Humor is pleasing because, like Aristotle's accomplished metaphor, it 
offers a novel or boundary-crossing comparison. We laugh at the 
inversion of roles, the doubleness of meaning, or the rapid trajectory 
from one order to another. The comedian seeks to engage that desire 
for risk taking and for slippage. The rhetorical root of humor lies in a 
concern with persuasion or indeed seduction, with the pleasure of 
confrontation and the charge of conflict, with the viscera of dialogue 
that were manifest from early on in the theoretical tradition of 
kynicism. 
There is no question but that Diogenes was an extremist. He 
scorned and abused and acted badly. As Nietzsche puts it, for the 
kynic, "his anger was his comfort, his recreation, his remedium against 
repulsion, his happiness. "578 It is the last term that requires attention 
here. Happiness, a non-utilitarian, spontaneous, and physical pleasure 
was the goal of kynicism. A society that could not allow for such 
pleasure was at fault. Kynicism stood for hope, for the celebration of 
humor and the disorientation of the senses. Hedonism stood opposed 
to moralism, as pleasure confronted fear. Kynicism was a way of life, a 
philosophy of practice that treated what was done, the event of the act, 
as the true expression of thought. What could not be embodied was of 
only secondary importance. And if it was contradicted by what was 
578. THE CYNICS, supra note 78, at 358 (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Zur 
Genealogie der Moral, in NIETZSCHE'S WERKE (1905)). 
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done, then it was nonsense. As Walter Benjamin put it, " [t]o be happy 
means to be able to look into oneself without being frightened."5 7 9  Or, 
to borrow from the English satirist Addison: "A man's first care 
should be to avoid the reproaches of his own heart; his next to escape 
the censures of the world. If the last interferes with the former, it 
ought to be entirely neglected."580 Strong words, a happy principle, a 
principle of happiness. 
Self-reliance, self-expression, and self-knowledge are the marks of 
anomalism. An initial, if by no means total, resistance to prior rules 
resulted in impassioned challenges to the intimidations of Christian 
moralism. The exception to the rule was the prime theme of kynicist 
hedonism, as also of gay science and of the later expressions of 
philosophical hedonism. In sedimented cultures, and particularly in 
legal institutions, kynicism engenders crisis - it unsettles - and 
relieves by drawing attention back to first principles and to the earliest 
of childhood questions: What should I do? What will make me happy? 
In Sloterdijk's paradoxical formulation: 
Periods of chronic crisis demand of the human will to live that it accept 
permanent uncertainty as the unchangeable background of its striving for 
happiness. Then the hour of kynicism arrives; it is the life philosophy of 
crisis. Only under its sign is happiness in uncertainty possible. It teaches 
moderation of expectations, adaptability, presence of mind, attention to 
what the moment offers.581 
All of which, even if one dislikes the irreverent style, seems plausible 
enough, even desirable. 
Again turning to the legal manifestations of kynicist hedonism, we 
can summarize the tradition of satirical legal studies by pointing to the 
distinctively modest theme of its twentieth-century manifestations. 
What the satirical legists have consistently fought against has been the 
prejudices or prior judgments of the legal institution. In the name of 
uncertainty and with a view to the singularity of the event, they have 
dragged the personal into the public, the literary into the legal, poetry 
into law, jazz into jurisprudence. They have confronted the norm with 
the facts, they have elided the "is " with the "ought," the grundnorm 
with its forebears, its advocates and detractors. There have been 
tirades against postmodernists, against liberals, against legal academic 
pundits, against theory, boredom, and long words as such. As if that 
were not bad enough, latter-day satirists have exposed the messy 
579. SLOTERDUK, supra note 93, at 126 (quoting WALTER BENJAMIN, 
EINBAHNSTRASSE 59 (1969)). 
580. JOSEPH ADDISON, Sir Roger at the Assizes, in THE SIR ROGER DE COVERLEY 
PAPERS FROM THE SPECTATOR 97 (Laura Johnson Wylie ed., 1990). 
581. SLOTERDIJK, supra note 93, at 124. 
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generative process of theory, 5 8 2  the immediacy of the body and of the 
emotions, as elements of law and specifically of legal judgment. Worse 
than that even, they have attended to difference and to color, to race 
and sexual orientation, to music and context as well as rule and law. 
The satirical legal scholars have at their best been highly inventive. 
They have played with uncertainty; they have mocked dogma; they 
have elaborated upon the underside of rules. The noble dream of 
freedom is counterposed to the nightmare of what often gets done in 
the name of the law. 
A final word on kynical jurisprudence as a satirical enterprise. It is 
the function of satire to be irreverent towards the norm and critical of 
the law. Whether ridiculing the pompous vacuity of public intellectual 
legal scholars, parodying the incoherence of postmodernist lawyers, 
dethroning the higher-status practitioners of transcendental nonsense, 
or simply exposing the imaginary thought processes of judges, 5 8 3  the 
satirical branch of legal scholarship offers the engagement of humor, 
the accessibility of experience, and the freedom of new forms. The 
incursion of youth, of difference, of novel forms, is what keeps legal 
studies alive. That was what Placentinus thought and what the utopian 
fictions of critical race theory resolve. No law without poetry, no truth 
without varying degrees of uncertainty, no norm of seriousness 
without its satirical counterpart and temporary nemesis. How else can 
we hold the future open? 
As an envoi, an anecdote from the golden age of satire, the 
Augustan Era, the early eighteenth century. The author is Addison, 
not a lawyer but a lawmaker, and his protagonist is Sir Roger de 
Coverley. Sir Roger is on his way to the Assizes and is joined by two 
further characters. Will Wimble is in essence the reasonable man, a 
yeoman, a jury foreman, a sensible person, and "he would be a good 
neighbor if he did not destroy so many partridges."584 The other is our 
friend the bad man, one Tom Touchy, who is famous for being 
extravagantly litigious. Tom Touchy has sued everyone, and "[h]is 
head is full of costs, damages, and ejectments."5 8 5  When the pair of 
characters fall into Sir Roger's company they place a dispute before 
him: 
Will, it seems, had been giving his fellow-traveller an account of his 
angling one day in such a hole; when Tom Touchy, instead of hearing out 
his story, told him that Mr. Such-an-one, if he pleased, might take the law 
of him [sue him) for fishing in that part of the river. My friend Sir Roger 
582. Bottomley, supra note 52. 
583. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). 
584. ADDISON, supra note 580, at 98. 
585. Id. at 98. 
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heard them both, upon a round trot; and, after having paused some time, 
told them, with the air of a man who would not give his judgment rashly, 
that much might be said on both sides. They were neither of them 
dissatisfied with the Knight's determination, because neither of them 
found himself in the wrong by it. Upon which we made the best of our 
way to the assizes.586 
No need to decide now. Judgment is for Jupiter. Absolute 
determination belongs to God. Down here, among terrestrials and 
under the rule of tellurian laws, justice is a way of talking. Human laws 
should have a human face. They should be spoken in the local tongue. 
Best, the satirist seems to say, to let the conversation continue. Which 
is an optimistic message. In this instance, the beauty of legal satire lies 
in the very ordinariness of its resolutions. Res severa, verum gaudium: 
"things are complex, the truth is simple," as I believe Horace once 
said, though I cannot at present find the source. 
VII. CONCLUSION: ON LIES 
The conclusion to any moderately thorough study of satirical legal 
studies is probably best formulated as the absence of a conclusion. The 
vice of lawyers is precisely the will to determine, end, or conclude 
prematurely. It is a morbid vice as well as a dangerous assumption. It 
plays with the absolute and presumes that lawyers can stand in the 
position of judgment or take up the place and role of Jupiter. 5 87 That, 
of course, is the nature of law and the exigency of the judge: They are 
under a duty to determine, but they are also under a duty to listen, to 
remain open, and to deliberate before judging. Satire addresses that 
moment prior to judgment in the hope of preventing prior judgments. 
The philosophical theme of satirical legal studies is thus a modest 
one. It proposes an effort to give up on the judgment of God while 
knowing full well that there is a time at which such determination is 
inevitable. The satirist in that sense behaves badly or at least 
irreverently, and endeavors to hold open the site of judgment, the 
transitivity of deciding, and to suggest that certainty is not necessarily 
the most valuable of values. The satirist is uncertain about certainty in 
precisely the same vein that "our friend the bad man" is interested in 
assessing and taking risks. And if uncertainty is painful, particularly to 
lawyers, then the humor of satire can at times placate the injury or act 
as a salve to the wound. 
To be cautious of taking up the position of judgment, to accept the 
uncertainty of reasoning and the incalculability of events, to write 
586. Id. at 98-99. 
587. See ANTONIN ARTAUD, To Have done with the Judgment of God, in SELECTED 
WRITINGS 555 (Susan Sontag ed., Helen Weaker trans., 1976). It is usefully commented on 
and elaborated in GILLES DELEUZE, ESSAYS CLINICAL AND CRITICAL 126-35 (1997). 
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humorously and in a literate way are all potentially avenues to legal 
irrelevance and scholarly lack of influence. To say that satirical legal 
studies is a modest genre, to observe that it is lighthearted and 
embodied, could easily be taken to mean that it is marginal and 
ineffective. Worse than that, the association of the satirical with the 
playful, the humorous, the youthful and different, could assign the 
legal satirist to the domain of the merely fictive, to the heterotopia of 
poetry, or the extrajudicial domain of theater. Those are certainly risks 
but by the very same token they are also signs of juristic health. Put it 
like this, the absolute is out of human reach, the serious is not always 
trustworthy, certainty is often a form of complacency, and what is, is 
open to question. 
Satire is certainly alive and well in the political sphere, and it has to 
be added that the Supreme Court is not above some distinctly ironic 
interventions and some biting, satirical dissenting judgments. It just 
goes to show that law is only politics by other and historically slower 
means.588 By that token of venue, satirical legal studies will soon be 
powerful again. In the meantime, a synopsis of its formal features can 
aid in the preparations. First, there is the question of legal language. 
Much of twentieth-century satirical legal studies had as its object the 
divorce of the language of lawyers from the reality of legal practice. 
What was said was a mismeasure of what was done. That was the 
argument of the realists, the critical legal scholars, and the critical race 
theorists. It was also the argument of the diverse critics of liberal 
legalism and left lawyering. The vices of formalism were linguistic sins, 
just as much as the incoherence of "pomobabble " was a form of 
aphasia. That, and much more, is captured in the epigraph from Flann 
O'Brien depicting the interchange between Justice Twinfeet and the 
counsel for the parties, Mr Juteclaw and Mr Faix. It can provide the 
avenue into a preliminary concluding observation. 
The epigraph comes from the first case reported before the 
Cruiskeen Court. It is emblematic by virtue of position and should be 
read as such, as the initiation of the theme upon which all the other 
cases collected are variations. The substance of the dispute before the 
Court is never made apparent. There are simply pleadings, technical 
words, exchanges between the counsel and the bench, and then an 
adjournment. The defendant's lawyer at one point considers himself to 
have been insulted and promptly abandons the case. He does not, of 
588. The current satirical best-sellers are FRANKEN, supra note 458, and MICHAEL 
MOORE, DUDE WHERE'S MY COUNTRY? (2003). It is interesting that Franken and Moore 
tend to get shelved under humor, rather than politics, but the success of the works means 
that they are also under current best-sellers. By way of contrast, ANNE COULTER, TREASON 
(2003), is shelved under politics. This curiosity of classification also perhaps surprisingly 
seems to accord both with independent booksellers, such as Shakespeare and Company in 
New York, and with conglomerates such as Barnes and Noble. 
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course, abandon in any old manner but rather, we are told, he leaves 
and then reappears saying that he wishes to apologize for a solecism he 
has unwittingly committed: 
When he felt compelled by the dictates of honour to quit the court, he 
had merely lifted his papers and left. As a lawyer of long standing, he 
knew that the correct and accepted thing was to gather up his papers and 
withdraw. He then renewed his apologies, gathered up his papers, and 
withdrew.589 
Just as the subject matter of the dispute is far from obvious, the 
debate between counsel appears rapidly to become internal to their 
choice of terms. In the hands of lawyers, the dispute, whatever it was 
in the substantive complaint, devolves into a self-perpetuating wrangle 
over foreign words of art. That is a common enough complaint about 
law, but its form is peculiarly paradoxical. The judge enjoins no Latin, 
but does so in a Latinate form and is immediately confronted with 
numerous Latinities, as well as obscure items of law in French and 
Middle English. It was stipulated that the debate was to be simple, but 
it could hardly have been made more recondite or obscure.590 It is in 
the context of this fog of verbiage that the judge hallucinates or at least 
imagines the need for a map. For want of a map, one could say, the 
case gets abandoned. 
The map is obviously enough a metonymy, a thinly veiled request 
for some approximation to what it is that is being talked about. None 
being forthcoming, the case folds. Wouldn't that reduce the docket? A 
happy reverie. It also should be noted that this strange request, this 
humorous divagation into the tellurian whereabouts of the fief in agro; 
or the space occupied by the caveat in feodo, the traverse and viaticum, 
could as easily be interpreted as a request for a text, and for a guard 
for the text, or for a lexicon or interpreter. That it was a map, however, 
has its pertinence. Whatever its details, and they are never given, the 
case concerns trespass and easement. Without an easement or 
invitation, entry onto property is arguably trespass and that seems to 
be the issue. Historically, the writ of trespass required a pleading that 
the intrusion occurred vi et armis, or "with force and arms."59 1 
Assertion of an easement was similarly direct and physical, it required 
proof of use of the property, or right-of-way, over substantial periods 
of time. Both legal concepts, in other words, are in origin corporeal or 
at least grounded in rites that took place through the body in relation 
to the land. Hence the antique term for common law was lex terrae, or 
"law of the land," and the judge, himself named after the pertinent 
589. O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 138. 
590. See Brooker, supra note Q4, at 24-26. 
591. ANTHONY FITzHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM 194 (photo. reprint 2003) (Watts 
1793) (1514). 
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body parts, the feet, flailingly calls for a map and perhaps also invokes 
Coke's sesquipedalian or pedestrian measure of law. 5 9 2  
The lawyers in O'Brien's inventive court case have the best of 
instructions and the exchanges appear to be with the best of intentions 
but lawyers will rapidly revert to linguistic type. The social object of 
O'Brien's wit is a law that cannot help itself, and which, in 
consequence, soon disengages reality and propels itself along the 
lexical pathways of a parallel universe. You know the sort of thing. 
And if you have ever been a law student you have experienced the 
drift, the linguistic tipping point beyond which borrowed words 
become your own.5 9 3  Satirical legal studies challenges that parallel 
linguistic universe, that fog or fantasy, what the Renaissance critics 
called the "tinctures of Normanism" or the baroque imperialism of 
Rome. They would occasionally deplore the hotchpot and inkhorn 
terms, and then of course they would return to them and with an 
alacrity made all the sweeter by their earlier denunciation.5 9 4  Common 
law is linguistically a reliquary, a bizarre remainder, a leftover from 
times when law was neither common nor what we generally now mean 
by law. Far from being the lex terrae in any obvious sense, common 
law, the expression of the commons and of common customs, is the 
imprint of foreign invention and the residue of occupation of the 
common law's territory. In a sense these laws are bad; they are marks 
of difference, signs of borrowing and importation that have through 
time become incorporated into the legal community but long forgotten 
by the territory and community from which the law comes. That at 
least is the norm. 
The map is a metonymy for the apprehension of the unknown and 
the satirical call for a map is precisely an attempt to attach the foreign 
words to a known geography and so to locate the bodies present, 
pending, or to be suspended. Trespass and easement imply, 
respectively, body and place. They are the ideal objects of mapping 
and the embodied cause of the case. The parallel world of legal 
abstractions has at some point to encounter the real world of events. 
Law meets the case or cause or instance of judgment. That is the 
592. One has to note that Justice Twinfeet is perhaps getting one over on Sir Edward 
who is only a foot and a half or sesquipedalian. The reference to 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE 
REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, at xxiii (1777). It is further worth noting that this is, as far 
as I know, Coke's only reference to satire and specifically to Horace (proicit ampullas et 
sesquipedalia verba). 
593. A point well made in BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW (1994). Duncan 
Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 
7, at 40, makes a similar point, namely that over time the mask becomes the person. 
594. Important as it is to have footnotes for each and every term of art, 594 and 
counting, these were commonplace terms for their era, and I will simply refer here to sources 
available in GOODRICH, LANGUAGES, supra note 103, where such themes are dealt with at 
greater length. 
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moment - the suspension, hiatus, punctum, or transposition - that 
satire engages. That is the moment of mapping, the instance that was 
classically termed chorographic, by which was meant the occasion 
when the law would dance and so deal with the living. At its best, 
which is not necessarily at its most juridical, satirical legal studies 
mimic, parody, or otherwise reenact the moment when an arcane 
language shatters on the rock of real. 
Thus Posner is much his most amusing in excoriating the erroneous 
predictions of public intellectuals. Frank was hilarious on encounters 
with facts, and Cohen aptly elaborated the dream of transcendentals 
that never left the domain of Morpheus long enough to touch down on 
diurnal ground. The same theme of transition to particularities 
characterizes the best of critical legal scholarship, of race theory and 
feminist jurisprudence. Just for the hell of it, Franken is funniest on his 
encounters with conservatives and on the lies that individuals actually 
spouted.5 9 5  The point is that whatever the satirical intent, Horatian or 
Menippean, juvenile or bitter, reactive or progressive, the humor lies 
in the legal event, the crossing of boundaries meaning the actual cause 
or encounter between laity and judiciary, vernacular and legalese. That 
is what is funny, because the satirical reenactment of the event shocks, 
surprises, inverts, or makes a farce out of what is usually and 
unthinkingly glossed over with terms of legal art of such abstraction 
that they bear only an indeterminate relation to any imaginable 
extralegal world. 
Fiann O'Brien again, and because one is supposed to end where 
one started, provides the best account of this collision of legal 
language with life. In the last case reported from the log of the District 
Court, " (t]he Sergeant said that defendant, having been ejected from 
gaol premises, was again found in his cell the following morning. "5 9 6  It 
is on this occasion the defendant who spouts Latin and who uses 
Latinate terms to explain why he could not conceivably have 
absconded: 
If I had failed to appear in this court at the time appointed, too well I 
knew that my bail would not be confiscated. Neither would it be 
impounded. (Here defendant became moved.) Neither would it be 
declared forfeit - or even forfeited. It would not be attached. It would 
be . . . .  (Here defendant broke down and began to weep.) . . .  Defendant 
(sitting in dock, burying face in hands and weeping loudly): My bail 
would be . . .  ESTREATED. I . . .  I . . .  could not . . .  face that. Estreated! 
(Here defendant blubbered uncontrolledly.)597 
595. FRANKEN, supra note 458, at 5, 218 (discussing Anne Coulter and Dick Cheney, 
respectively). 
596. O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 152. 
597. Id. at 153. 
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The choice of legal terms is wonderfully apposite. Estreat is both a 
noun and a verb, and it has a comparably profound effect on the 
defendant. Strange though that degree of affective impact may seem, it 
is simply a graphic depiction of everyday legal process. The words get 
out of hand. A word like estreat can intrude into the real in diverse 
ways. It, in fact, originates in a procedure that was intended to prevent 
harm, indeed to provide a modicum of mercy,5 98 according to the 
relevant writ; but time is the enemy of equity.5 9 9  The estreats were 
maybe common in the sixteenth century but only a Latinist or 
historian (more agni inter lupos) would know the import of the word 
now.600 Its meaning was originally to check the record by sending for a 
copy and seeing whether the relevant party had paid what was due -
the penalty or amercement - into court. The estreat was the moment 
of truth, appropriately enough in the form of the arrival of the copy, 
and thence the application of the law. The word is perfectly chosen 
and brilliantly exemplified. Logically the defendant had broken into 
the prison so as to prove his good character; he had committed the 
crime so as to prove his innocence. 
We lawyers don't deal in estreats anymore. And frankly, after 
reading O'Brien, it would be hard to use the term in anything other 
than a wickedly humorous way. The meaning would be changed, and 
that is the point. If asked to define the role of satire, of this eminently 
literary genre, in the study of law the answer has to be that the satirical 
has effects. It changes meanings, it punctures complacency, and offers 
one of the most powerful and effective of challenges to the self­
aggrandizement of lawyers and the related pretensions of legal 
scholarship. Satire estreats the law. As this history of satirical legal 
studies has lengthily evidenced, it has time and again been satire that 
has deflated the inflated, concretized the abstracted, put a face to the 
mask, and called the wayward - the prophets and pundits, the 
pompous and prolix - to account. It is satire that has made the 
weaker the stronger and, at least since Holmes found his Moriarty, the 
bad the good. 
598. FITZHERBERT, supra note 591, at 173, lists the estreat under the general heading of 
the writ of moderata misericordia, or "of moderate mercy." 
599. Id. at 174-75. JOHN RASTELL, LES TERMES DE LA LEY, s.v. Estreat. The estreat is 
listed here as well in relation to the writ of moderata misericordia. 
600. The Latin phrase is used by the estreat-fearing defendant in reference to his own 
circumstances, and loosely translates as "the way of the lamb amongst wolves." 
